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ABSTRACT
THE FANTASTIC AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR
Brian Kenna
Marquette University, 2019

This study argues that the First World War was a key event in the formation of the
modern fantasy genre. It asserts that academic literary criticism formed around a set of
assumptions that left it ill-equipped to conceptualize the fantastic as a modern mode of
writing. By studying veteran English authors of World War I, including Siegfried
Sassoon, David Jones, and J. R. R. Tolkien, it identifies the fantastic as an essential
means of representing and responding to a set of events that were experienced as
incomprehensible, even impossible. Because it offered a safe means of engaging the
events of the war, the fantastic provided a means to convey the experience to a
disbelieving civilian audience, to grapple with personal and cultural trauma, and to
critique the positivist discourses that underwrote political justifications for war. The
fantastic mode provided an alternative to rationalism, in an environment so
fundamentally twisted that it seemed to escape rationality’s bounds.

i

To Kate, for risking more than I did.

ii

Contents
Introduction: The Fantastic and the Modern World ……………………………………. 1
Chapter 1: Modernism, History, and Fantasy …………………………………………. 34
Chapter 2: The Fantastic Front ………………………………………………………... 91
Chapter 3: War Trauma and the Fantastic ………….………………………………… 150
Conclusion: The Fantastic Lens on Late Empire ..…………………………………… 209
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………….. 222

iii

List of Figures
1. Lord of the Rings Manuscripts. Box 2, Folder 19, Leaf 18, Side a. ………..…………………. 3
2. Lord of the Rings Manuscripts. Box 2, Folder 19, Leaf 18, Side b. ……………………………4

1

Introduction: The Fantastic in the Modern World

The manuscripts of J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings are held in the
Special Collections of Marquette University’s Raynor Library Archives. On nine
thousand, two-hundred and fifty pages, one finds several versions of Frodo (first Bingo)
Baggins’s journey out of the Shire, the fellowship’s travails across Tolkien’s now-famous
Middle-Earth, sketches of the narrative, of dwarven doors, notes on the hobbit calendar,
as well as their measuring system. One finds typeset alongside handwriting alongside
hand-drawn maps of fictional spaces – everything, in short, that one would expect to find
among the work of the century’s archetypal fantasist. But one sheet stands out among
these. On the front (as we might call it) are calculations concerning the phases of the
moon – that is, the phases of Middle-Earth’s moon. They indicate that on December
twenty-ninth, four days after the fellowship sets out from Rivendell, the moon is in its
first quarter. On February third, just after the Battle of the Hornburg, it is full. The page is
dated May of 1944. On the back (or the front, if you prefer) is a printed sheet labeled
“CITY OF OXFORD AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS WARDEN’S REPORT FORM.”
Tolkien served as a civilian air warden during the German bombing campaign, at the
same time as he was drafting The Lord of the Rings. Due to the wartime rationing of
paper, he often scavenged and repurposed whatever was available for his writing.
The form instructs its reader to “Commence report with these words: AIR RAID
DAMAGE.” It then outlines the information to be relayed to the receiving officer. First,
the warden is instructed to declare the “Designation of the REPORTING AGENT” – that
is, the sector number in which the report originates. Next, he is to name the Position of
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Occurrence (“occurrence” here meaning “explosion”); Types of Bombs (selected from a
list, which includes HE, Incendiary, and Mustard as well as Phosgene Gases); and
Approximate No. of Casualties (distinguishing between Serious and Minor). If any
individuals are trapped, the warden is instructed to “say so;” the same instruction is given
in the event of a “Major Fire.” Then he is to report any damage to Mains. Again, a list of
possibilities is provided for clarity: water, coal gas, electric, or sewer. The form elicits the
names of any roads currently blocked, as well as “Positions of Any Unexploded Bombs,”
presumably also to be reported by address. Finally, it asks for those public services
already on location, and the time of the “occurrence.” The instructions direct the warden
to sign off: “SAY: MESSAGE ENDS.”1
This Air Warden’s Report is the perfect modern document. It encapsulates with
appropriate absurdity the hermeneutic crises visited on the modern subject by a suddenly
unrecognizable world. As Marina MacKay points out, “the history of aerial bombing
overlaps almost entirely with the history of modernism itself.” 2 The bombing campaign
thus came to signify much of what was troubling about modern warfare: its intrusion into
civilian and urban spaces, the scale and suddenness of the destruction enabled by
technological advancement, and the unpredictability with which violence could be visited
upon the population. In Tense Future, Paul Saint-Amour argues that the anticipation of
violence, and bombing in particular, is a key feature distinguishing the experience of war
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in the twentieth century. Faced with such a novel and preposterous event as fire falling,
without warning, from the sky, the warden’s report responds by attempting to rationalize
the unimaginable. It is designed to categorize, organize, and thus contain the bombing by
systematizing it according to the same frameworks that structure modern western society.
Bomb locations are rendered as street addresses; mustard gas receives the same attention
as broken water mains. At the same time, the mass violence of a bombing campaign is
obscured behind euphemism; the warden reports an “occurrence,” rather than an
explosion, suggesting the banality of the event. The disruptive effects of violence are
suppressed and normalized, enabling the traditional British stiff upper lip.
Ironically, this suppression-by-bureaucratization of the effects of violence reflects
the bureaucratic means by which violence was being carried out across the channel, in the
concentration camps of Nazi Germany. The efficiency with which the Nazis set about a
task of such monstrous immensity as the extermination of the entire Jewish population
was made possible in part by the systematization of modern industrial advancement, as
well as technological development. This has led Zygmunt Bauman to argues that the
Holocaust was “more than a deviation from an otherwise straight path of progress … not
an antithesis of modern civilization and everything (or so we like to think) it stands for,”
but rather “another face of the same modern society whose other, more familiar face we
so admire.”3 Modernity, Bauman asserts, is ambivalent. The rationalizing epistemologies
that structure modern life are amoral – no more or less inclined to exterminate millions
than to feed them or cure their diseases. The Holocaust therefore represents not a
regression to a barbarous past, but a rebuke to belief in the progressive effects of
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civilization. It reveals violence to be less exceptional than “a constitutive element of the
very process of constructing and relating to reality under conditions of modern Western
civilization.”4 Incomprehensible violence is made possible because it is rendered in such
a way as to make it mundane. Modern practices cleared the way for “an event that even a
post-theological age could describe only in the language of evil.” 5
Bureaucracy and rationalization provide the means for the modern subject to
process extremities of violence; but what of the other side of the air warden’s report?
What relevance do the phases of an imaginary moon or the geography of a fantastic
landscape have in a century that has seen unimaginable public violence as well as epochal
shifts in cultural, economic, and social structures? Mainstream criticism has tended to
answer “none,” and to dismiss the fantastic as frivolous, self-indulgent, and escapist.
Particularly in the context of the urgent crises of twentieth-century modernity, the
fantastic seems designed to avoid confrontation with modernity – contrived almost with
its own contemporary irrelevance in mind. And yet, this page from Tolkien’s notes is a
reminder of the close proximity the two have shared. The century that saw the global
transformations we associate with modernity also produced the founding texts of what
has come to be known as the fantasy genre. It is my contention that this is not
coincidental. Rather, the re-emergence of the fantastic as a pre-eminent mode of writing
came about as writers sought ways to respond to precisely the upheavals that are seen to
have given rise to canonical literary modernism. At the core of each movement is the
question of what response, if any, is appropriate to engaging the rapidly changing
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epistemological landscape perceived by writers of the twentieth century. If the fantastic is
so often dismissed as retrogressive, it is in part because we have such difficulty
recognizing its origins in the crises of modernity, when the failures of progressive
ideologies crystalized before millions of vulnerable witnesses.
In critical studies of fantasy, it is something of a shibboleth to begin by
acknowledging the general lack of agreement among scholars on a single definition of the
term. Some version of this assertion appears in nearly every major work on the fantastic
of the last fifty years. Among others, this includes Tzvetan Todorov’s The Fantastic
(1973), C. N. Manlove’s Modern Fantasy (1975), W. R. Irwin’s The Game of the
Impossible (1976), Christine Brooke-Rose’s A Rhetoric of the Unreal (1981), Rosemary
Jackson’s Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion (1981), Kathryn Hume’s Fantasy and
Mimesis (1984), Brian Attebery’s Strategies of Fantasy (1992), and Farah Mendlesohn’s
Rhetorics of Fantasy (2008). As Attebery observes, this is in part a consequence of the
term’s multifarious uses: “in psychiatric sessions and literary discussions … titles of
erotic romps on late-night cable TV … the interchangeability of a lot of what is labeled
“fantasy” on the supermarket book rack.”6 The inescapable conclusion is that, despite the
long history of scholarship on the fantastic in the twentieth century, there is little
consensus on what it actually is. Moreover, even if one definition could be agreed upon,
popular usage of the term would likely continue to create confusion.
Critics have therefore been obliged to offer their own definitions of fantasy,
expanding or restricting the boundaries to enable their explorations. As Farah
Mendlesohn observes, this is often accomplished by “[picking] and [choosing] among
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these and other ‘definers’ of the field according to the area of fantasy fiction, or the
ideological filter, in which they are interested.”7 Perhaps the only element to persist
across these definitions is the principle that the fantastic in some way violates the reader’s
sense of reality. Charles Manlove, for example, defines the fantastic as literature which
contains “a substantial and irreducible element of the supernatural with which the mortal
characters … of the reader” come to be on “at least partly familiar terms.” 8 In The Game
of the Impossible, W. R. Irwin argues that the fantastic is “based on … an overt violation
of what is generally accepted as possibility … the narrative result of transforming the
condition contrary to fact into ‘fact’ itself.”9 Kathryn Hume offers perhaps the broadest
definition when she describes the fantastic as a “deliberate departure from the limits of
what is usually accepted as real and normal,” which she reminds us is not exceptional,
but rather is “an element in nearly all kinds of literature.” 10 These form the core of how I
define and conceptualize the fantastic in the twentieth century; likewise, they suggest its
special relevance in a time when collective understandings were being so dramatically
overthrown.
This study defines the fantastic as a mode of literature which encourages in the
reader a credulous performance of belief in the in the impossible precisely because it
makes no overt claims on genuine reality. This roughly correlates to Irwin’s
transformation of conditions “contrary to fact into ‘fact’ itself.” Tolkien himself describes
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the phenomenon in a more limited context, dubbing it “Secondary Belief” in On FairyStories, his seminal treatise on fantasy:
[it] has been called ‘willing suspension of disbelief.’ But that does not
seem to me a good description of what happens. What really happens is
that the story-maker … makes a Secondary World in which your mind can
enter. Inside it, what he relates is ‘true’: it accords with the laws of that
world. You therefore believe it, while you are, as it were, inside. 11
I take this as a broadly accurate description of the ways that the fantastic operates on
belief, and induces a reader’s credulity. The seemingly isolating quality of secondary
belief has at times been a target of critique; author China Mieville, for example, has
lamented fantasy’s “hermetic totality.” 12 But I attach greater significance to the
implications of the process, as well as its interactions with the epistemological
frameworks that structure modern belief. It is the capacity to engender belief without
subjecting that belief to rationalizing discourses that lends the fantastic its modern
potency.
If, as Kathryn Hume argues, the fantastic constitutes a “departure from consensus
reality,” then what is included in the category shifts and changes according to
consensus.13 In the latter half of the century, postmodern theory called attention to the
ways in which even seemingly solid categories which delineate reality are, in fact,
determined by ideological and discursive forces: based, in other words, on consensus.
Like Rosemary Jackson, I see the fantastic as “a telling index of the limits of [the
dominant cultural order]. Its introduction of the ‘unreal’ is set against the category of the
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‘real’ – a category which the fantastic interrogates by its difference.” 14 I argue however
that the capacity of the fantastic to induce belief in the unreal not only delineates the real,
but also grants it the ability to negotiate the fluid boundaries between real and unreal.
Moreover, because it does not claim genuine veracity, the fantastic appears not to
threaten the ideological and discursive forces which structure modern reality, even as it
probes their limits. By insistently conceiving of the fantastic as what Ceri Sullivan and
Barbara White call “involved in the creation and dissolution of social tensions,”
therefore, I aim to extract it from its hermetic totality and theorize its modern political
virtues.15 For many writers, the fantastic offered a safe, generative departure from
consensus reality at a time when consensus reality radically conflicted with political and
cultural exigencies.
I draw a distinction here (and throughout) between “the fantastic,” which I define
as a literary mode that engenders willful credulity in the unreal, and “fantasy,” referring
to the modern commercial genre. The distinction results first from taxonomic demands.
As Brian Attebery notes, the fantastic mode is a much broader category, more concerned
with functionality than which categorization; moreover, the fantastic is not distinct from
mimetic literature, but is present to some degree or other in nearly every work of
fiction.16 Second, as is outlined above, “fantasy” refers in everyday speech to several
distinct phenomena, all sharing some element of the fantastic in their makeup. The
distinction is thus a practical response to the challenge of clarity. Finally, and most
importantly, this study addresses, in part, the distillation of the commercial fantasy genre
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from the work of J. R. R. Tolkien, whose early twentieth-century work is its primary
subject. The modern genre, which has staked perhaps the most tenacious public claim on
the word “fantasy” since its emergence in the 1970s, was shaped largely by the awareness
of and response to The Lord of the Rings. So profound was Tolkien’s influence on the
genre that earlier authors were reprinted alongside imitators, giving the appearance that
even his predecessors were following in his wake. 17 This is particularly true of what is
sometimes called modern high fantasy, which generally mimics Tolkien’s medieval
setting, heroic narratives, elves, dwarves, dragons and so forth. It is therefore
anachronistic to consider Tolkien’s early works in the context of what we now
understand as “fantasy.” It would be nearly impossible to read anything through the lens
of fantasy without deriving most of our principles from the work of Tolkien himself; a
tautological conclusion would be unavoidable. Moreover, through this study, I
deliberately read Tolkien alongside contemporaries who would certainly not fall under
the heading of fantasy. The broader lens of the fantastic thus enables us to recognize
affinities between texts that would be concealed a narrower genre category. It
furthermore enables us to ask why and how this broader lens was winnowed into a much
more prescriptive and limiting category, according what principles it was undertaken, and
what was gained or lost by doing so.18
The fantastic as I define it was made possible in the eighteenth century by the
Enlightenment. The Enlightenment brought a political and ideological dimension to

17
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empirical reality in the form of positivism. Society was now ideally structured according
to empirically observable and quantifiable phenomena. As John Clute argues, the effect
of this shift on English literature was an emergent need to expel the unreal into the
isolated sector that he refers to as “fantastika”:
Up until about 1700 … we did not categorize works of art according to
their use (or failure to use) story elements that might be deemed unreal or
impossible to realize the world as normally perceived. After that point …
a fault line was drawn between mimetic work, which accorded with
rational Enlightenment values then beginning to dominate, and the great
cauldron of irrational myth and story, which we now claimed to have
outgrown, and which was now deemed primarily suitable for children. 19
Having quarantined the real from the unreal, the associated rational/irrational binary is
mapped onto temporal scales – both personal and cultural. Fantastic stories are relegated
to children’s literature and thus the fantastic is aligned with childishness. 20 Beliefs and
practices viewed as irrational are likewise associated with primitivism, creating for
rational modernity a nonmodern other against which to define itself. At the same time,
the binary is mapped spatially onto the world map in order to express the modern
Europeans’ superiority over primitive, childish colonial peoples. The modern fantastic
can thus be made coherent only by recognizing it as an implicit refutation of the
deterministic delineation between real and unreal that is a precondition of Enlightenment
orthodoxy.
Positivist rationalism’s supremacy as the modern mode of Western thought
ironically empowers the fantastic as its opposite. In, Making Magic: Religion, Magic, and

19

Clute, John. “Fantastika in the World Storm,” in Pardon This Intrusion: Fantastika in the World Storm.
(Chippenham: Beccon Publications, 2011), 20.
20
Tolkien famously refutes this principle in “On Fairy-Stories,” arguing that children ‘neither like fairystories more, nor understand them better than adults do,’ but rather that their association is a result of adults
presenting fantastic stories as the appropriate material for children, trading on ‘their credulity … which
makes it less easy for children to distinguish fact from fiction in particular cases, though the distinction is
fundamental to the sane human mind, and to fairy-stories.’ (130-32).

13

Science in the Modern World, Randall Styers argues that the fantastic category of
“magic” has been essential to articulate and maintain the stability of the public sense of a
“world under the ‘rational’ control of politics, science, [and] capitalism.” 21 Consequently,
magic takes on subversive potential as a means to undermine “reified and idealized
notions of modern identity and for interrogating the insidious binary logics and dualisms
on which modernity has been founded.”22 It is therefore at the boundary of what is
knowable via rationalist methodology that the fantastic becomes relevant to modernity.
Colin Davis’s Haunted Subjects describes the disruptive effect of the ghost on modern
consciousness as an infringement on rational certainty. According to Davis, ghosts
represent “a kind of excess or fault line within belief … revealing a gap between what we
think we believe (How could there be ghosts? How ridiculous!) and what we nevertheless
continue to believe (There are ghosts!).” 23 By interpreting modernity through the lens of
the fantastic, Tolkien undermines the distinction between primitive and modern that
undergirds progressive ideolog-ies. Moreover, because the reader’s participation is
voluntarily offered by what he calls “secondary belief,” the reader is enlisted as an active
agent in the process, and avoids the self-censors effects of rationalism.
China Mieville’s discussion of science fiction in “Cognition as Ideology: A
Dialectic of SF Theory” illustrates the slipperiness of such distinctions. Science fiction,
which is often conceived of as the fantasy genre’s pseudo-rational counterpart, succeeds
through the appearance of plausibility. This principle distinguishes plausibility from

21

Styers, Randall G. Making Magic: Religion, Magic, and Science in the Modern World. (Oxford: Oxford
UP, 2004), 11.
22
Styers, 21.
23
Davis, Colin. Haunted Subjects: Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis and the Return of the Dead. (New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 4.

14

actuality. The reader understands the portrayed events to be possible in the theoretical
sense, but not currently achievable. But Mieville tells us that this is a textual construct
which simulates verifiability: not “reality-claims but plausibility-claims that hold purely
within the text.”24 The standards by which science fiction convinces the reader of its
veracity are themselves constructed and therefore mediated by social mores and
ideologies:
To the extent that SF claims to be based on ‘science’, and indeed on what
is deemed ‘rationality,’ it is based on capitalist modernity’s ideologically
projected self-justification: not some abstract/ideal ‘science’, but capitalist
science’s bullshit about itself.25
In other words, the means by which the reader makes determinations about plausibility
are themselves determined by positivist ideological frameworks that determine capitalist
worldviews. These frameworks set the bounds of what is possible, prompting readers to
respond credulously or otherwise, within the bounds of rationality. Science fiction
succeeds by operating within these boundaries, or rather by seeming to. It submits itself
to the standard of verifiability, in the interest of rendering the reader credulous. The text
does not actually adhere to standards of veracity, scientific or otherwise. Rather, its
perceived veracity depends on the success with which it rationalizes itself. The fantastic,
in contrast, succeeds to the degree that it avoids the very question of rational verifiability
and thus undermines rationality’s authority as a method of verification.
I take J. R. R. Tolkien as my primary focus because of his formative influence on
modern fantasy, but also because of his close relationship to many of the quintessential
events associated with modernity and modernism. Tolkien was born in 1892; he wrote
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and published between 1914 and his death in 1973. Much of the material examined in this
study was written during the interwar period, although it was published much later.
Tolkien’s first published fictional work was The Hobbit in 1937. But during and after
World War I, he wrote an extensive fictional fantastic history that has since appeared in
various forms in The Silmarillion, Unfinished Tales, and the first five volumes of The
History of Middle-Earth, an edited compilation of his manuscripts. These years (from
1914 to 1937) correspond roughly with the heyday of high modernism, the predominant
literary and artistic movement of the early twentieth century. In fact, T. S. Eliot’s
description of David Jones from the introduction of In Parenthesis could refer to Tolkien
almost as easily:
David Jones is a representative of the same literary generation as Joyce
and Pound and myself, if four men born between 1882 and 1895 can be
regarded as of the same literary generation. David Jones is the youngest,
and tardiest to publish. The lives of all of us were altered by the War, but
David Jones is the only one to have fought in it. 26
Tolkien obviously would not have been the youngest, having been born in 1892 to
Jones’s 1895, but he nonetheless falls into the same range of ages described by Eliot. (In
Parenthesis, like The Hobbit, was first published in 1937). It is my contention, in part but
not only because of this generational and literary simultaneity, that Tolkien participates in
the modernist project, at least in the sense that his work is an attempt to interpret as well
as critique the new paradigms of twentieth-century modernity.
Like Jones, Tolkien was a veteran of the First World War. After finishing his last
year of college, he enlisted in July of 1915, and joined the 13 th Service Battalion of the
Lancashire Fusiliers. He notes in a 1941 letter to his son, Michael, that “[in] those days
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chaps joined up, or were scorned publicly.” 27 He served at the Battle of the Somme in
July of 1916 before contracting trench fever, a minor but persistent condition that soldiers
referred to as “a cushy one,” – enough to get you sent home, but not disfiguring or lifethreatening.28 In November of 1916, he returned to England, where he would spend most
of the rest of the war under medical care. 29 According to most verifiable accounts, it was
during this period that he first began composing the text that would become The Book of
Lost Tales, and later The Silmarillion.30 (Some, likely apocryphal, accounts suggest that
the earliest pages of “The Fall of Gondolin” were actually composed in the trenches). 31
The war had a profound impact on Tolkien, who famously declares in the foreword to the
second edition of The Fellowship of the Ring, that “[by] 1918 all but one of my close
friends were dead.”32 This “one” was Christopher Wiseman who, along with Rob Gilson,
G. B. Smith, and Tolkien himself had formed the close-knit core of the Tea Club and
Barrovian Society at King Edward’s School in Birmingham before enlisting. 33 Gilson
was the first to die – a casualty of the first days of the Battle of the Somme. 34 The pain of
loss caused Tolkien to declare, in a letter to Smith, that “something has gone crack … I
don’t feel a member of a little complete body now … I feel a mere individual at present –
with intense feelings more than ideas but very powerless.” 35 Smith himself would die five
months later.
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At various times, Tolkien identified the war as an important motivation for his
literary work. Most famously, in a letter to his son Christopher, he declares that the
disruption and doubt generated by the experience of war created the impetus for the shape
his legendarium would ultimately take:
I sense among all your pains … the desire to express your feeling about
good, evil fair, foul, in some way: to rationalize it, and prevent it just
festering. In my case it generated Morgoth and the History of the Gnomes
… It did not make for efficiency and present mindedness, of course, and I
was not a good officer.36
This passage amounts to an explicit acknowledgement that the trauma of the war
catalyzed what would become the founding texts of the modern fantasy genre. Indeed,
Rebekah Long identifies an affinity between the two in “Fantastic Medievalism and the
Great War in J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings.” She argues that they “share a
fundamental bond. In each maps are redrawn, new worlds are created, and the given is
dismantled. An unlearning takes place.” 37 What Long characterizes as a “fundamental
bond,” however, I view as an emergent affinity resulting from the changing associations
of the fantastic and warfare in the modern context. In other words, their bond is a
reflection of their common modern origin, or at least their common transformation during
the Great War. This interpretation suggests that the history of the modern fantasy genre
extends far further back than is generally acknowledged. By asserting this connection, I
argue that the contemporary fantasy has an origin point in the conflict that has come to
epitomize modern warfare. To mainstream twentieth-century criticism, this is a
contradictory assertion; fantasy is, by definition, anti-modern is its facing. Nonetheless,
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there is a clear connection to be made between the beginning of contemporary fantasy
and the war that, for years, was interpreted as the inciting event of literary modernism.
Like high modernism, therefore, it is possible to theorize the prevalence of the fantastic
as a means of navigating the representational and philosophical disruptions that resulted
from modernity.
By using the war to provide both the fantastic and high modernism with a
common grammar of sorts, I hope to interrogate the ways that critical consensus
foreclosed possible interpretations of modernity at the historical moment of its
consolidation. This method is not intended to re-instate the Great War as the inciting
event of modernism. The longstanding critical truism that bound the two utilized
“[phrases] like ‘The Lost Generation’ and ‘The Men of 1914’” to describe the war as “the
moment in which the new sensibility of English – and international – modernism comes
fully into existence.”38 The effect was to establish the war as the central motivating event
which lent shape to what would ultimately be described as high modernism. This
perspective was encouraged in part by modernist practitioners, such a Wyndham Lewis,
who argues in Blasting and Bombardiering, his memoir/artistic manifesto, that the Great
War demarcated an epochal shift. The war, he says, “imposes itself upon our
computations of time like the birth of Christ. We say ‘pre-war’ and ‘post-war’ rather as
we say B.C. or A.D.”39 Nonetheless, in the last few decades, this view has been largely
replaced by the idea that the war and modernism each represents a manifestation of much
more wide-reaching processes of modernization, which were nonetheless in close
conversation with one another. As MacKay describes the current consensus, the
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“powerful impact” of the war on modernism “is virtually impossible to dispute; that the
impact should be understood as directly causal, however, is a harder case to make.” 40
What has changed, therefore, is the uniquely catalytic way in which the Great War is
imaginatively connection to modernism. If it is discussed as an influence, the war’s effect
tends to be characterized as transformative rather than originary. (Wyndham in fact
gestures toward this type of relationship later, when he describes “war, [modern] art, civil
war, strikes, and coup d’états dovetail[ing] into each other.”) 41 Thus, I do not present the
war as a common locus between modernism and the fantastic in order to disregard these
developments. Rather, I treat the imaginative closeness between the two as a historical
artifact that has helped to shape ideas about war and modernity even as it has receded.
Implicit in this argument is the position that the First World War precipitated a
collapse of faith in the doctrine of Enlightenment positivism. The promise of positivism
is that history is teleological – social improvement and increased material prosperity
accompany scientific and technological progress. For many, however – particularly
soldiers who experienced No Man’s Land – the first half of the century demonstrated that
technological advancement could just as easily enable greater and more efficient acts of
savagery. As Mieville puts it, the period saw
hard’ and social science harnessed to mass industrial slaughter – an epoch
which unsurprisingly shattered the bourgeois reformist daydreams of
ineluctable progress through rationality … the model of ‘scientific
rationality’ that is ‘progressive’ in opposition to ‘reactionary’
‘irrationalism’ is … a bad joke after World War I, let alone after the death
camps.42
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The Great War created the possibility that progress and rationalism could constitute
oppositional forces to civilizing ideals. Vincent Sherry’s The Great War and the
Language of Modernism argues that this effect was exacerbated by the political
establishment’s continued use of rationalist discourse in making the case for support of
the war.43 This shift in understanding contradicted positivist ideological frameworks that
had previously rendered it unthinkable. By calling into question firm delineations of
epistemology, the war effected a change in what was imaginatively held to be possible. In
effect, distinctions between “real” and “fantastic” were being renegotiated during and
after the war. The modern fantastic thus appears regressive primarily because of modern
critical perspectives which temporally dislocate it. By resituating the fantastic into a
moment that is defined by the explosive and bloody failures of positivism and
rationalism, its timeliness as a means of critique can be made visible.
At the same time, this study does not attempt a broad rejection of Enlightenment
empiricism or rationalism as heuristic frameworks. Rather, it contends that the fantastic
provided the capacity to probe the boundaries of empirical knowability by generating a
state of contingent belief. The fantastic offered what Sullivan and White describe as the
opportunity “for the rehearsal of alternative scenarios from a position of relative
safety.”44 Indeed, this is the significance of World War I as a historical moment. It
created a demand for precisely this kind of critical reflection on the Enlightenment,
thereby contextualizing the modern fantastic’s apparent obsession with the past as a
response to contemporary realities.
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Tvzetan Todorov argues that connection between the Enlightenment and positivist
ideas of progress is actually rather tenuous. Rousseau, he says, distinguished humanity
not by “its march toward progress [but] its perfectability, meaning its capacity to improve
itself and the world – but the effects … were neither guaranteed nor irreversible.” 45 The
Enlightenment advocated rationalism and empiricism, yes, but the ideological apparatus
of positivism was grafted on afterward. While this is true enough, it is implicit that the
twin standards of rationalism and empiricism should be employed in making
determinations about the correct course of action, both individually and collectively –
determinations which necessarily affect future events. The Enlightenment is, in this
sense, concerned with the right relationship between the present and future. This would
not be a problem if rationalism or empiricism could produce genuinely objective
knowledge, but as postmodernism has shown, models of empirical reality identify as
objective much knowledge which does in fact contain interpretations. In the context of
the Great War, for example, Evelyn Cobley argues that the documentary style for which
the war memoirists are known conceals “a desire to contain a threat to Enlightenment
confidence … to rationalize through … their descriptive strategies” the violent
manifestations of imperialist and capitalist agenda in the war. 46 In other words, even
apparently uninflected statements of reality represent interpretations. And in a conflict
between interpretations, it is the powerful whose reality will be lent force to determine
the future. The modern fantastic, the Enlightenment, and modernism are each
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fundamentally concerned with the relationship between past, present, and future, and it is
along these axes that they interact with one another.
Why then has Tolkien – and the fantastic more generally – been omitted from the
critical conversations surrounding English literature of the twentieth century? On the one
hand, the answer appears self-evident. The content of modern high fantasy broadly
contradicts the concerns of modernism and its adherents. It is difficult to see what
relevance swords, castles, elves, dragons, and wizards can have to the century that
brought us the Somme and the Holocaust. But this study contends that this imaginative
demarcation is as much a product of the fantastic’s discursive isolation as its cause. To
some degree, modern fantasy’s nearly exclusive use of worldbuilding as a literary
technique contributes to its isolation. Tolkien himself famously declared to his publisher
that The Lord of the Rings “is not ‘about’ anything but itself” in a letter to his American
publisher.47 (Although he would later acknowledge that, at least in landscape, “The Dead
Marshes and the approaches to the Morannon [perhaps] owe something to Northern
France after the Battle of the Somme).”48 Once again, however, the model of
worldbuilding is itself derived from Tolkien’s concept of the “Secondary World,”
introduced in “On Fairy-Stories.” It is thus similarly inextricable from critical histories of
modern fantasy that implicitly respond to principles and practices established by Tolkien.
Broadly speaking, the fantastic has been excluded as a representational mode by the ways
that critical discourse crystalized around a canonical set of texts and authors. Through
their institutionalization, these were then used to delineate and enforce particular notions
of modernity in the context of literary expression. This effect was exacerbated by
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Tolkien’s late publication. Because his work did not become publicly known until after
high modernism was entrenched as the definitive literary movement of its time, it
appeared an attempt to resuscitate an obsolete type of literature, when in fact it
represented an undercurrent of modern literature that had persisted, unrecognized in high
modernism’s shadow.
The relative invisibility of the fantastic to theories and histories of modern
literature persists even after the democratizing effects of recent decades have weakened
traditional barriers between high and low culture. In 1986, Andres Huyssen’s After the
Great Divide fired a first shot across the bow of the institutionalized high modernist
canon, declaring that it sustained its elite status primarily “by avoiding any contamination
with mass culture and with the signifying systems of everyday life.” 49 Since then,
definitions of modernism have expanded geographically, culturally, and temporally.
Nonetheless, in mainstream critical studies, authors like Tolkien are often most
conspicuous in their absence. For example, in Mourning and Mysticism in First World
War Literature and Beyond, George Johnson explains that he has selected “a range of
writers [from the period] who engaged in a mystical response to mourning.” These
include:
‘Frederic Myers who died well before the First World War … fathers or
surrogate fathers who lost sons during the war, such as Olive Lodge,
Arthur Conan Doyle, J. M. Carrie, and Rudyard Kipling … sisters and
friends of soldiers killed, including Mary Sinclair and Virginia Woolf, to a
front-line soldier, Wilfred Owen, and even to a writer disqualified for
Military service, Aldous Huxley.50
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Given the range of authors and their varied relationship to war, it is striking that perhaps
the most-read author of the century who declared “all but one of [his] close friends” dead
in the war merits no attention, particularly when he is known for writing fantastic
literature. Perhaps even more surprising, writing in 1994, Kathleen Staudt argues
“modern poets have dealt with this [modern] sense of exile [from history] by describing
alternate worlds ruled by the poetic imagination. The most memorable of these, perhaps,
is Yeats’s Byzantium.”51 Staudt is here seeking to align the work of David Jones with
Yeats to establish Jones’s relevance to conversations surrounding modernist scholarship.
But Tolkien is arguably a larger exclusion. Staudt suggests that the imaginative world
portrayed in “Sailing to Byzantium” is perhaps “the most memorable” of alternative
worlds created in response to a modern sense of alienation. Coming, as it does, forty
years after the initial publication of The Lord of the Rings introduced readers to Tolkien’s
Middle-Earth, this is a strange claim to make. By the time of Staudt’s study, The Lord of
the Rings, as well as its predecessor The Hobbit, had sold tens of millions of copies in
dozens of languages. In another six years, it would be voted the best book of the
twentieth century by viewers of BBC Channel 4’s Book Choice, as well as the readership
of the Daily Telegraph, and the membership of The Folio Society. 52 While this is neither
scientific nor definitive, it does suggest that, for a sizable population of twentieth-century
readers, Tolkien’s alternative world occupied considerable imaginative space. The
specific, unproblematized claim that Yeats’s Byzantium is more memorable (as opposed
to, say, technically sound, aesthetically coherent, or some other evaluative standard not
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reflected in breadth of cultural appeal) seems therefore to necessitate a critical framework
that continues to overlook or exclude Tolkien from consideration.
This lack of a framework for the modern fantastic mode is one of the major
challenges facing this study. Because it developed in obscurity, relative to modernism, no
widely-accepted theory of the modern fantastic exists. More to the point, critical schools
that developed alongside and in response to primarily modernist (and later postmodernist)
scholarship are founded on distinct principles, derived in part from interpretations of their
literary practices. These approaches are thus less prepared to account for the fantastic as a
modern literary or aesthetic method. Brian Attebery argues in Strategies of Fantasy that
even within critical discourse, the schools of thought that have achieved prominence are
inclined either to find little worth analysis in Tolkien’s work, or else to delegitimize him
outright. As he describes it, the prominence of particular schools of theory have “forced
[critics] to emphasize elements that conform to standard literary theory, even though
those elements might not be characteristic of Tolkien’s story as a whole.” 53 The
alternatives Attebery proposes include philology in place of structuralism and
poststructuralism, Jungian in place of Freudian psychoanalysis, and ecological in place of
economic criticism.54 Although the alternatives Attebery provides offer to open new
possibilities for reading Tolkien (along with the genre he spawned), they cannot account
for the ways in which critical conversations (including the alternatives he offers) were
shaped by the absence of Tolkien and authors like him. As useful as these frameworks
may be, they cannot help but highlight the fact that forty years after Colin Manlove first
remarked with surprise, there remains no standard critical method for understanding the
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fantastic in the context of twentieth century. It remains modern literature’s antagonistic
opposite, regarded if at all as something of a tantrum against modernity, not to be
indulged lest we embolden it.
The need to grapple with this problem has shaped the works of those critics who
have attempted to address Tolkien’s work. Most often, this means searching for
productive points of comparison within existing critical frameworks – either by
identifying legitimating textual corollaries or by locating a critical field prepared to
concede modernity and engage with antimodern texts. Consequently, outside of fantasy
genre criticism, most scholarly work on Tolkien has come from medievalists like Tom
Shippey and Jane Chance. Alternatively, source criticism has identified connections
among Victorian authors like Lord Dunsany and William Morris, whom Tolkien himself
admired. Each reflects the need to find a system of signification prepared to
accommodate Tolkien’s content. But each also has the effect of temporally dislocating
his work, effectively conceding the point that he cannot be read in the context of
modernity.
The decision to read Tolkien as an author of the Great War is driven in part by a
desire to revise this a-temporal paradigm of understanding. By using the war as a
concrete point of connection I examine Tolkien’s early work alongside that of his nearest
contemporaries. At the same time, however, Tolkien creates some grounds for the reevaluation of the ways we have understood writing of the Great War. The writing that
emerged from the war is generally thought of in the terms set forth by Paul Fussell’s The
Great War and Modern Memory. Fussell argues that “the application of mind and
memory to the events of the Great War” gave rise to “one dominating form of modern

27

understanding … [that is] essentially ironic.” 55 He finds that the war writers tended to
locate a bitter brand of irony in the immense gap between the realities of war that they
experienced on the front, and the romanticized version of war presented on the home
front in political rhetoric. In the interest of undermining these falsities, the authors whose
work Fussell regards approvingly produced fiercely realistic visions of the front,
complete with the violence and stupidity that they found to be its defining features. These
primarily include Siegfried Sassoon, Wilfred Owen, and Robert Graves. Edmund
Blunden and David Jones, whose more traditional modes he views as unsuited to the
environment, receive somewhat more reserved praise. Even those he favors, however,
Fussell concedes to be “lesser talents” in the face of the high modernists. He cites their
“technical traditionalism” as evidence of a “kind of backward-looking typical of the war
itself … For [the soldier], the present is too boring or exhausting … and the future too
awful. He stays in the past.”56 The Great War and Modern Memory thus maintains the
assumptions that separated high from low art. Subsequent scholars have reconceptualized
the war writers, treating them instead as another branch of a broader modernism.
However, although Fussell’s conclusions have been disputed in the years since the text’s
publication, it nonetheless continues to set the terms for conversations surrounding the
literature of the Great War. My study must therefore be seen to be responding in some
way to his. The argument that the war encouraged recourse to the fantastic as well as to
realism is presented not as an alternative, but an expansion to this understanding.
In approaching this study, I limit myself generally to primary texts produced in
the years between 1914 and 1937. This period, beginning with the first shots of the Great
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War and ending with the 1937 publication of David Jones’s In Parenthesis, is often seen
as the heyday of literary production by veterans of the war about the war itself. Most
notably, beginning in 1928 with the publication of Robert Graves’s Good-Bye to All That,
is the litany of memoirs that Walter Benjamin describes as “[pouring] out ten years later
… [a] flood of war books.”57 This cathartic outlay of traumatic recollections by writer
veterans provided much of our sense of the experience of the front. (For example, many
of Fussell’s findings in The Great War and Modern Memory emerge from his readings of
these texts). These works, as well as much of England’s literary production during the
interwar period, were engaged in remembering the war and determining how best to live
in the new present. The end of the interwar period, with the looming threat of the Second
World War, saw a changing focus that is often associated with late modernism. The
publication of The Hobbit to widespread acclaim in 1937 also represents the end of
Tolkien’s literary obscurity. The year thus also represents the point at which ideas of the
fantastic, fairy tales, or what would become the fantasy genre, existed uninflected by
Tolkien’s presence. By restricting myself to this period, I hope to facilitate a reading of
Tolkien’s work in context of the experiences to which it was ostensibly responding, and
to minimize interference from the associations it later gained with the publication of The
Lord of the Rings.
To maintain veteran status as a consistent reading lens and a concrete point of
connection, I have chosen to read Tolkien alongside texts by authors who were also
veterans of the Great War. I focus primarily on prose works that directly concern the
wartime experience itself (implicitly contending, I suppose, that much of Tolkien’s work
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can be considered war writing). The war memoirs thus comprise much of my primary
material. These most prominently include Siegfried Sassoon’s Memoirs of George
Sherston trilogy, Edmund Blunden’s Undertones of War, Robert Graves’s Good-Bye to
All That, and Max Plowman’s A Subaltern on the Somme. In Parenthesis constitutes
something of an exceptional case in a number of ways. It is, strictly speaking, poetry, but
it contains extensive prose sections as well. It is a memoir in that it tracks Jones’s
wartime experience, yet it also contains Welsh and Arthurian myth, and replaces Jones
with an everyman in the figure of Private Ball. Moreover, like Tolkien’s early work,
Jones resists classification. (Although, unlike Tolkien, Jones did not later birth an entire
genre to retroactively embrace him). Combined with their similar affinities for
medievalist motifs in the modern context, this makes Jones an important point of
comparison for this study. Perhaps ironically, however, it is the dramatic differences
contained by the memoirs that I have found the most valuable. Perhaps the most unified
impression held regarding the war memoirists is their unflinching realism in portraying
the front. By identifying affinities between these texts and Tolkien’s early work I suggest
the dramatically different ways in which modern crises can manifest literarily. At the
same time, I offer potential for revising our understanding of the mimetic character of the
memoirs. In fact, I find instances of fantastic motifs throughout these most realist texts.
In some cases, these are figurative rather than literal, but they nonetheless highlight the
degree to which writers were obliged to draw on the fantastic in order to address and
represent an experience that was, in many important ways, unreal.
This study also draws frequently upon Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of
Enlightenment, approaching it as a text engaged in reflecting upon the interwar period,
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and concerned with precisely the epistemological disruptions that I identify as critical to
the modern functions of the fantastic. Like the Air Warden’s report, I treat it in some
sense as an artifact. Although many of the arguments contained within have fallen out of
favor, it nonetheless offers insight as a text that gives voice to the instinct to repudiate
entirely the ways of thinking that gave birth to the war and insisted on its value. I have,
however, deliberately avoided reference to the works of the Oxford intellectual group,
The Inklings, of which Tolkien was an active member. I do so not because I do not find
them useful, but because Tolkien’s work is so often read in light of his membership in
this ground and their debates and artistic interactions. I endeavor in this study to
dramatically refocus the ways in which his work has been read, and recontextualize the
conclusions we draw from it. It is my concern that recourse to this common lens will
include a return of the assumptions that tend accompany it.
Chapter One, “Modernism, History, and Fantasy,” examines the ways in which
the development of modernist scholarship of the early twentieth century contributed to an
institutionalized ideal of modern literature that foreclosed the possibility of reading
Tolkien or anyone like him as a modern author. Drawing primarily on T. S Eliot’s
“Tradition and the Individual Talent,” and The Great Tradition by F. R. Leavis, I
highlight the ways in which “modern” came to signify a particular type of relationship to
the past, which was then consolidated around an authoritative set of authors and texts
whose methods and material were understood to exclusively manifest this relationship.
This model crystalized and gained institutional force in the years between 1920 and 1950,
dominating models and practices of critical theory to one degree or another. When The
Lord of the Rings was published in 1954 and 1955 it therefore appeared both
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unprecedented and stunningly retrogressive. I argue that, even as recent decades of
modernist scholarship have opened the canon, perception of Tolkien continues to be
dominated by this impression. By restoring Tolkien’s work to its proper origins in many
of the same crises that motivated early modernism, I suggest the possibility to see him as
a modern author, even as the representative of an odd and late-emerging branch of the
new, more broadly-defined modernism.
Chapter Two, “The Fantastic Front,” focuses on the representational crisis
encountered by many veterans of the First World War who attempted to express their
experiences in writing. Examining the war memoirs, most notably Edmund Blunden’s
Undertones of War and David Jones’s In Parenthesis, I argue that the front constituted a
fantastic space. It rendered realistic representation impossible, forcing writers to draw on
the language of the fantastic to convey it in language. By considering the ways that
modern military technology transformed the environment into a disturbing otherworld, I
suggest that this representational challenge was a question both of scale and of
ideological disruption. Many soldiers saw the front as an inversion of a moral relationship
between humanity and nature. Paradoxically, this inversion was brought about by
technological advancement – a measure of progress which in positivist thought was
meant to accompany moral perfection. I argue that realistic language is incapable of
representing of the front because according to ideological consensus, it is an impossible
space. Thus, the war writers infused it with fantastic images and motifs. I suggest that
Tolkien’s contemporary work reverses this dynamic, infusing his fantastic myths with the
demonic technological logic that he encountered on the front. The Book of Lost Tales
reconfigures an imaginative past in order to account for the present.
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Chapter Three, “War Trauma and the Fantastic,” considers the ways in which the
fantastic serves the opposing demands of revelation and secrecy for veteran authors
suffering from wartime trauma. Drawing on Good-Bye to All That by Robert Graves, and
Sherston’s Progress by Siegfried Sassoon, I argue that the presence of the fantastic in the
war memoirs is not merely a utilitarian demand of representation, but an authentic
account of trauma, which is defined both in experience and memory by distortion.
Tolkien’s Middle-Earth is likewise traumatized by the persistent, continuously
resurfacing effects of its own past. The haunting disturbances caused by the fantastic
communicate the seeming-impossibility of the experiences they signify. In some sense,
then, I argue that The Book of Lost Tales – as well as its later incarnation, The
Silmarillion – represents an attempt to imagine a way of commemorating past atrocities
while avoiding paralysis in the face of their horrors. At this, I return to the modernists, for
whom the need to move forward while also acknowledging the loss of the war was of
foremost concern.
Finally, I feel the need to emphasize that this study is meant to be neither
comprehensive, nor a broad apologia for Tolkien’s work, which does at times display
shockingly conservative sentiments in the face of the changing twentieth century. Nor do
I intend to minimize the work done by medievalist scholars such as Tom Shippey and
Jane Chance, who have, for decades, found value in Tolkien’s work by placing him in
what was, for years, the only context by which he could be made available to serious
scholarship. My aim here is merely to suggest the possibility of understanding this, very
different type of response to the Great War as precisely that. I mean to open the
possibility that this too can be modern writing, and that it is – as writing must after all be
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– concerned with its own time. I present Tolkien as an undercurrent in modern literature,
rendered invisible by circumstance and critical orthodoxy. In doing so, I suggest the
utility, as well as the comfort that many veteran authors located in the fantastic, as the
world exploded around them.
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Chapter 1: Modernism, History, and Fantasy

The process by which twentieth-century fantasy was conceptualized as a
commercial genre, and thus isolated from the literary mainstream of the twentieth
century, relied on effacing its origins in the same crises that were imaginatively deployed
to consolidate and valorize high modernism. Contemporary fantasy literature coalesced
around the writing of J. R. R. Tolkien, which has historically been perceived as
temporally dislocated: engaged primarily with medieval concerns at best, retrograde
nostalgia at worst. In his review for Time and Tide, C. S. Lewis famously called The Lord
of the Rings “like lightning from a clear sky… sharply different… [and] unpredictable in
our age.”58 Though clearly meant to praise the novel’s freshness, Lewis’s language
suggests an impression from early on that The Lord of the Rings, and therefore the
fantasy genre for which it was the prototype, appeared essentially from nowhere.
Ironically, Lewis perhaps more than anyone knew this to be untrue. As a member of the
Oxford-based Inklings reading group, Lewis was aware that The Lord of the Rings was
the most recent product of a decades-long project that originated in the First World War.
Nonetheless, his language creates the impression that the text manifested spontaneously,
as if it has entered (or re-entered) literary history from the outside. In contrast, the
modernist movement was valorized in part by binding it tightly and definitively to its
historical moment. The formal features of high modernist works were exclusively
associated by critics with the social, cultural, and technological transformations of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By the time The Lord of the Rings
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introduced Middle-Earth to the world at large, what constituted “modern” writing as such
was rigidly defined in terms established by T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and their coterie –
hence, Lewis’s contention that the trilogy was unforeseeable “in our [modern] age.”
Critical discourse at the time was uniquely ill-equipped to understand Tolkien as a
modern author, and therefore engaged almost by default in delegitimizing him by
interpreting his work as retrogressive. In the time since, these assumptions were extended
to include the fantasy genre as a whole.
If there is indeed something particularly modern about modernism, it is visible in
the movement’s ambivalence toward the past. Being modern implies a separation from
the past that is experienced as newness, as novelty. Scholarly histories of literature that
center high modernism do so by asserting its status as a literary vanguard, whose
practitioners and their innovations best represent the essentially transformed experiences
of modernity. But as Paul de Man has argued, the act of imagining oneself as separated
from the past necessarily contains a reflective act. The deliberate rejection of history is
itself a type of relationship to history – one which paradoxically necessitates an
engagement with the past that is at odds with the high modernist ideal of liberation from
historical continuity. Modernity inevitably discovers the past to be “irrevocable and
unforgettable because it is inseparable from any present or future.” 59 The experience of
being modern is a transitionary one, marked and troubled by an awareness of the present
as a moment of change from one state to another. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the
idea of being “modern” has persisted throughout history, as people often perceive
themselves to be at the horizon of the future. Each era, as far back as “the late fifth
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century” imagined itself a herald of the future while nonetheless living in the context of
the past.60 Modernity’s newness is an elaborate self-deception, contrived to give the
impression of having left the past behind. The reality of changing conditions – indeed,
sometimes radically changing conditions – is mistakenly construed as a fundamental
difference is nature to account for otherwise confounding incongruities. As this and other
contradictions inherent in earlier conceptions of high modernism have been exposed, the
model of a singular version of twentieth-century modernity has been replaced by a
multiplicity of social and political experiences, as well as a variety of sometimes-unified,
sometimes-antagonistic aesthetic practices. Consequently, “modernism” has lost a good
deal of its descriptive potency as the core novelty of experience around which it initially
constellated has expanded.
And yet, the persistent (though increasingly problematized) use of “modernism”
to describe literary works of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries attests to the
persistence and pervasiveness of the descriptor’s influence. More importantly, it
continues to endow legitimacy upon those texts to which it is applied. Implicit within the
term is the sense that a given work contains some ill-defined critical mass of modernness, however slippery and ephemeral the “modern” might be. Even as definitions of
modernism have expanded, therefore, the inclusion of works within its sphere
nonetheless endows them with descriptive power. To describe a work as modernist is to
avow it as authentically “modern,” which is to say that it grapples in some meaningful
way with the dilemma of historical disassociation as described by de Man. As the field of
modernist studies has expanded, it nonetheless continues to confer the impression that
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some authentically modern quality can be identified in those works with which it
concerns itself. Consequently, the exclusion of a contemporaneous work from the same
classification argues that it is insufficiently modern, or perhaps insufficiently concerned
with the dilemma of being modern as such. Despite the field’s expansion, the term retains
epistemological force. The representational authority with which the modernist
classification endows a given work has the potential to replicate the deterministic
character of early modernist scholarship. Sean Latham and Gayle Rogers argue that the
history of modernism can be understood “as a history of exclusions… and their
interactions – hidden or in plain sight – with all that they attempted to occlude.” 61 By
considering the case of the modern fantasy genre, with attention to its origins in the early
twentieth century, I hope to highlight such an interaction, and the means by which it was
occluded.
If modernism earned literary status and proliferated through its perceived
relationship to modernity, fantasy’s marginal status has been sustained by its imaginative
disconnection from the same. Because the history of modern fantasy is understood to
have begun when modernism was already established as the definitive movement of its
time, it has been distinguished chiefly by its differences from modernism. Neither critical
theory nor practice was equipped to perceive the ways in which modern fantasy itself
developed in response to the conditions of modernity. Fantasy in the twentieth century
has its own history, omitted from literary narratives that were constructed in order to
quarantine modernism from low art and set firm boundaries around it as cultural
bellwether. Due in part to these critical practices, and in part to an accident of
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publication, fantasy in the twentieth century has been perceived a-chronologically. This
has occluded its imaginative roots in the same transformative period that gave rise to the
modernist movement. The marginalization of the genre persists beyond the breakdown of
the high/low art dichotomy because these connections remain largely unexamined.
Lacking an understanding of the ways the genre developed alongside modernism as an
undercurrent, it remains difficult to interpret its products, except as a regressive response
against modernity. Critical norms, developed from and around high modernist theories,
created the movement as the dominant and therefore determinate model of literature in
the first half of the twentieth century. The centrality modernism carried as the vanguard
of western culture shaped discussions and principles of literary valuation in general.
Conversely, even charitably-inclined scholars tend to conceive of fantasy as a
commercial genre, and as such, something of a literary cul-de-sac.
Fantasy is excluded from much of mainstream critical discourse in part by this
relegation to commercial genre. Even as narratives of twentieth-century literature has
expanded, fantasy has remained largely isolated from broader scholarly conversations. As
recently as 2004, Jes Battis has described the state of Tolkien criticism in particular as
“various interpretive realms… [which] do not maintain any sort of meaningful dialogue
with each other.”62 Still less, then, do these conversations engage with literary criticism
as a whole. This is in part a product and continuation of the history of modernist
scholarship. The modern fantasy genre crystalized in the 1970s, largely as a result of the
popularity of The Lord of the Rings. At the time, scholars were already beginning to
reconsider many of the assumptions underlying the narrative of modernism; however,

62

Battis, Jes. “Gazing Upon Sauron: Hobbits, Elves, and the Queering of the Postcolonial Optic,” Modern
Fiction Studies 50 no. 4 (Winter 2004), 910.

39

Huyssen’s After the Great Divide, which would dismantle the high/low culture
dichotomy that valorized modernist literature and quarantined it from mass culture, was
still years away. The relegation of fantasy to the status of a commercial category thus
delegitimized it by categorizing it as low culture. In her acceptance speech for the 1989
Pilgrim Award, Ursula Le Guin identifies genre status as the mechanism by which
fantasy is “excluded from serious criticism and consideration as literature… 95% of
canonical authors are white men writing realism for adults.” 63 (As I will discuss later,
even within fantasy/sci-fi scholarship, Tolkien is often regarded with a derision that is
consistent with low culture status.) The critical isolation that Battis describes mirrors and
intensifies modern high fantasy’s status as a parallel but subordinate current of twentieth
century literature. Brian Attebery argues that “even though genre ought to be a neutral
descriptive term… it is applied only to those genres whose primary readership is outside
the power structure of the academy.”64 In other words, the genre category confers
marginal status by its nature. The discursive isolation endowed by genre creates fantasy
as a stagnant literary practice, in contrast to modernism’s generative influence.
To the degree that our evolving understanding of modernism has shaped the larger
critical conversation of the twentieth century, the justification for fantasy’s exclusion
from the academic mainstream is therefore interpretable in terms of its relationship to our
understanding of modernity. If the institutional mechanism by which fantasy is excluded
from the literary mainstream is its commercial orientation, the discursive justification for
its exclusion is its lack of meaningful interaction with its time. Fantasy’s marginalization
is frequently justified in terms that illustrate the weight still given to particular attitudes
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toward modernity. In “Radical Fantasy,” for example, Frederic Jameson explores the
genre’s relationship to models of history and premodernity in an attempt to chart the
possibility of legitimate fantasy (albeit in a strictly materialist context.) He argues that
modern fantasy rarely includes the perspective of modernity; “the premodern world alone
exists, and therefore it cannot be defined as premodern.” 65 Modern fantasy, in other
words, elides the tension between the past and present that de Man argues is essential to
the modern condition, and a central feature of modernist literature. In this view, “modern
fantasy” appears to be a contradiction in terms. A literature that, by its nature, declines to
inhabit the present, cannot after all grapple with the dilemma of creating a modern
relationship to the past. In some ways, this is simply a more elaborate rendering of the
common critique that modern fantasy is fundamentally escapist and/or retrogressive.
Indeed, this accusation is often leveled at Tolkien specifically, as the archetypal
representative of modern fantasy. Marxist critic Rosemary Jackson, for example,
condemns Tolkien’s fantasy as a nostalgic longing for “a lost moral and social
hierarchy.”66 In some sense, Jameson’s argument simply extends this critique to the genre
as a whole, though he does reserve specific critique for Tolkien whom, he says,
demonstrates “reactionary nostalgia for… the medieval world,” and fails to move forward
“to the politics of imperialism and modernisation.”67 As we will see later, Tolkien in fact
does precisely this; the Great War is something of a touchstone in his work. It provides
both the origin point of his writing and the imaginative endpoint of his fiction. That this
is so rarely recognized by literary critics highlights a blind spot in critical discourse as it
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developed over the twentieth century. For the moment, however, it is enough to point out
that fantasy’s delegitimization is frequently justified on the grounds that it declines to
inhabit the modern moment.
Critiques such as these, leveled at Tolkien’s work, have shaped our understanding
of modern fantasy. The Lord of the Rings served as a template for much of what would
later become the fantasy genre. Attebery has gone so far as to define the genre as “the set
of texts that in some way or other resemble The Lord of the Rings,” suggesting the degree
to which Tolkien sets the terms of inclusion.68 Ballantine Books was the first publisher to
create an imprint devoted to the publication of modern high fantasy: Ballantine Adult
Fantasy was founded in 1969, largely on the success the company enjoyed as the first
American publisher of The Lord of the Rings in 1965. Their earliest publications included
classic fantasists such as Lord Dunsany and William Morris, but later moved on to
original work by contemporary authors. 69 Ballantine’s chosen publications similarly give
the impression of fantasy as an essentially antiquated form that suddenly re-appeared
with The Lord of the Rings. The subsequent works which formed the bulk of the genre
were largely written in imitation of or response to The Lord of the Rings. Authors in the
genre are necessarily working in the context of Tolkien, whether imitating, critiquing, or
otherwise. Tolkien’s influence on the genre, however, is not limited to inspiring
responses from subsequent authors. In Stories About Stories, Attebery points out that the
practice of writing what we would now consider fantasy persisted during the interwar
decades. Hope Mirrlees, a contemporary and acquaintance of Virginia Woolf, for
example, published novels like Lud-in-the-Mist throughout the period. Nonetheless, her
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exclusion from literary history was sufficiently complete for Lewis’s declaration in 1954.
After Tolkien, Lud-in-the-Mist was published by Ballantine as part of the Adult Fantasy
Series, retroactively giving the appearance that Mirrlees was part of the modern genre
that followed in Tolkien’s wake. 70 Tolkien’s work has thoroughly shaped not only the
genre itself, but our ability to define, describe, and discuss it. The terms with which
critics initially responded to The Lord of the Rings therefore inform the current state of
fantasy scholarship, and vice versa.
The Lord of the Rings appeared at a moment in which critical discourse was
perhaps uniquely configured to reject it. Critical frameworks constructed upon
established models derived from high modernism engendered a prescriptive discourse
that was hostile to the idea of fantasy as a literary practice. By the time Tolkien entered
the public consciousness, a narrative of modern literature had crystalized and been
endowed with academic authority through the work of literary critics. This was
accomplished in part by the selection and valorization of a set of canonical authors whose
inclusion was upheld by the construction of a tradition that meaningfully bound them in
terms of their relationship to the past. Critical discourse identified this relationship with
the perceived manifestation of a set of principles established by the early practitioners of
high modernism. These principles were observable in phenomena such as “formal
invention, difficulty, and aesthetic autonomy,” which “pervaded the assumptions of
critics on both the right and the left.”71 The authority of the academy leant prescriptive
power to these descriptive features, such that by the publication of The Lord of the Rings,
its style and content both appeared synonymous with the antimodern. That
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characterization has retained its epistemological power even as the assumptions on which
it was founded have been revised by the critical community.
The critical conversation surrounding Tolkien (and consequently the genre that he
spawned) therefore carried at its inception a number of assumptions that rendered it
impossible to see Tolkien meaningfully as a modern author. Through the process of
consolidation by which modernism was canonized, “modern” in the literary context came
to possess a necessary relationship with the sorts of formal characteristics present in the
writings of Eliot and Joyce, but not exhibited by Tolkien’s work. As a result, critical
consensus necessarily interpreted The Lord of the Rings to be nostalgic in nature, and
therefore retrogressive with regard to modernity. The ways in which the text attempted to
chart its own relationship with history were uninterpretable within a critical framework
grounded in the study of high modernism. That Tolkien’s work was catalyzed by
modernity was not apparent at the time it became available for public consumption. It had
developed in private obscurity along trajectories distinct from the high modernist texts
that dictated contemporary understandings of modernity in literature. Because of the
asynchonicity between the text’s publication and the beginnings of the project of which it
was the culmination, the ways in which it too navigated the tensions between past and
present were invisible to scholars.
Revising our critical understanding of Tolkien’s work, and consequently the
fantasy genre, therefore requires that we reestablish its origins as a product of the First
World War. Such an approach challenges the impression that his works arose
spontaneously by making visible the ways in which they grew out of interpreting their
own time. In doing so, we find that Tolkien’s work was born in response to many of the
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same conditions as high modernism. Like de Man’s modern literature, Tolkien’s early
work strains to navigate the tension of an unsustainably ambiguous relationship to the
past. It does so in a way unlike the canonical modernists whose aesthetic experimentation
carried the weight of critical authority in the middle of the twentieth century. Tolkien
engages with twentieth-century modernity by constructing a narrative of the past that is
seeded in its own way with the crises of the modern world. Locating one origin of his
project in the First World War enables us to use the war as a common point of departure.
The war shaped British public consciousness for years afterward, and in the process,
helped to define modernity for the twentieth-century British subject. While the idea that
the war served as the origin of what we call modernism has been largely done away with,
its consistent presence in the literary imagination in the years between 1914 and 1937
provides a strain that can be followed both in the works of Tolkien and canonical
modernists. By doing so, we can draw conclusions about the different strategies with
which they navigate the upheavals of their mutual present.

Theorizing High Modernism: “Tradition and the Individual Talent”

To understand how modernist scholarship and canonization foreclosed the
possibility of a charitable modern understanding of Tolkien’s work, we first must
understand how modernism as such came to signify the authoritative artistic relationship
to history. One of the necessary steps to the canonization of certain authors as “modern”
was to locate their works within a historical context. To name a work “modern,” after all,
locates it at the leading edge of history. A historical context is thus a necessary
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component to establishing the relevance of the modern. But the sense, expressed by many
of the works under consideration, that contemporary history represented a break with the
past constituted a barrier to any such attempt. Without historical context, the “modern”
lacks a clear point of contrast against which to position itself. It becomes much more
challenging to articulate the body of works as a coherent movement. Consequently, early
modernism set about constructing a history against which to define itself. This history
was often articulated and embodied in the idea of the artistic tradition. The concept
provided a malleable body (or bodies) of works with and against which modernism was
able to define itself. The strategies devised by artists and critics alike to overcome the
challenge of defining the modern in art established the terms by which subsequent works
of art and literature were evaluated. The terms in which critics were obliged to address art
developed in part in response to the demands that emerged from this tension between
history and modernity. The solutions arrived at by artists and scholars, and enforced by
the academy, created the conditions for modern fantasy’s chilly reception.
It is not sufficient to point out that early modernist scholarship prescribed
particular solutions to the dilemmas of twentieth-century modernity. This alone would
not be sufficient to devalue an entire mode of writing under the auspices of the genre.
Rather, the question is how did the endorsement of one set of responses to the modern
come to enact the exclusion of all others, and how did the process act on fantasy in
general and J. R. R. Tolkien in particular? It is a consequence of the method by which
modernism made itself coherent and was thereby consolidated into a defining set of
features that laid the boundaries of the movement. Latham and Rogers describe the early
process of consolidation as a battle for the right to define modernity:
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Figures ranging from Rimbaud to Pound were… entangled in this larger
revaluation of the meaning and value of the modern; they helped fashion
one of the earliest definitions of modern by proclaiming first that form was
the defining feature of an object of text, and second, that this new
formalism was supremely modern. 72
It is the second element that primarily concerns us here. The persistent idea that formal
experimentation is “supremely” (and therefore uniquely) modern creates the conditions
for the exclusion of alternative artistic engagement with modernity. To articulate
modernism in these terms required that it be constituted as a movement. To construe such
a group as a unified whole, principles were expressed that provided a common solution to
the problem of modernity as it was later described by de Man. These principles were held
to be meaningfully and inherently attached to the observable traits of many of the works
in question: formal experimentation in this case. At the same time, such a formulation
required an outside, a counterpoint against which to define itself by exclusion. A text that
failed to exhibit the characteristics expected of a modern work would be presumed to be
retrogressive. It would thus be under the burden of proving its modern-ness to a hostile
audience. For Tolkien, whose content was derived largely from medieval sources, this
challenge was all the greater.73
Early modernism justified its exclusivity by theorizing itself in a relationship to
the past that was capable of imaginatively overcoming the contradictions inherent in the
idea of modernity. To do this, it had to imaginatively construct a version of the past that
invited its response. To illustrate this process, I examine T. S. Eliot’s “Tradition and the
Individual Talent” – Eliot’s artistic manifesto of sorts, with regards to the artist’s
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relationship to the past. I have not chosen this text in the belief that it definitively
encompasses modernism as a whole. Such an assumption would reinforce the prescriptive
discourse against which I have positioned myself. Rather, it is because the strategies Eliot
employs here deeply influenced later attempts to understand, interpret, and codify
modernism as a coherent, enclosed literary movement. The idea of a continuous tradition,
as well as the manner in which a modern poet is expected to relate to it, persists as a
major theme of modernist scholarship. It provides first, a standard of inclusion for a set of
authors, and second, a concrete expression of the tension between past and present that
constitutes an experience of the modern moment. Both are necessary components to
defining a group of texts as identifiably “modern.” Eliot deploys the idea of tradition to
navigate the manifestation of the past in the present and construct a theory of modern art
that would later be codified and authorized by the academy. His model of tradition is
designed as a means to circumnavigate what he saw as the culturally bankrupt practices
of nineteenth century poetics, and claim inheritance of a greater poetic lineage.
Eliot’s use of “tradition” concretizes an ambivalence toward the past that emerges
from the sense of being modern. If modernity as a quality implies unprecedented
newness, then deference to an authoritative tradition arguably serves little purpose except
to impede innovation. Thus, he distinguishes his model of tradition from its common
usage. The word, he says, is generally only employed positively by evoking “some
pleasing archaeological reconstruction.”74 This version of tradition is socially acceptable
in so far as it is the object of a sufficiently rational, modern, and scientific study, which
dispassionately isolates it in the past. Such an approach reassures the modern subject of
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their modernity, neatly sidestepping the inescapable influence of the past. It reassures
modern subjects that they are “up to date, rational, well armed, technologically savvy …
[in contrast to] others who are seen as backward, savage, primitive.” 75 The artistic
corollary to this disapproval of tradition is that originality is valorized above all: that “the
poet’s difference from his predecessors, especially his immediate predecessors” is the
source of greatest aesthetic satisfaction. 76 For Eliot, however, this is a mark of immaturity
in the artist, and shortsightedness, or outright denial in the reader. He asserts the
seemingly paradoxical formula that tradition is an inherent and indeed a necessary
component of modernity:
the historical sense, which we may call nearly indispensable … involves a
perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence … a
feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe … has a simultaneous
existence and composes a simultaneous order. This historical sense … is
what makes a writer traditional. And it is at the same time what makes a
writer most acutely conscious of his place in time. 77
This preoccupation with the inescapability of the past in the present anticipates de Man’s
exploration of modernity’s inherent contradictions. It acknowledges the falsity of
pretensions toward an escape from history, while theorizing an art founded in novelty. To
be a modern artist requires conscious habitation of the transitional break between past
and present. Constructing a tradition makes this habitation possible by making its
qualities concrete.
Eliot’s ideal artist is one that most purely and dispassionately inhabits the
transitionary moment – that is, most objectively acts as a conduit between the past and
present. This relies on (or produces) artistic independence from the personal conditions
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and positions of the artist. The perfect artist displays perfect separation between “the man
who suffers, and the mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest and
transmute the passions which are its material.” 78 This does not mean the material of the
past comes through unchanged. Indeed, Eliot goes to pains to differentiate his method
from mere imitation. “To conform,” he says, would be “not really to conform at all; it
would not be new, and would therefore not be a work of art.” 79 Rather, the work derives
its meaning in part from the meaning of its predecessors, and the transformative effect
each has on the other. The tradition is a set of “existing monuments,” which “form an
ideal order among themselves.” Each new (“really new”) piece added to the collection
alters the meaning of the whole: “the relations, proportions, values of each work of art
toward the whole are readjusted.”80 The meaning of a given text is therefore determined
in part by its place in the tradition – a tradition that is successively and continuously
altered with each addition. Eliot’s model of tradition embodies the perpetual transitionary
moment that de Man describes as the experience of modernity. A fluidity is therefore
inherent in the ideal tradition’s deterministic and descriptive power.
Eliot utilizes his traditional model to endow his understanding of the past with the
appearance of objective stability. According to Eliot, tradition at the time of his writing is
something of an amorphous concept. This lends a degree of pliability to the concept even
before it is altered by a new contribution. “Tradition” is an apparatus onto which a
version of the past can be charted that renders a preferred response desirable. Eliot’s
tradition operates as a touchstone with which to create a distinct model of the past and
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anchor himself in it. The resulting picture of modernity is determined by the tradition that
he asserts. Once made, Eliot conceals this determination in the assumptions of
universality that so often underlie early modernist theory. The poet, Eliot argues, “can
neither take the past as a lump, an indiscriminate bolus.” Tradition is extracted from the
past through determinations made by the artist. These determinations, however, must not
constitute “one or two private admirations, nor … one preferred period … The poet must
be very conscious of the main current, which does not at all flow invariably through the
most distinguished reputations.”81 The artist envisions tradition as a continuity, a
narrative through-line that links past to present. The selection of valid points of contact is
not a matter for consensus: “distinguished reputations” are no indicator. At the same
time, it cannot be a purely subjective choice, as a small collection of “private
admirations” is also forbidden. The standard by which the tradition is extracted from the
“indiscriminate bolus” is unclear. But at the same time, Eliot’s assertion of the “main
current” suggests an absoluteness to the conclusion. The phrase posits a singular, genuine
tradition and grants it primacy. A privileged knowledge of the past replaces both
consensus and subjective response, or perhaps finds some indeterminate balance between
them.
What Eliot leaves unsaid is that the tradition into which the poet enters, and the
nature of the poet’s response, are mutually constitutive. Each constitutes an act of
interpretation on the past vis a vis the present, which is concealed by its agreement with
the other. The perceived shape, character, and value assigned to the tradition in part
determine the meaning of a given artistic response. Likewise, the value and meaning
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assigned to a given response alter our understanding of the tradition among and against
which we judge it. The set of works that comprise a tradition shape the narrative at the
end of which a new work of art locates itself, and reshapes what has come before. Eliot
gestures toward this operation in his idea of tradition. If you allow that tradition creates
the artistic order, he says, you must also allow “that the past should be altered by the
present as much as the present by the past.” And yet, the new “must inevitably be judged
by the standards of the past.”82 What he does not acknowledge is that this mutual
determinism destabilizes both poles of the interaction. The “the main current” of artistic
history that Eliot describes is in fact a product of selection. His earlier reference to a
“reconstruction” of tradition reminds us that every such reconstruction is, in fact, a
construction undertaken in light of what is now known. The writers of the past, Eliot says
“are that which we know.”83 But this declaration understates the precarious nature of this
knowledge with its apparent surety. Post-structuralism has since reminded us of the
unstable foundations on which knowledge rests. Eliot argues, for example, that
“Shakespeare acquired more essential history from Plutarch than most men could from
the whole British Museum.”84 Meant, it seems, to emphasize the completeness with
which a true artist apprehends the past, the statement actually undermines such
certainties. If we ask what constitutes “essential” history, we recognize that both Plutarch
and the British Museum represent constructed imperial histories. They differ in scale and
distance from the present. Both, however, reflect the ultimate malleability of history,
rather than its essential nature. Narratives of tradition, and consequently the meaning and
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worth of artistic works that enter into history, are deeply inflected by such determinations
as these.
Eliot conceals the determinations that underlie this model of tradition with
universalizing language. The tradition (that is, the tradition he identifies as the “main
current”) is the tradition because it reflects and embodies the collective consciousness of
the western world. At the same time, it tautologically reflects and embodies this
collective consciousness because it is the genuine tradition:
[The poet] must be aware that the mind of Europe – the mind of his own
country – a mind which he learns in time to be much more important than
his own private mind – is a mind which changes, and that this change is a
development which abandons nothing en route.85
The ever-accumulating “mind of Europe” concretizes the metanarrative from which
tradition is said to manifest. It is conceptualized here as a process of expansion, rather
than of movement from one artifact to the next, but nonetheless reflects similar
principles. Each addition enacts a transformation, however minute, on all that came
before, and is acted on in turn by subsequent additions. Collective consciousness imbues
the chosen tradition with authority. Pericles Lewis argues that for modernist novelists
“the idea of a national consciousness … lent an apparently eternal, if not universal,
significance to their isolated experiences.” This ideal “offered a matrix through which to
interpret events that otherwise appeared to lack any internal logic.” 86 The idea of a
collective consciousness replaced God as the presence that leant meaning to the arc of
history, at a time when previous models seemed incapable of explaining the events being
witnessed. By casting the collection of works which constitute his tradition in national
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and civilizational terms, Eliot asserts an authenticity that is immune to interrogation. The
work is no longer a subjective response to local historical and cultural conditions; it is the
latest entry in the accumulating artistic production of the western world.
In the years since the peak of high modernism’s influence, leftist critics have
called such universalizing rhetoric into question. Such language, they argue, merely
conceals historical contingency by alienating the work from the conditions of its creation.
Modernism (and by extension, modernist scholarship) had by the mid-twentieth century
been robbed of its innovative potency, becoming an institution in its own right. In “The
Ideology of Modernism,” György Lukács observes that such abstraction from concrete,
local realities goes hand-in-hand with an overriding critical concern with formal qualities.
Modernism participates in what he calls a “negation of history” that understands and
represents history as a largely static phenomenon. 87 In doing so, it abandons what he calls
“the selective principle” – that is, the subjectivity of a singular perspective. Modernism
“asserts that it can dispense with [the selection principle], or can replace it with its dogma
of the condition humane” (the universal human condition).88 This is made sustainable,
however, only by critical practices that separate the work from its historic specificity in
favor of purely formal concerns. Revising and expanding on Lukács, Frederic Jameson’s
The Political Unconscious reads in high modernism a repression of history. Political and
economic conditions are “relentlessly driven underground by accumulated reification.” 89
Originating in an attempt to navigate the demands of new experiences and forms of
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consciousness that comprised modernity in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries, high modernism occluded its historical origins through its pursuit of a purely
symbolic order. Restoring cultural and historical specificity has been a powerful tool in
recent work dedicated to opening the modernist canon. By highlighting the local origins
of such central works, we are made aware that they represent one of many available
responses to modernity.
Prior to such objections, however, Eliot’s model of the artist and tradition shaped
the critical conversation surrounding modernism. If Eliot’s construction of the modern
artist is driven by the need to navigate the tension of modernity, then the purely
translational character of his ideal artist reflects the need to defend his artistic project in
the context of a modernity which saw stability give way to uncertainty. In the character of
the genuine tradition (however unstable such an ideal might have been) the
national/western consciousness acted as an authorizing figure in place of God. It located
the authority in the artist who was seen to access to the essential human experience. The
artist was cast as a conduit for this essence. The subjective determinations made by the
artist, the specificities of the conditions in which they worked, are concealed by the ideal
of universality. Schools of criticism that later emerged from these theories carried on the
assumption of an absolute “condition humane.” The critics who would come to lionize
Eliot and his cohorts naturally, therefore, identified the characteristics of high modernism
as the qualities of definitively modern literature.
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Consolidating and Enforcing Modernism

By the time of The Lord of the Rings’s publication, modernism had lost its
original iconoclastic status. In the intervening decades, it had become, as F. R. Leavis
describes, a “public institution, a part of the establishment.” 90 A small but still varied set
of works was united into what was called “modernism” by the argument that they
collectively represented a singular, transformed relationship to history which constituted
the modern. This claim was upheld by the identification of various that were seen to
inherently signal this relationship. These traits, largely characterized by formal
experimentation, are conspicuously absent in Tolkien’s work. Thus, by the time the
trilogy was published, the critical landscape was exceptionally ill-equipped to assimilate
a fantastic legendarium into its understanding of modern literature. As modernism made
its way to the forefront of literary studies, critics sought ways to conceptualize it as a
comprehensive, teachable movement. In part, this meant finding a way to “articulate a
clear set of conditions for valorizing certain works,” which in the case of the New Critics
meant “connecting modernism to other great works.”91
Though true consensus was never in prospect, by the time Tolkien’s work became
widely known, there existed a general, if not always compatible, set of identifiers
believed to mark a text as modern. The method by which these identifiers were
established reflected theoretical underpinnings established by Eliot. By the 1950s, the
critical project was essentially retrospective. Studies like The Modern Tradition and The
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Great Tradition began to theorize modernist works within the tradition. These texts
imagined modernism as an essentially closed movement, and sought to define its
parameters and effects by locating it firmly in literary history. They lent primacy to
modernist works by locating them at the end of a continuous literary genealogy, thereby
establishing them as the (most recent) climax in the narrative of western literature. The
chosen works inhabit the modern moment as the culmination and revitalization of that
which came before. This has the effect of investing the chosen works with a singular
modernity. In contrast to Eliot’s model, however, in which genuine tradition is accessed
by the singular mind of an author possessed of “the historical sense,” critical work
amounted to an attempt to ground this tradition in consensus. The modernist canon
invests with the authority of critical consensus a singular literary tradition which has, at
its terminus, the works of the high modernists. Their privileged position at the center of
the modern moment excludes those works which are not granted canonicity, and
implicitly casts them as in some way less modern.
As critical work on high modernism proliferated, critics began to identify a set of
shared practices that distinguished modernist writing and marked it as modern. Rather
than advancing discrete arguments for every text under consideration as “modern,” these
traits enabled the imaginative consolidation of the movement as a coherent whole by
signifying a text’s modernity. They stood in for the fraught relationship with the past that
shaped contemporary impressions of the modern. In part because his work does not
display these traits, it was natural to conclude that Tolkien represented a contrary, antimodern position. A thorough exploration of the ways in which modernism was delineated
and defined in the first half of the century is beyond the goals of this argument. Such
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work has been extensively undertaken by others, and moreover, any attempt to settle on a
single definition of modernism is unlikely to be successful. Identifiers of modernity in a
text were manifold, subject to disagreement, and rarely found all together in the same
text. Though, as Latham and Rogers note, Eliot’s The Waste Land features all or nearly
all such characteristics, and is, in many ways, the prototypical modernist poem.
Modernism, they suggest, “constellated around” the poem, further emphasizing Eliot’s
influence on both the theory and practice that defined modernism in the first half of the
century in much the same way that the fantasy genre formed around The Lord of the
Rings.92 Rather than attempting a comprehensive analysis, therefore, I will briefly
consider two characteristics commonly found in critical studies of the modernist canon
that was forming during this time: experimentation, and difficulty. By “experimentation,”
I refer broadly to the strategies employed by high modernists to thwart traditional reading
practices and express an aesthetic for the chaotic present – innovation of new poetic
forms, non-representation, fragmentation of perspective, and so forth. “Difficulty” refers
to the related argument that the most distinct feature of modern writing is its tendency to
challenge the reader. In some ways, this is the experiential application of modernism’s
formal complexity – how such complexity, and refusal to adhere to expectations,
manifest in the text’s interaction with the reader. As we will see, however, this category
also relies on elitist assumptions of a superior reader, ultimately concretized in the
high/low art dichotomy.
New Beginnings in English Poetry, by F. R. Leavis, concretizes Eliot’s theory of
the tradition in national terms, situating modern poetry within and against English poetic
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history. This study exemplifies the process by which modernist poetic technique was
invested with privileged status by the critical community. Originally published in 1932, it
aims to illustrate “in what new ways the present of English poetry must now be seen as
related to the past.”93 Leavis argues that his chosen poets, “Eliot, Pound, and Hopkins –
together represent a decisive re-ordering of the tradition of English poetry.” Leavis
acknowledges, however, that the three are quite “unlike … each other.” 94 The use of
“together” thus highlights the difficulty of this position. The principle through which
Leavis unites the three poets is his assertion about their relationship to the tradition that
he constructs. To sustain this argument, he is obligated to contend that their
heterogeneous practices collectively contribute to a transformation of English literature
that is distinctly, even uniquely, modern. Such an argument furthermore requires an
exclusive interpretation of modernity on which the responses of the selected authors find
especial purchase.
Leavis portrays his chosen poets as a disruptive influence that destabilizes artistic
norms and thereby revitalizes the English literary tradition by remaking it for the modern
era. His version of modernity is defined by cultural bankruptcy, inherited from Victorian
and Edwardian England. The twentieth century, he says, is “an age [with] no serious
standards current, no live tradition of poetry, and no public capable of informed and
serious interest.”95 Practically speaking, Leavis’s modern moment begins with World
War I. In his view, by the end of the war Georgian poetics exemplified the stagnation of
the English poetic tradition that had dominated the nineteenth century. Unsuited to the
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bevy of new realities – “the ways of feeling, the modes of experience” – epitomized by
the Great War, English poetry languished in the doldrums.96 Though he acknowledges
“other very important conditions, social, economic, philosophical and so on,” he
professes to confine himself “as far as possible to those conditions which it rests with the
poet and critic to modify.”97 Often, however, poetry and criticism function as a
synecdoche for national culture. For Leavis W. B. Yeats is the exemplar of this condition.
His Yeats is a poet with roots in the romantic tradition, but one who has come to
recognize its impotence under modern conditions. Lacking a living poetics, Yeats
responds with disillusion and nostalgia. Leavis concedes that Yeats is responding
“against not the poetic tradition, but the general state of civilization and culture.”
However, he argues, this “implies nothing against holding that if the poetic tradition had
been different … he might have brought more of himself to expression.” 98 In doing so,
Leavis ascribes to his version of tradition fidelity with the broader unfolding of the
modern age, effectively granting his interpretation deterministic capacity. English culture
as a whole is waiting for a revivification that will be enacted through poetry by his
chosen authors, particularly T.S. Eliot.
Just as Eliot’s theories serves as a prototype for Leavis’s critical framework, his
poetry provides the benchmark for the renewal of English poetry. Leavis goes so far as to
locate in The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock “a complete break with the nineteenthcentury tradition, and a new start.” It constitutes, he argues, “poetry that expresses freely
a modern sensibility, the ways of feeling, the modes of experience, of one fully alive in

96

Leavis, 76.
Leavis, 7.
98
Leavis, 48.
97

60

his own age.”99 The Waste Land, however, exemplifies Eliot’s transformative effect, and
epitomizes his aesthetic theories. Leavis argues that the poem, which unites imagery of
the No Man’s Land with ancient tropes of the eastern and western worlds, best represents
the fractured conditions of modernity. Again, this argument replicates Eliot’s theoretical
principles. In describing the poem’s significance, Leavis both unites it firmly with the
modern moment, universalizes the condition, and echoes Eliot’s historical method:
What is the significance of the modern Waste Land? The answer may be
read in what appears as the rich disorganization of the poem … [and] the
wealth of literary borrowings and illusions. These characteristics reflect
the present state of civilization. The traditions and cultures have mingled,
and the historical imagination makes the past contemporary. 100
Leavis maps Eliot’s model of tradition and modernity onto The Waste Land. In doing so,
he assigns to it a privileged affinity with the modern world. The characteristics of the
poem, he says “reflect the present state of civilization.” Because Eliot’s critical model
frames the poem, its poetic methods are rendered instructive in the context of tradition
versus modernity. The justification for valorizing Eliot rests on establishing him as
supremely modern, as manifesting uniquely the tension between past and present that
constituted this modern moment. Eliot’s criticism provides a framework to do just that.
Because Leavis uses Eliot’s criticism and poetry to confirm one another, the
mutual interpretive act shared between them is rendered invisible. Thus, the resultant
picture of modernity takes on the appearance of objective certainty, and therefore
universality. This reflects the broader practices of many early critics of high modernism,
who tended to apply the modernists’ self-described intent unproblematically to their
works. Michael Edward Kaufmann has critiqued the over-reliance of Leavis (and others)
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on Eliot’s own notes on The Waste Land, particularly the credulity with which they were
read. Eliot, he argues, was motivated to create his tradition as the national consciousness
that he sought to channel. This moved him to portray the accomplishments of writers like
James Joyce as part of the same movement, despite the differences in their methods. 101 In
effect, by consolidating modernism as an aesthetic movement, Eliot endowed his
iconoclastic “historical sense” with the legitimacy of critical consensus. He appears, from
the retrospective position of critics looking back, to have anticipated the consciousness of
his age, rather than having provided its dominant interpretive framework. (Vincent
Sherry has made this argument as recently as 2003, though modified to incorporate the
influence wielded by high modernists through the critical and artistic communities.) 102
Kaufmann demonstrates that scholars not only utilized Eliot’s theoretical framework, but
“depended on [his] notes for interpreting” The Waste Land: “Having formulated their
concept of Modernism from Eliot’s precepts … the New Critics tautologically pointed
back to these works as proof of their definition.”103 This included influential figures such
as Leavis, I. A. Richards, and Cleanth Brooks, who would play major roles in
establishing critical discourse in the first half of the century. They went on to enforce this
orthodoxy in the academy. The particular interpretation of modernity by a small group of
authors (or even one) was thus granted the authority of critical consensus.
Connecting a given historical model of modernity meaningfully with the works of
selected modernist authors required critics to identify textual characteristics that could be
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seen to signify the requisite relationship with the past. These reflect the aesthetic
practices I have broadly termed experimentation: fragmentation, formal irregularity,
novelty. By virtue of their contrast to the Romantic and Georgian poetic traditions, these
features were seen to represent a modernity that was experienced by many as chaotic and
alienating. This, Leavis tells us, and not “by mentioning modern things, the apparatus of
modern civilization, or by being about modern subjects,” is how a text will identify itself
as modern.104 The connection between experimentation and modernity, observable in the
chosen authors, is generalized by critics and applied instructively to contemporary
literary practice generally:
We have … considered the poet as being at the conscious point of his age.
There are ways in which it is possible to be too conscious; and to be so is,
as a result of the break-up of forms and the loss of axioms noted above,
one of the troubles of the present age … We recognize in modern
literature the accompanying sense of futility.105
The generalization of Eliot’s historical sense ascribes an exclusivity to the relationship
between the technical features of a text and its capacity to address the modern world. The
“break-up of forms and loss of axioms” appears to be a direct manifestation of the
modern condition within the text, rather than the products of an interpretive act.
By silencing the interpretation implicit high modernism, and universalizing its
tenets, Leavis negates the possibility of alternative interpretations. Authors like Tolkien,
whose practices differed, were necessarily understood to be retrogressive, and
antimodern. For example, Leavis briefly addresses Edmund Blunden, a soldier-poet of
the Great War, and one of the memoirists I will examine in the next chapter. Blunden,
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Leavis tells us, “has some genuine talent, and is an interesting case.” 106 Leavis ultimately
dismisses him, however, because his technique is at odds with the high modernists, who
are otherwise his contemporaries. Indeed, Blunden’s relative success is portrayed as an
exception that proves the rule, a curiosity that further strengthens the Eliot-derived model
of tradition. Blunden, “conservative in technique,” is able “to draw upon the eighteenth
century, because the immemorial order that is doomed was real to him. It is not likely that
a serious poet will be traditional in that way again.”107 To sustain his analytic framework,
Leavis is obliged to apply hierarchical and chronological qualifiers to Blunden’s work.
Blunden is, after all, a contemporary of Eliot and Pound. He does not share their
practices; therefore in order to sustain an all-encompassing historical model which posits
a bankrupt tradition, Leavis must conclude that Blunden will be the last “serious” poet to
practice his methods. In fact, he goes further and suggests Blunden is “at any rate
significant enough to show up the crowd of Georgian pastoralists,” establishing a clear
hierarchy among the Georgian poets, Blunden, and the modernists, with the high
modernists on top.108 The textual features of the high modernists are intertwined with
standards of timeliness, novelty, and quality. To lack these features is to be less modern,
less appropriate to the time, and therefore inferior – even backwards.
Contemporaneous texts that failed to exhibit the requisite features of modern
literature had to be something else in order to avoid destabilizing the category. The
high/low art dichotomy fulfilled this function. To sustain the singular valorization of high
modernism as the only appropriate response to modernity, critics had to find justification
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for the exclusion of, as Latham and Rogers put it, “the enormous diversity of twentiethcentury art and literature.”109 Andreas Huyssen argues that this process reflects “an
anxiety of contamination by [modernism’s] other: an increasingly consuming and
engulfing mass culture.”110 The low art category provided a repository for art that did not
display the characteristics established by modernism. The division emerged in part from
high modernism’s principle of autonomy – the paradoxical separation of the art object
from its political environment. This allowed the lion’s share of cultural production to be
relegated to the category of mass culture. Marxist critics like Theodor Adorno would later
argue that this division reflected the ability of non-representative modern art to confound
the uncritical consumption that was associated with mass culture. By estranging the
subject from reality, he reasoned, modern art had the potential to suggest genuine
alternatives to a world order defined by the capitalist system. 111 But the boundary
between low and high art was initially constituted in terms of sophistication.
Critical discourse surrounding the high/low art dichotomy stratified oppositional
traits like difficulty vs. clarity, the sophisticated vs. plain reader, and maturity vs.
childishness, and aligned them in support of high modernist aesthetic principles. To be
modern was to embrace difficulty and the sophisticated reader; to be otherwise was to be
antiquated, and thus consigned to the category of low art. As early as 1927, A Survey of
Modernist Poetry, by Laura Redding and Robert Graves, explicitly identified difficulty –
that is, a perceptible increase in challenge posed to the reader – as a defining
characteristic of modern poetry. This study is one of the earliest to refer in print to the
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poetry of Eliot’s coterie as “modernism.” Nonetheless, it is already engaged in justifying
the exclusion of other contemporary writing. Redding and Graves contextualize this
emergence of difficulty as a guiding aesthetic principle by exploring its relationship to
the works of the past. Here, the past is personified by what they call “traditional poetry:”
poetry not characteristically “modernist” presents no difficulty for the
plain reader; for the complaint against modernist poetry turns on its
differences from traditional poetry. 112
The traditional strain against which Redding and Graves define modernism here is not
Eliot’s sprawling western tradition, but the more recent practices of Victorian poetry. (It
should be noted, however, that the tradition Eliot articulates largely omits the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, arguably as a tactic to liberate his work from the standards of
their practices.)113 Victorian poetry, they argue “domesticat[ed] itself in order to be
received into the homes of the ordinary reading public,” and as a result grew “so tame, so
dull, that it ceased to compete with other forms of social entertainment.” 114 Modernist
technique is defended as a response against this tendency.
This perceived deficiency of sophistication is levied as an accusation of sorts
against the reading habits of a projected general public. Redding and Graves’s argument
relies on the concept of “the plain reader” – a hypothetical untrained, casual consumer of
poetry. This is the reader who has learned reading habits from “domesticated” Victorian
poetry. With their readerly habits stuck in the past, the plain reader is unprepared to
engage modern works: “even traditional poetry, it is sometimes charged, has a tendency
to withdraw itself from the plain reader. But the sophistications of advanced modern
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poetry seem only to make the breach wider.” 115 Because modern poetry is conceived as a
progressive response to traditional poetry, it is described as “advanced.” Consequently,
those elements which obscure meaning from the reader are “sophistications.” If
modernist poetry is characterized by its inaccessibility, it is therefore also set within a
presumed hierarchy of sophistication. In this framework, the modern text is the standard,
and the traditional text is regressive. Likewise, the reader who prefers a text perceived as
traditional (in form or content) is necessarily perceived as unsophisticated.
The high art/low art structure was essential to the elevation of high modernists to
the status of literary exemplars. But it depended on this fundamentally elitist distinction
between the expert and common reader. Leavis asserts that the “ordinary cultivated
reader” has ceased “to be able to read poetry.” But unlike Redding and Graves, his culprit
is not regressive Victorianism. Rather, Leavis blames mass culture itself. He attributes
the lack of sophistication to “the perpetual avalanche of print,” against which the public
“has had to acquire reading habits that incapacitate [them] when the signals for
unaccustomed and subtle responses present themselves.” 116 Although they disagree on
the proximate cause, Redding, Graves, and Leavis concur that the average English reader
is in some way deficient. Thus, the high modernists’ iconoclasm is justified; a reader (or
writer) who favors other practices is merely the victim of their own lack of sophistication.
By aligning high modernist practices with sophistication, maturity, and progress, critics
permitted themselves to dismiss the vast majority of written mass culture as irrelevant.
Those texts which did not meet the established criteria were delegitimized, as were their
readers. (The delegitimization of fantasy literature would later be carried out along
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similar grounds, dismissing it as “childish” or “juvenile.”) Despite representing a
relatively small amount of the contemporary cultural production, high modernism came
to be regarded as the representative interpretation of its time.
The universalizing principle of artistic autonomy subjected all cultural production
to the standards of high modernism by concealing the limits and subjectivities of the high
modernist perspective. By elevating high modernism to the pinnacle of contemporary
culture, critical discourse effectively silenced a considerable portion of contemporary
English experiences by delegitimizing writing that sought to represent them. By
consigning writing that failed to practice high modernist technique to the allencompassing, all-marginalizing categories of “low art” and “mass culture,” critics
concretized and enforced the impression that high modernism represented the only
credible interpretation of twentieth-century modernity. Alternative perspectives could be
written off as inferior, behind the times, and thus unworthy of consideration. The best a
contrary author could hope for was the grudging acknowledgement of talent, combined
with the assertion of ultimate irrelevance, that Edmund Blunden received from Leavis.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, critics began teasing out some of the
limits of the modernist canon and the ways in which they shaped the understanding of
modernity that it conveyed. Scholars have observed that high modernism was uniformly
male, white, and addressed from the colonial center. Paul Fussell and Jay Winter have
argued that the exclusively civilian perspective of the English high modernists creates a
key limitation in a period that was deeply affected by the military action of the Great
War.117 Allen Frantzen and Elizabeth Vandiver have more explicitly argued against the
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model of a defunct tradition, reinvigorated by the high modernists. They suggest that high
modernism’s prominence has concealed the fact that, for the majority population of the
“plain reader,” the tradition remained vital even into high modernism’s heyday. In 1986,
Andreas Huyssen’s After the Great Divide dismantled the high/low art apparatus that
justified the excision of mass culture from the modernist canon, and which sustained so
many of the attendant exclusions. Huyssen argues that mass culture was separated from
modernism precisely because it threatened to undermine the perceived universality
ascribed to high modernism’s version of modernity. The obscurity and difficulty of high
modernist technique served mainly to give the appearance of separation from mass
culture and everyday life. The advent of postmodernism, however, rendered the
distinction meaningless. As a result of these scholars and others, the modernist canon has
expanded to include the diverse and often incompatible perspectives of those authors
whose modern experiences were not represented by the high modernists, as well as forms
rejected by the practitioners of high modernism. The effect has been to divest high
modernism of much of its prescriptive power. “Modernism” has taken on a meaning that
we might call kaleidoscopic. It shifts and changes, depending on the angle from which
one views it, seemingly oriented around a stable core and yet apparently remade by the
moment as one’s perspective changes.
What is curious, therefore, and the question I will take up in the next section of
this chapter, is why this expanding canonical inclusion continues to be withheld from J.
R. R. Tolkien, particularly given the scope of his influence. Tolkien, it practically goes
without saying, is low art. Romantic narrative, straightforwardly told, has little apparent
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affinity with the practices of high modernism. Likewise, the idea of fantasy connotes an
escapism much like Leavis accuses Edmund Blunden of indulging in. It is easy to see
why scholars rejected Tolkien on the initial publication of his work. But despite the
recent dissolution of the high/low art dichotomy, he remains largely unexamined as a
contemporary of the modernists. This is in part because his work remains so difficult to
integrate into narratives of twentieth century literary criticism. Lacking historical
grounding, The Lord of the Rings still seems to emerge as if from nowhere. Without
returning it to its historical context, we lack the ability to recognize in Tolkien another
interpretation of his time, to place him within the kaleidoscope of modernism.

Fantasy as a Modern Phenomenon

Fantasy’s exclusion from the legitimacy enjoyed by this literary elite was largely
achieved by imaginatively disconnecting it from its roots in twentieth-century modernity.
In the critical discourse that was constructed around high modernism, fantasy literature is
not generative; it speaks to and reflects primarily itself. Describing the relationship
between The Lord of the Rings and modern fantasy, Edward James asserts that it “looms
over all the fantasy written in English.” Tolkien is something like an overbearing parent:
“most subsequent writers of fantasy are either imitating him or else desperately trying to
escape his influence.”118 The binary James creates – either bland imitation or desperate
escape – neatly illustrates the gap that persists between genre and mainstream literature.
Eliot asserts the transformative capability of the artist on the material of their
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predecessors in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” as does Ezra Pound with his
famous imperative to “make it new.” James, however, identifies no space for this
positive, generative model of influence; writers following in Tolkien’s footsteps must be
either imitating him or rejecting him. Moreover, this dichotomy is inflected by
established values of each possibility. Shallow imitation carries the presumption of
inferior artistry, while resistance to one’s predecessors suggestions a denial of the
precursor text’s value. Remember also that this dynamic is appearing in the work of a
critic who is sympathetic to the value of modern fantasy. But, because it operates within
the strictures of a critical history that resists the place of fantasy in modern literary
discourse, it lacks the tools to positively interpret Tolkien’s literary practices.
If modernism grew initially through the imaginative extrapolation and application
of the high modernist movement’s self-declared principles, the modern fantasy genre was
constructed retrospectively. It has become almost a cliché at this point to begin a booklength study of the genre by taking up the problem of how to define fantasy. Farah
Mendlesohn has said that critics tend to “pick and choose” among various definitions of
fantasy, depending on “the area of fantasy fiction, or the ideological filter, in which they
are interested.” Rarely if ever do scholars simply point to a stable definition with which
they agree.119 This is a symptom of the way that the fantasy genre took shape. Brian
Attebery describes nearly all modern definitions of fantasy as “descriptions after the fact;
that is, the critic assembles a body of texts that somehow seem to fit the term and
describes the common feature or features.”120 Contrast this with our examination of how
modernism was consolidated, above. The body of works that were understood as
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“modernist” are defined outwardly. A set of principles, received from Eliot and other
practitioners of the movement, comes first. Through their application (however uneven it
may be) a body of texts is selected. Fantasy, however, is defined retrospectively. A body
of works which “seem somehow to fit” are selected first, and standards are derived from
them. The standards, clearly, will vary wildly with the selection of texts. But because of
its retrospective construction, the genre appears to be static. The texts have been selected
according to perceived similarities before an evaluation takes place. This hinders our
ability to conceive of modern fantasy in conversation with something other than itself.
Because common traits are derived from a set of texts, those traits which disrupt the unity
of the set are less likely to be remarked upon, as they tell us less about the group as a
whole. On the other hand, commonalities with (for example) modernism are likely to be
suppressed. Modernism is thus seen to emerge through meaningful response to the
external world that manifests in its characteristic experimentation, whereas fantasy is
understood merely to share a set of static traits. It is thus almost impossible to mount a
defense of fantasy (an act which, of course, presumes the need for defense) outside the
terms of the discourses it is being defended against.
The critical conversation surrounding The Lord of the Rings manifests the effects
of this self-reflective definition. The influence of LotR is so pervasive that most critical
discussions concerning “fantasy” are, to some degree or other, about this text. Attebery
has described it as the “mental template” of fantasy for readers in English. 121 Given the
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extent of its publication, we might suggest the same for other languages as well. The
presents a problem which Attebery does not quite acknowledge, however. Namely, any
discussion of The Lord of the Rings as modern fantasy is complicated by the fact that the
genre is incomprehensible outside the terms of The Lord of the Rings. The examination of
LotR as an example of fantasy is tautological, almost redundant. Moreover, it illustrates
the problems created by the genre’s historical dislocation. Studying The Lord of the Rings
as an example of the fantasy genre ignores the reality that the genre (as we conceive of it
now) did not exist to be participated in when Tolkien wrote. It was only subsequently
developed in response to and in the context of Tolkien’s own work. On the other hand, if
the current genre coalesced around LotR, a study of the text’s history could offer insight
into the genre’s construction, particularly as it relates to its imaginative and discursive
separation from mainstream literature. But in the case of LotR, the text’s origins predate
the text itself – a fact whose consequences have often gone unexamined. The Lord of the
Rings emerges from – and was imagined and composed in the context of – a larger body
of texts. The composition of this larger body began in and around Tolkien’s time as a
signal officer in the First World War. The text of LotR (and the influence it enjoys on the
fantasy genre) is inflected, sometimes invisibly, through the lens of this ongoing creative
project.
The critical tendency to overlook the connections between Tolkien’s writing and
the Great War is in part the result of his texts’ publication history. Tolkien’s work was
published (nearly) in the opposite order of its completion. The Silmarillion, mostly
composed prior to The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings, was published in 1977 – more
than twenty years after The Return of the King. The original, and in some cases still the
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most complete versions of the legendarium were published later still. Many of these saw
posthumous publication as incomplete, heavily-edited manuscripts. By the time the lion’s
share of Tolkien’s work became available, scholarly consensus had already settled his
reputation based on prescriptive standards that took no account of him. The result is that
Tolkien criticism (and consequently, scholarship on modern fantasy) has at times an
oddly a-chronological bent. For example, consider Colin Manlove’s Modern Fantasy –
published in 1978, one of the earliest scholarly studies of both the modern fantasy genre
and Tolkien in particular. Manlove draws conclusions roughly in keeping with what we
would expect when subjecting The Lord of the Rings to critical standards established by
studies of high modernism: the text represents a reaction against the modern, it is
nostalgic, retrogressive, and so on.122 Despite the space he dedicates to Tolkien, however,
consideration of the larger body of work is limited to two mentions:
Tolkien was however able to begin writing “The Silmarillion” when
invalided out from the Somme in 1916.
And
Behind this, The Silmarillion’ continued and one day (it seems to have
been in 1930) while in the midst of the ‘agony’ of marking exam scripts
for extra money, Tolkien turned to a blank page in an exam book and
wrote, ‘In a hole in the ground there lived a hobbit.’123
While, in the first instance, Manlove acknowledges the close connections between the
work’s genesis and the events of the Somme, he considers the implications of this
relationship no further. Later, The Silmarillion is presented merely as pretext to The
Hobbit, barely more than a footnote to provide bibliographical data. In fact, the textual
history suggests that The Hobbit’s connection to the legendarium was built in
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retroactively. In the earliest design, the relationship was limited to the borrowing of
names. Ironically, therefore, Manlove’s formulation of an incidental relationship between
the two was technically correct, but not for the reasons he imagined. Manlove is writing
here in 1975, two years before the publication of The Silmarillion. His formulation is not
the result of critical oversight; the material was simply not available to him. As a result,
however, a foundational text on the modern fantasy genre draws conclusions about its
foundational practitioner without knowledge of the full text, and without theorizing its
origins or its modern context.
Implicit in this argument is the belief that Tolkien’s work, unified as it is by a
single fictional continuity, is most appropriately read as one immense text. This is
complicated at many points by the existence of multiple, sometimes contradictory
versions, and greater weight must naturally be given to those selected for publication.
Undeniably, however, certain themes persist. The texts are meant to be read in context of
one another, to reflect and resonate with one another more directly than two unconnected
works from the same author. An analysis which lacks this context is at times doomed to
misinterpretations, some of which fundamentally misconstrue the nature of the text’s
various figures. For example, Manlove’s discussion of immortality (and consequently
time) in The Lord of the Rings is determined largely by a lack of full knowledge of the
text:
To heighten [a sense of the wearing action of time], Tolkien has given
varying degrees of longevity to the different races: hobbits live at most
130 years, mortal men can live more (Aragorn dies at 190), dwarves have
a maximum of 250, Elves live much longer – indeed the High elves or
Eldar have been granted ‘immortality within the walls of the world’ … All
of them are in one way or another mortal: though the elves do not die
naturally, they can be slain (as was Elendil at the battle of Dagorlad) or
their purpose in continuing to live in Middle-Earth can fade (as happens
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with the destruction of the Ring). The Ents devolve through time into
trees; even Bombadil would be overthrown if Sauron recovered the
Ring.124
While one of the misconceptions in this selection is the product of careless reading
(Elendil was not an elf) most simply result from incomplete access to the fictional context
in which the assertions are made. Briefly: hobbits seem to be of a type with mortal men;
Aragon’s lifespan is not usual but a result of his own remarkable history; all elves are
immortal, not only high elves; elves are not slain, strictly speaking, not at least in the
same final way as humans; the fading of the high elves is not a result of the Ring, rather
the rings held off a natural process; and the change of Ent to tree is not conceptualized as
a devolution. The context needed to interpret these elements are contained not within The
Lord of the Rings, but in earlier materials like The Silmarillion, from which the later texts
are derived.
No one of Manlove’s misapprehensions here is damning. In fact, most are
reasonable interpretations of the material, given the partial access to the text that Manlove
(as well as the reading public) had. Taken as a whole, however, they produce a
misreading of Tolkien’s interpretations of both death and time – two of the most
prevalent themes in his work. This reading misses, for example, that the difference
between the life and death of men and elves is a matter of type, rather than quantity. Also,
Tolkien’s conception of time is strictly material; consistently throughout his work, time is
wedded in one way or another to the physical processes of the world. This is emphasized
by the presence of a metaphysical plane that stands outside of both time and the material
world. Without access to the material that establishes these principles, Manlove asserts
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that the features he describes exist to heighten “a sense of mortality and the wearing
action of time.”125 He interprets them, in other words, as markers of anti-modern
nostalgia, signifying a desire to return to a fuller time located in some indistinct past.
They appear to represent a straightforward degeneration from a previous golden age, to
which the author longs to return. While seemingly reasonable, this conclusion is
symptomatic of the retrospective process by which modern fantasy is defined. Manlove
identifies prominent features of the text, but lacks the historical context to explain why
and how they developed. He therefore diagnoses their function according to the terms
established by modernist criticism. In these terms, the text appears to be resurrecting old
forms in the interest of wish-fulfillment, rather than critique. The features Manlove
identifies, as well as the outmoded form and seemingly antiquated content, appear to be
reactions against modernism, because it is not apparent that they developed
contemporaneously with modernism. Because the assumptions that underlie Manlove’s
critical approach prescribe a particular response to modernity, his analysis cannot allow
the text to stake its own claim on the experience. In many ways, this would provide the
model for much of the later criticism of the genre.
When the text’s twentieth-century origins are acknowledged, they are often used
as a means of attack, rather than a point for consideration. In these instances, we can
observe the antagonistic nature of the assumptions that underlie a prescriptive model of
modern literature. This antagonism persists even outside the discourse of the academy.
Consider this critique of Tolkien by Richard Morgan (himself a fantasy author):
The great shame is, of course, that Tolkien was not able (or inclined) to
mine this vein of experience [WWI] for what it was really worth … I
suppose it’s partially understandable – the generation who fought in the
125
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First World War got to watch every archetypal idea they had about Good
and Evil collapse in reeking bloody ruin around them. It takes a lot of
strength to endure something like that and survive, and then to re-draw
your understanding of things to fit the uncomfortable reality you’ve seen.
Far easier to retreat into simplistic nostalgia for the faded or forgotten
values you used to believe in.126
From the retrospective position, Tolkien’s interpretation of the events of his own life is
incorrect, because the standard modernist interpretation has been upheld, legitimized, and
enacted exclusively for decades since. In other words, the critical discourse that has been
constructed in the intervening years invites, and, from some perspectives, necessitates
Morgan’s critique. His complaint echoes the early assertions of Graves and Redding. It
assumes the sophistication of a particular response, and therefore the childishness of
those who would indulge another. Morgan even suggests that ages twelve to fourteen
strike him as “about the right age to read and enjoy [Tolkien’s] stuff.” 127 But this is not a
mid-century scholar passing judgment; rather, it is a fellow writer of modern fantasy!
This reflects the pervasiveness and persistence of such broadly-held beliefs concerning
the nature and value of literature; Morgan seems almost to echo Redding and Graves,
some eighty years later. These truisms are available as an easy means of critique, but they
decline to account for the process by which alternative writing practices developed
alongside high modernism. Most importantly, they preclude the critical examination of
these texts by reducing them to their simplest, most binary form. They elide the
possibility that Tolkien’s work is not so easily reduced to good versus evil, that it is about
the experiences in question, because – they assume – if it were more complex, it would
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be written in the manner understood to signify an appropriate response. Because these
texts are unlike the authorized forms of twentieth century literature, that difference is
presumed to be the single most important thing about them; they must, therefore, be
reactionary in nature.
But another critical discourse more subtly, and arguably more pervasively,
separates Tolkien’s texts from their time: the model of world-building. I say “more
pervasive,” because critical concern with world-building as a literary practice appears
almost exclusively within criticism of the fantasy genre. The term refers to the
construction of a persistent fictional world that serves as a backdrop for fantasy stories.
This world (“Arda,” in Tolkien’s case) maintains continuity between events and provides
depth to the narrative setting. The author often provides the world with the trappings of
concrete existence, such as histories, maps, locations, characters, and artifacts that do not
directly relate to the immediate narrative. Edward James has argued that the invention of
world-building was “Tolkien’s greatest achievement,” adding the important caveat “in
retrospect.” In retrospect, because world-building “has become so standard in modern
fantasy that it is not easy to realize how unusual it was before Tolkien.” 128 This creates
two problems. First, the ubiquity of the technique among Tolkien’s imitators has (as
James acknowledges, and as is suggested above) hindered the critic’s ability to evaluate
the ways it developed prior to its wider adoption. It becomes much more difficult to
consider Tolkien in any way except “in retrospect.” Second, with the secondary world as
the foremost issue under critical consideration, the text’s relationship to the real-world
conditions of its writing is suppressed. The persistent secondary world means that the text
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is capable of providing its own context, via China Mieville’s “hermetic totality.” 129 It
becomes possible, even easier, to consider the text primarily in relation to its own,
internal world. The reality that the “world” in question is an element within the text itself
is suppressed. This is exacerbated by the text’s extreme remove from mimetic practice:
the dissimilarity between the secondary and the primary (real) worlds. The text’s
interactions with the external world, and with its own time, are occluded by critical
discourses already inclined to view it as escapist and therefore illegitimate.
Admittedly, the study of the secondary world has the benefit of being supported
by Tolkien’s own espoused concerns. In his essay, “On Fairy-Stories,” Tolkien identified
as his artistic ambition the creation of a fully-realized and believable fictional world. 130
Moreover, I argue above that critics have been in error by not considering the context
provided by Tolkien’s wider body of writing. These of course include, and even concern
themselves primarily with, the construction of his secondary world. But I make a
distinction here in the method of their consideration. My concern is the degree to which
critical practice imaginatively separates Tolkien’s work from the time and place of its
production. A methodology that over-privileges the fictional world and treats it as selfcontained equally separates the text from its reality as one that ignores both. In fact,
Tolkien conceived of his secondary world not as an abstracted fictional space, but as an
imaginative prehistory for our own world. The distinction between Tolkien’s fictional
construct and the world in which it was composed is nebulous by design; a complete
analysis can assume the difference to be neither complete nor irrelevant. James argues
that this prehistorical conception “is not sustained, and to all intents and purposes,
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Middle-Earth is a separate creation, operating totally outside the world of our
experience.” He cryptically acknowledges, however, that the published work “retains the
hint” of this formulation.131 Indeed, the early drafts of Tolkien’s work occur within a
literal map of Europe. Analogous locations stand in for the modern counterparts. The
“Lonely Isle,” for example, is an imagined ancient England – right down to an
identifiable proto-Warwickshire. Its visitation by Eriol (later Ælfwine), a sailor from the
continent, provides the inciting event for the revelation of the secret history that
constitutes Tolkien’s fictional narrative. Subsequent versions increased the degree of
abstraction, until the relationship was diminished to the purely linguistic – what Tom
Shippey describes as “a literary calque.”132
However, while the precise points of connection shifted, this imagined continuity
with the living world seems to have persisted until the end of Tolkien’s life. After the
publication of The Lord of the Rings, he went so far as to attempt a radical reorganization
of his mythic cosmology with the intention of bringing it in line with modern
astronomy.133 Later still, he revisited the concept of a mainland European sailor
stumbling into his fantastic world. Despite the imaginative abstraction applied to Arda by
this period, the manuscript refers to the translation of his myths into modern English by
Ælfwine, complete with reference to Queen Elizabeth I and II. 134 Evidence of these
connections is nonetheless largely absent from the popular published material. Other than
vague cultural similarities between, for instance, hobbits and Georgian bourgeois or
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Rohan and the Anglo-Saxon kingdom of Mercia, nothing in The Lord of the Rings or The
Hobbit suggests a connection between Middle-Earth and European history. Again, this is
partially the result of publication history, and partially the result of the text’s
construction. The Silmarillion was conceived on one level as a document within
Tolkien’s fictional world, and on another level as a digestible summary of much of what
he had previously written. The earliest version of Tolkien’s legendarium, The Book of
Lost Tales, was a more expansive, detailed account. The text presented as a collection of
individual, linked stories, rather than a single continuous narrative. Emphasizing their
perceived independence, Tolkien would later treat selected individual tales poetically.
These included the Lay of Leithien and the Lay of the Children of Hurin. The earliest text
referred to as the Silmarillion was written between 1926 and 1930, nearly a decade after
the original composition, and was designed to be a brief sketch of the larger
mythology.135 Within the legendarium, the Silmarillion is described as an extant text
received by Ælfwine and translated into modern English. 136 The Silmarillion thus
embodies the connections between Tolkien’s fiction and the modern world. However, by
the time it was published in 1977, The Lord of the Rings had established the fictional
space Middle-Earth for the reading public. The Silmarillion represented the only
complete, publishable version of the legendarium for which there was apparent demand.
It was published without the meta-narrative of Ælfwine’s translation. Its context and
meaning derived retrospectively from The Lord of the Rings, which, as we have seen, was
already presumed to have no relationship to modernity.
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Removing The Silmarillion’s framing narrative distorts the context in which the
reader interprets the text. If the text did in fact portray a purely imaginative history, we
would be forced to agree with the distinction Charles Manlove draws between fantasy
and science fiction: while “fantasy often draws spiritual nourishment from the past …
science fiction is usually concerned with the future and the way we may develop.” 137 If,
however, we understand Tolkien’s fantasy as a fictional interpretation of our own past,
then we must see modernity as the implicit imagined endpoint of the narrative writ large.
We are invited to consider the ways in which we have developed, how we differ (or not)
from the world portrayed in the text, and the ways in which our imagination of the world
differs. With the frame in place, it becomes clear that narratives about the past are always
about the present. They invite us to project that narrative, and the questions it raises, into
the future. The modern moment, composed as it is by the tension between the past and
future, denies us the luxury of isolating them from one another. Jameson’s argument that
fantasy concerns itself the “premodern world alone” is an impossibility. The modern
world is present, both within the text and without, at the inception of the modern fantasy
genre. Like his contemporaries in the high modernist movement, Tolkien engaged in
inventing a past that would confer significance on his work. In Tolkien’s case, the past is
located in the work itself. The artifice is concealed by the practice of fantasy, which
estranges the narrative from historical reality. But as we have seen, the construction of an
accommodating past is always a matter of selection and interpretation, and therefore a
matter of invention. Tolkien’s treatment of the tradition is to transform and overtly
reshape its origins in the context of the present. He leaves modernity implicit. In contrast,
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Eliot and the high modernists utilize formal experimentation to manifest the modern in
the work, allowing it to imply their selected tradition.
The persistence of the perceived disconnection between Tolkien’s work and his
world contributes to an unusual critical situation. It leads to J. R. R. Tolkien – an author
who wrote and published exclusively between the years of 1910 and 1972 – existing
frequently as the subject of medieval scholars. The reasons for this are fairly clear. First,
while Middle-Earth is imaginatively distinct from the genuinely medieval, it is
constructed primarily from the material of medieval texts – dragons, knights, and swords.
Moreover, Tolkien’s writing seeks in some ways to emulate them. Second, because the
discourses surrounding twentieth century literature treat modernism as the natural
representative of its time, there is no apparent contradiction in treating Tolkien otherwise.
But the resulting conversation at times gives the impression that Tolkien’s nearest
contemporaries are authors who wrote centuries before he was born. This is visible in the
proliferation of source criticism of Tolkien’s work. Tom Shippey, for example,
introduces The Road to Middle Earth by examining the philological inquiries that
unearthed the building blocks from which Tolkien derived and shaped his secondary
world.138 Scholarly anthologies such as J. R. R. Tolkien and His Literary Resonances, and
J. R. R. Tolkien and the Study of His Sources approach Tolkien by considering the
material from which his stories are constructed, much of which is medieval. 139 Similarly,
Jane Chance’s Tolkien and the Invention of Myth contains essays relating Tolkien to
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everything from ancient Greek and Latin sources, to Old Norse and Old English. 140 In the
absence of twentieth-century scholarly interest in Tolkien, medievalism provides an
accredited point of entry into his work. The dominant concern of this approach tends to
be the details of the setting, and the sources from which it is composed. In this it is like
the discourse of world-building – treating the setting, seemingly in an implicit admission
of deficiency elsewhere. The approach clearly does not operate under the misconception
that Tolkien’s work is a genuine example of a recovered mythology. Nonetheless, the
focus on source material tends to create the sense that Tolkien was the contemporary of
authors of the medieval and early modern eras, rather than the modernists and the rapidly
changing world with which they grappled. In much the same way that fantasy scholarship
reads Tolkien in the context of a genre that developed after his time, source criticism
reads him in the context of writing produced long before his time. Meanwhile,
modernism continues to crowd him out of his own historical moment.
This false synchronicity leaves little room for Tolkien to be read as an author of
the early twentieth century, except through the critical norms and practices of modernism,
which we have seen are inclined to delegitimize his work in a variety of ways. Ironically,
medievalist and genre-based critical approaches emerged in part as an effort to resist this
dismissal. They offer alternative points of entry into Tolkien’s work, without the trouble
of directly attempting to gainsay critical orthodoxy. In some sense, however, this
exacerbates the central problem; Tolkien’s apparent estrangement from the pressing
concerns, traumas, and transformations of his own time. Fantasy scholarship in some
ways positions itself as an offshoot, or a special interest. Genre status implicitly concedes
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that Tolkien is not part of the literary mainstream, regardless of critical work that lays
bare the constructed nature of the mainstream. This invites the old critique that his work
is escapist, interested in avoiding the challenges of modernity, and therefore irrelevant.
Medievalist scholarship imaginatively displaces Tolkien from his time, in an attempt to
legitimate his work in terms other than those of the twentieth century. By privileging the
context of the sources over that of the text itself, however, these studies similarly concede
that Tolkien was not engaged with his own world. In an effort to restore Tolkien to his
century, Attebery has suggested the application of alternative, contemporaneous analytic
models: replacing structuralism with philology, Freudian psychological analysis with
Jungian, and Marxist criticism with ecological theory. 141 However, insisting on these
alternatives threatens to further alienate Tolkien from the dominant discourses of
twentieth-century literary studies. Such a strategy does little to address the manner in
which these norms and values assumed dominance. It similarly offers no opportunity to
consider the ways in which their growth and definitions were inflected by the exclusion
of writing in the fantastic mode. The value of the new modernist studies is that it asks
precisely this question of the various discourses that were marginalized by the
valorization of high modernism and its descendants. Therefore, to inscribe Tolkien’s
work into the narrative of the twentieth century literature, we must first and foremost
reestablish its proper synchronicity.
By focusing on the origins of Tolkien’s work in the First World War, this study
anchors his work in one of the seminal moments both of the century and of modernism.
The importance of the war in shaping definitions of modernism has diminished over time.
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For early modernist critics, it was a crucial turning point in history; to those who lived
through it, the war epitomized many of the upheavals seemed primed to overwhelm
European civilization. It was widely seen as a catalytic event that compelled an aesthetic
and imaginative rejection of traditional epistemologies, inciting the rebellions of the
modernists. This took the form of a fixed cultural narrative that persisted for years.
Samuel Hynes describes the narrative as a sense of the “gap in history that the war
engendered,” being “rendered … in images of radical emptiness … fragmentation and
ruin, all expressing a fracture in time and space.” 142 Hynes, however argues that the
dominance of this narrative was a symptom of the strategies of exclusion that were
employed to consolidate and authorize high modernism. Its realization was carried out by
critics, as well as artists. Ultimately, he argues, the simplified narrative suppressed a
more complicated process of shifting and overlapping codes of meaning associated with
the war. This includes Paul Fussell’s attempt to homogenize responses to the war along
the civilian/soldier binary. Fussell’s The Great War and Modern Memory extended
literary study to the “lesser” soldier-poets and memoirists of the war. Nonetheless, it
upheld the homogenizing narrative that the war was a watershed moment – “the last [war]
to be conceived as taking place within … a coherent stream of time running from past
through present to future.”143 The war, in this narrative, is the moment of disjunction
when modernity begins. Hynes and others have worked to undermine the ubiquity of this
version of modern history. Nonetheless, the war continues to define ideas of modernity,
although its precise role has become less certain. In Rites of Spring, Modris Eksteins
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inverts the relationship between the war and modernity. He argues that, rather than the
war shaping our ideas of modernity, in-process aesthetic and social transformations
likewise altered the way that the war was perceived and experienced. 144 The increased
flexibility with which the war is viewed by scholars has led Allyson Booth to utilize the
war and modernism as something akin to mutually interpretive lenses for one another.
Her approach, she says, is not about “the particulars of … exchanges [between civilian
and soldier, war and modernism].” Rather, it is a question of “the patterns that emerge as
appropriate to … worlds of both combatant and civilian modernism.” 145
The same logic underlies my decision to examine Tolkien’s work in the light of
the Great War. I do not assume or argue for the war’s unimpeachable significance to the
cultural production of modernism. Rather, I search for emergent patterns between the
demands of modernity as enacted by the war, and the practice of writing the fantastic. In
part because of the immense body of critical work theorizing the relationship between the
war and modernism, the war is a promising point of contact at which to locate affinities
between modernism and the work that would give rise to the fantasy genre. Note that this
is distinct from treating these theories as certainties; rather they offer a field of
possibilities. Booth describes how this grants access to new and variegated historical
knowledge in the context of the high modernists:
A canonical modernist text, like any other work of art, will reconfigure
itself depending on the lens through which one peers, and there are any
number of narratives that can be constructed from the numerous forms of
representation that provide us with our only access to the past. 146

144

Eksteins, Modris. Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, (New York:
Houghton-Mifflin, 2000).
145
Booth, Allyson. Postcards From the Trenches: Negotiating the Space Between Modernism and the First
World War, (New York: Oxford UP, 1996), 5.
146
Booth, 5.

88

By utilizing the First World War as a point of common theoretical departure, this project
configures Tolkien in such a way as to place him in conversation with modernism, rather
than opposition. By relocating Tolkien as a war writer, it asks how the nature of the
experience of the war could have compelled the interpretive and representative strategies
we have come to associate with Tolkien, in the same way they have been understood to
have contributed to those of the high modernists. What we find, is that, as Wyatt
Bonikowski argues, “there is something in the nature of the modern war experience, both
physical and psychical, that resists representation: it overwhelms the senses, disturbs
memory, and leaves traces in disruptive symptoms.”147 “And,” we might add, “in
storytelling.”
Far from mere reactionary escapism, Tolkien’s turn toward the fantastic is
analogous to the high modernist turn toward formal experimentation. Both emerge in
response to the challenges to mimetic representation brought about by twentieth-century
modernity. This is no longer as unusual a claim as it might once have been, as recent
scholarship has called into question the purely rational character of post-WWI England.
Critics such as George M. Johnson have called attention to the burgeoning interest in
magic and mysticism in England that coincided with the war and its aftermath. Johnson
argues that previous studies have assumed that society has “progressed toward
enlightenment, rendering the earlier era limited in its understanding.” This distorts their
understanding of the practice, by “back-projecting assumptions and values.” 148 The
process Johnson describes resembles the way that scholars retroactively applied
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modernist norms to Tolkien and his imitators. Leigh Wilson has gone further, arguing
that the prevalence of magic during this time was in fact a response to modernity, because
its primitivism implicitly rejects modern rationalism that, in that moment, seemed so
clearly to have resulted in disaster. Magical thinking was “attractive to artists trying to
remake an idea of mimesis precisely because of their modern status.” 149 If modernism is,
by its very definition, engaged in a project of self-differentiation from the recent past, the
irrationality of magic provides an ideal oppositional force to the progressive liberal
humanism that stagnated before rationalizing its way into the war.
Although it codes itself differently, therefore, Tolkien’s work reacts to the same
epochal shifts as that of the high modernists. More than the civilian writers, however, the
uniquely overwhelming experiences and distortions of the war compelled the soldierwriters toward the fantastic. In the coming chapters, therefore, I read Tolkien in
conversation with the soldier-poets and war memoirists, rather than the high modernists.
John Clute describes the war as “an experience so unhouseling that otherworlds – even if
they were impossible – became regions of the mind easily inhabitable in the imagination
of the mature writer.”150 The war, in other words, was sufficiently unthinkable to untether
those who lived through it from the imaginative strictures of the “impossible.” By placing
Tolkien’s work in the context of the war, we recognize that its apparent reactionary
nature is in fact an urgent response to this contemporary crisis of belief. If a fantasy
narrative is, as W. R. Irwin defines it, “a story based on and controlled by an over
violation of what is generally accepted as a possibility,” then its emergence in and from a
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world that seemed pathologically to upend old certainties appears inevitable. 151 Like
Brian Attebery, I see modern fantasy not as “an anachronistic alternative to Modernism
but as one of its important manifestations,” albeit one that existed for decades as a mere
undercurrent.152 What we lack is the terms according to which fantasy’s modern roots can
be effectively understood and interpreted.
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Chapter 2: The Fantastic Front

For British soldier-writers, the images and experiences of No Man’s Land fitted
into no readily available paradigm by which war could be understood. The young men
who set off for the western front took with them models of war and images of Europe
derived from chivalric romance. What they encountered on the other side of the English
Channel was so wildly different that many interpreted it as a type of otherworld. It
seemed to them that they had stepped out of the orderly, rational, modern world and into
a twisted space that Paul Fussell has described as a manifestation of Northrop Frye’s
demonic world.153 The front both undermined and overwrote contemporary
understandings of warfare. More than this, it upended traditional relationships between
nature, technology, science, magic, and religion on which positivist ideologies depended.
The oppositional order that resulted was evident in the landscape. Its pits and mires were
products of modern technology; mortar shells reshaped the land; thickets of razor-wire
hedged it in. Rather than the uplifting effects of scientific advancement predicted by
Enlightenment rationalism, the front presented the soldiers with what Horkheimer and
Adorno call “a new kind of barbarism.”154 On the front, humanity was reduced to
disposable materiel – a fungible resource, liable at any time to be annihilated by the
technology of modern war. Soldiers seeking to communicate this unthinkable reality to
the civilian population at home found themselves without an available discourse capable
of rendering it comprehensible. The Great War presented a representational dilemma
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because it was not only unprecedented, but quite literally unimaginable. It so violated the
liberal humanist ideologies that dominated contemporary England, and which helped fuel
the drive to war, that many authors found themselves drawing on the fantastic to convey
the experience to their countrymen.155
The British war memoirs that appeared between 1928 and 1937 exhibit many
characteristics of what Farah Mendlesohn calls the “Portal-Quest Fantasy.” This subgenre
concerns a protagonist who passes across a barrier – a wardrobe, a looking glass, or the
borders of the Shire – and in doing so, enters the world of the fantastic. Portal fantasy
protagonists “[go] from a modern life … into direct contact with the fantastic.” They
learn to function in and manipulate this new world by coming to understand its
(apparently irrational) governing principles. The portal fantasy plot is thus concerned
with “entry, transgression, and negotiation.” 156 Soldiers crossing the channel and passing
through western France to the front describe the journey in similar terms. This should not
be surprising. According to Fusssell, for British soldiers brought up in the Edwardian
school system, one of the best-known common texts was Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress.
The text, he argues, made “front-line experience … available for interpretation when it
was seen how closely parts of it resembled” Bunyan’s narrative. 157 Mendlesohn likewise
identifies it as a foundational text in the portal-quest fantasy. For Mendlesohn, it
highlights that the real goal of such journeys “is moral growth … or redemption. The
process … is shaped by a metaphorized and moral geography.” 158 The landscape
literalizes the narrative, embodying the transition undergone by the protagonist as it is
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traversed. By crossing the landscape, the pilgrim or the questing hero enacts a spiritual
journey.
While the journey undertaken by British soldiers imitated the portal fantasy
pattern, it also inverted the structure. Few, if any, memoirists report finding either
redemption or moral growth on the front. On the contrary, most found the front
remarkable in its stark amorality. If they had crossed into an otherworld, it was one that
mocked the traditional standards of honor in warfare expressed in chivalric romance. This
inversion was perceived by soldiers along several indices. For example, in his preface to
In Parenthesis David Jones describes the contrast and its effects. He describes the change
as a product of the technology with which war is waged. “We feel a rubicon has been
passed,” he says, “between striking with a hand weapon as men used to do and loosing
poison from the sky as we do ourselves. We doubt the decency of our own inventions and
are certainly in terror of the possibilities.”159 Jones maps moral degradation not only onto
advances in technology, but across time and onto landscape. The use of “rubicon,”
although idiomatic, conveys the sense of passing across a boundary into a new space –
one which is qualitatively irreconcilable with its counterpart on the other side. This is a
key feature of the portal fantasy for Mendlesohn: “the fantastic is on the other side [of the
portal, relative to the mundane] and does not leak.” 160 This mutual isolation means that
the otherworld is fantastic not only for the reader, but for the characters within the
narrative who encounter it. For those who don’t encounter it at all, the otherworld
remains unknowable and incomprehensible. (Consider, for example, The Wizard of Oz, or
any other well-known fantasy in which the protagonist, having returned from the
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otherworld, is met with disbelief and condescension by their mundane community).
Many veterans of the Great War returned home to a public whose ideas of the war were
derived from state propaganda and who were unprepared to recognize the reality of the
conflict.
Like the soldiers who shipped out, many civilian ideas of warfare were based on
chivalric romance. Pro-war propaganda reinforced this with images of St. George and
King Arthur, encouraging the public to view the war as a noble undertaking. 161 The
population of England was ill-equipped to imagine the unprincipled and distinctly
modern slaughter taking place in Europe. Ironically, this made the war more suited to
being rendered in the fantastic, not less, by ensuring that it remained outside the bounds
of knowability. In effect, the quarantine of information kept the portal closed for most
British citizens during the war. This created a conundrum for veteran authors, many of
whom saw themselves as having a responsibility to open the eyes of their readers by
conveying to them the reality of the front. If, as I assert, the fantastic operates through,
and grants access to, events beyond the limits of collectively-recognized possibility, it
also renegotiates the boundaries of belief. This virtue meant that it was a viable means to
communicate the experience of the war to an incredulous or uncomprehending public.
Precisely by circumventing the question of possibility, the fantastic invites the credulity
that Tolkien describes as secondary belief. 162 By inviting the reader to perceive the front
as a space that is in some way unreal, the war writers made them more receptive to the
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transformative effect it worked on their image of war, as well as the ideological
upheavals they implied.
If this claim seems curious at first glance, it is likely because the war memoirists,
are generally viewed to have worked primarily in the mimetic mode. The notable
exception is David Jones (whose In Parenthesis is, in any event, difficult to categorize).
This has been understood in part as a desire to communicate the material conditions of
the battlefield, and in part as a rejection of abstractions like honor and glory that serve to
conceal suffering. But, as Kathryn Hume notes, the clean divide between the mimetic and
fantastic modes is a false dichotomy; most works in fact contain elements of both. 163 To
sustain this dichotomy, critics like Fussell find themselves having to explain away textual
elements that register as fantastic, even by a stricter definition. For example, he identifies
among the soldiers “a plethora of very un-modern superstitions, talismans, wonders,
miracles, relics, legends, and rumors,” which he considers anomalous in “the midst of a
war representing a triumph of modern industrialism, materialism, and mechanism.” He
attributes the motivation for such superstitions to “inexpressible terror long and
inexplicably endured,” effectively casting the fantastic as an irrational symptom of
traumatic experience, rather than examining the benefits it offered. 164 At the same time,
the distinction he makes relies on frameworks that utilize binaries discussed in the
previous chapter. Modernity is defined primarily by excluding the un-modern, which in
this instance includes mostly elements that would be considered fantastic. Categorizing
the fantastic as unmodern, and the technological as modern, creates the appearance of an
opposition without substantively establishing their exclusivity. Instead, it asserts their
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mutual exclusivity according to what Randall Styers describes as “a mode of selfreferential opposition” in which modernity is conceivable only as a negation of the
primitive.165 Presenting the war as if it is fundamentally unsuited to the fantastic thus
effectively requires that the fantastic be written out on tautological assumptions much
like those that formed around high modernism.
On the contrary, it was quite common for war memoirists to present the front as a
space imbued with fantastic overtones by virtue of precisely the characteristics that
Fussell identifies as modern. David Jones describes the practices and routines of trench
warfare as a set of distortions that color the soldiers’ impressions of the landscape:
the day by day in the Waste Land, the sudden violences and long
stillnesses, the sharp contours and unformed voids of that mysterious
existence, profoundly affected the imaginations of those who suffered it. It
was a place of enchantment. It is perhaps best described in Malory, book
iv, chapter 15 – that landscape spoke ‘with a grimly voice.’ 166
The enchantment Jones refers to describes a space and a set of phenomena whose
existence cannot be comprehended or explained in strictly rational terms. This is
represented both by the practice of modern war – “sudden violences and long stillnesses”
– and the unearthly shape of No Man’s Land’s “sharp contours and unformed voids.”
These mark the front as a time and place given form by the technology of modern war.
Trenches, bombs, gun emplacements, mortar shells, and barbed wire remake the
landscape. The practical and logistical necessities that these technologies create regulate
the ability of armies to move and operate within the environment they remake. Far from
being an oppositional category to modern war, the fantastic as it manifests on the front is
a product of modern war.
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The front enchants by transforming the imaginative capacities of those who
experience it. The war’s utter lack of precedent meant that soldiers encountered it without
readily-available means of comprehension. If realism denotes those concepts which
appear possible within the bounds of rational thought, then the fantastic’s presumed
oppositional stance toward reality renders it more suited to the task of constructing
alternative epistemological frameworks than purely realistic representation. It allowed
soldiers to imaginatively inhabit a world that exhibited no apparent rational order, but
which operated under the seemingly-arbitrary logics and compulsions of modern war. By
declining to engage the standard of verifiability, the fantastic avoids what Horkheimer
and Adorno call “modern civilization’s fear of departing from the facts.” 167 The fantastic
has the power to negate rationalism’s monopoly on the possible. In the case of the First
World War, this meant representing and addressing conditions that turned positivist
Enlightenment doctrine on its head. Fussell’s use of “inexpressible” and “inexplicable,”
above, suggests the scale of the challenge; soldier writers were obliged to find a means to
signify a place that was ideologically and epistemologically impossible.
I conceptualize this challenge as a search for a viable mythology. I use the term
here in the sense articulated by Roland Barthes: a second-order signifying system that
dictates cultural values to such an extent that it provides a model for reality. 168 By this
model, much writing of the Great War can be understood as a realization that available
mythic systems of signification had become defunct. On the front, cultural myths of war,
nature, and technology ceased to instructively correspond to experience. The soldiers
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who were obligated to inhabit this uniquely nihilistic space – and particularly those who
sought to convey it to others – found it necessary to reconfigure available systems to
enable new meanings. The preponderance of new myths and rituals on the front that
Fussell identifies as curious and unmodern is thus a response to this vacuum of meaning.
Brian Attebery has argued that the reconfiguring of mythic systems is one of the primary
functions of the fantastic.169 I argue that this is also a feature of the fantastic’s capacity to
model ideas that contradict reality without inducing incredulity. Secondary belief offers
potential alternatives to consensus cultural certainties without offending modern
insistence on empiricism. If, as Margaret Hiley contends, “the main function of myth is to
help mankind come to terms with reality,” the fantastic is uniquely suited to renegotiating
the limits of belief.170
This perceived lack of meaning-making cultural systems is not, of course, unique
to the war writers. A sense of bottomlessness, a lack of grounding experienced as
constantly-receding meaning, is commonly identified in twentieth-century writing.
Michael Bell goes so far as to argue that modern myth encapsulates the “central problem
of modernity: how to live, given what we know.” 171 Moreover, the widely-observed
cultural sense of a break with the past is symptomatic of this same lack of meaning. The
ability of myth to simulate an inherent relationship between signifier and signified
“transforms historical reality into a natural, self-justifying image of [the cultural
certainties it conveys].”172 Delegitimizing predominant mythic systems thus eliminates
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the apparent instructive qualities of the past as a guide for present action. But the front
presented this dilemma in a particularly concrete and urgent manner. The sense that so
many soldiers experienced of having stepped into another world is the effect of
certainties falling out from under them. It is the ability to operate without certainty that
lends the fantastic its power in this environment.

Technological Landscapes and the Representational Challenge of the Front

To many writers of the Great War, the set of experiences which constituted the
front seemed to actively resist being rendered into language. The difficulty lay partly in
the representation and communication of a set of events that were experienced as
fundamentally incoherent. When describing the war to readers who had spent it on the
home front, the challenge was exacerbated by the utter lack of an applicable frame of
reference. Edmund Blunden describes the impossibility of representing the war as a
problem of selection – an inability to choose those “sights, faces, words, incidents which
characterized the time.”173 But Ford Madox Ford suggests that the problem is a lack of
available language appropriate to the assault that mechanized warfare inflicts on the
senses. He describes the moment that memory meets language:
extraordinarily coloured and exact pictures behind my eyeballs – little
pictures having all the brilliant minuteness that medieval illuminations had
– of towers, and roofs, and belts of trees and sunlight; or, for the matter of
these, of men, burst into mere showers of blood and dissolving into muddy
ooze; of aeroplanes and shells against the translucent blue. But as for
putting them – into words! No: the mind stops dead, and something in the
brain stops and shuts down.174
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The experiences Ford describes are neither irretrievable nor indistinct. On the contrary,
they are vivid and immanent. Nor does their horror compel silence. Rather, they appear to
resist language as a medium. The “mind stops dead” at the prospect of rendering the
experiences into language. Curiously, however, Ford has clearly just done so. He does
not, therefore, mean that literal description is impossible. Rather, language fails to extend
beyond literal description, into the enormity and terror that accompany the images. The
words required to render the front faithfully and completely are not available. Samuel
Hynes argues that although the war “might be described … [it] could not be imagined.
For to imagine it would be to discover its significance.” This is in part a consequence of
the war’s immensity but also its refusal to resolve into narrative, “because it would give
[the war] a significance it did not possess.”175 The lack of a viable interpretive framework
meant that the entirety of the war experience was not directly communicable.
For many war writers, the landscape of No Man’s Land provided a means to
communicate the war indirectly by embodying its otherworldly character. As Paul Fussell
has observed, No Man’s Land in war writing is cast as the antithesis to Edwardian
England’s pastoral ideal.176 The blasted surface and stagnant mires of the front evinced
the grotesque transformation that rural western Europe had undergone. In contrast to the
natural systems that shaped rural spaces, the front and its ordering were products of
technology. The front was hostile to life, destructive and degenerative. And yet, when
soldiers sought to represent the phenomena that occurred there – the launches of mortars,
explosions of shells, and the impact craters they left behind – they turned most often to
natural imagery. Chivalric models are warfare were ill-equipped to account for field guns,

175
176

Hynes, 106. Italics in original.
Fussell, 235.

101

tanks, or mustard gas. Even the scale on which these technologies affected the
environment confounded attempts to contain them in language. This turn to natural
imagery is a tactic to represent the magnitude and consequences of the technological
processes that operated on the front. Volcanoes, meteors, and above all the constant
thunder of the guns provide the images that writers use to make the experience of No
Man’s Land comprehensible, for themselves as well as their readers.
One consequence of these strategies was to discursively weaken the distinctions
that structured ideals of modernity. In Making Magic: Religion, Magic, and Science in
the Modern World, Randall Styers argues that the distinctions between religion, magic,
and science are fundamental to the western subject’s ability to see itself as modern. When
the Enlightenment established rationality as the essentially modern mode of evaluating
the world, religion’s role in giving structure to human life receded to the spiritual
dimension alone. This new, secular society nonetheless required a category to
differentiate religion from its less rational cousin. Magic was “configured as the
illegitimate (and effeminized) sibling,” defining religion “through contrast with this form
of deviance.”177 Thus, magic is modern western society has provided the imaginative
barrier that separates science and reason from religion. In doing so, it has helped to
structure western ideology, playing a “crucial role … in producing a sense of the secular,
a nonreligious world under the “rational” control of politics, science, [and] capitalism.” 178
As we will see, the experience of the front, and the necessities of representing its
unprecedented nature, undermined magic’s integrity as a barrier. Moreover, because
dominant contemporary discourses understood magic as “a definitive characteristic of the
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“primitive” mentality,” weakening the distinction threatened to collapse the perceived
difference between the past and present. 179 Despite the radically modern associations with
which we have tended to hold the war, therefore, No Man’s Land also manifested as a
turn toward the past.
The monstrous novelty of No Man’s Land demanded recourse to readily available
frameworks to produce it comprehensibly for a modern readership. But by deploying
these frameworks in this radically new context, the writers necessarily redefined them.
For example, as Fussell has noted, the act of shipping out “[could not] help seeming to
[the soldier] like those of the hero of medieval romance.” 180 These stories (or at least their
Victorian revisions) were among the most prevalent common texts of British soldiers.
Thus, they provided a potential narrative framework by which to order the soldier’s
journey. The similarities between the typical chivalric romance quest and the prospect of
leaving for the front are straightforward: a male warrior ventures into the European
landscape, faces challenges there, and returns home. However, the landscape encountered
by the Royal Welch Fusiliers was nothing like the countryside through which – for
example – Sir Gawain rode. No Man’s Land was the grotesque, fetid state of Europe
under the auspices of modern industrialized warfare. It posed a material threat, in contrast
to the spiritual threat faced by the quest hero. The romance quest continued to shape the
soldiers’ expectations and thus helped to frame their experiences. But their content – the
pastoral landscapes and spiritual triumphs – had ceased to resemble reality, now
appearing naïve, even quaint. The predominant mythic system available lost its ability to
instructively order the world. Consequently, soldiers sought a means to make their myths
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signify again or, failing that, a mythic system capable of providing meaning to this new
world. Hence, Fussell’s “un-modern superstitions” represent efforts to impose order on
an irrational space.
The effect of this mythic reorganization is particularly visible in portrayals of the
landscape. The environment came to emblematize the totality of the amoral,
technological systems that structured the front, and determined the soldiers’ place in it.
Through the landscape, the war writers recorded the event of a changing relationship to
nature. The front did not assume the primacy of natural forces over technological;
technology determined the character of the environment on equal terms with nature, and
in fact superseded it. Ironically, this could be taken to signify the triumph of
Enlightenment rationalism. Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the purpose of the
Enlightenment was the subjugation of nature to humanity, promising freedom from
natural cycles of life and death at whose mercy we had existed.181 But the technological
processes acting on the front were similarly indifferent to human life. Mustard gas and
mortar shells dispatched with human material as efficiently and dispassionately as disease
and natural disaster. But where nature was understood to be random and amoral, these
were products of human ingenuity and rationally-driven advancements. No Man’s Land
epitomizes Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument that the overthrow of nature – the
fulfillment of Enlightenment doctrine – leads back to an amoral world:
the subjugation of everything natural to the sovereign subject culminates
in the domination of what is blindly objective and natural. This tendency
levels all antithesis of bourgeois thought, especially that between moral
rigor and absolute amorality.182
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The technological supremacy of the front rendered soldiers fungible – reduced to
materiel, indistinct from the weapons they carried. They were another interchangeable
component in the machinery of war, operating in a landscape that both recorded and
enacted this condition. Edmund Blunden describes “old uniforms, and a great many
bones” intermingled with the mud in the trenches, remarking that the skeletons seem
“less coherent than most,” as if they had taken on the chaotic character of the front. 183
This is similar to Ford’s description of men “dissolving into muddy ooze,” above. Styers
argues that a fundamental feature of premodern “magical worldview,” was that “the
boundaries between the self and the natural world were seen as essentially permeable.”
This changed when the Enlightenment promised freedom from this vulnerability, and
isolated religion to an inward, spiritual practice.184 No Man’s Land, we might say,
ironically revived an essentially premodern way of knowing the world.
The front disrupted the ideological organization of nature, technology, and
humanity that undergirded the imperial project and thus facilitated the drive to war. In
this sense, it epitomized the bad faith with which Enlightenment principles were placed in
service of the war. On the home front, the public case for war was made via rationalist
discourse that served to conceal the humanist contradictions inherent in sending hundreds
of thousands to die in the service of imperial political interests. Rational argumentation
was deployed not in the service of truth, but as a means “to make sensible a policy
previously deemed irrational.” Sherry describes the government’s strategy as the
deployment of “partisan thinkers … to rationalize the government’s cause.” Charles
Hayward, for example, conceded “that ‘war’ and ‘rational politics’ denominate an
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impossibility,” before undertaking “a fierce attempt to reason out the rightness of the
English cause.”185 The pliability of reason exhibited to the political demands of empire
should come as little surprise. If imperialism is “reason in its most terrible form,” then
safeguarding the empire advances the ostensibly humanist goals of positivism. 186 The
front thus has the capacity to signify not only the immediate technological and natural
implications, but a broad breakdown in the epistemological underpinnings of western
imperial ideology.
While natural imagery made modern warfare describable, it did little to make it
truly comprehensible. Discrete events could be communicated, but the significance they
took on as a totality upended the soldier’s understanding of reality. Positivism assumes an
arrangement of man, nature, and machine in which technological (and thus civilizational)
growth progressively frees humanity from the tyranny of the natural world. An encounter
with technology operating on the scale of natural phenomena upended the relationship
between nature and technology that was needed to sustain positivist assumptions. Using
nature to represent these technologies only served to make this breakdown apparent.
Human tools now affected the environment on a scale previously reserved for natural
forces. But they produced a grotesque, demonic version. Where natural processes might
produce rivers and forests, technological processes produce craters and sludge.
Technology replaces nature as the careless, violent manifestation of human caprice and
folly, rather than a benevolent force opposing natural chaos. Representing the conditions
of the front did nothing to resolve this contradiction; Enlightenment positivism and the
soldiers’ experiences were fundamentally irreconcilable.
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The fantastic in these texts results from authorial strategies that interrelate these
irreconcilable knowledges. In doing so, they endow these experiences with associations
and placed them in contexts that seemed impossible before. Edmund Blunden argues that
the context of war robs authors of meaningful points of reference:
I have not noticed any compelling similarity between a bomb used as an
inkpot and a bomb in the hand of a corpse, or even between the look of a
footballer after a goal all the way and that of a sergeant inspecting a
whale-oiled fleet.187
Despite the superficial similarities between the objects and events he describes, modern
war has robbed them of the coherence necessary to draw meaning from them. To lend
these phenomena the semblance of coherence, writers described them in terms of
available referents. But by connecting the mundane to the unknowable, they imbued both
with strangeness, by virtue of the dissonance between them. This is illustrative of Brian
Attebery’s argument that much of modern fantasy gains its generative potency by
“yoking two incompatible systems of belief.” 188 In Tolkien’s terms, some facet of the
mundane is removed outside of primary belief, sacrificing a degree of its knowability and
becoming a part of the fantastic. If the front represents a negative telos of the
Enlightenment process of disenchantment through all-encompassing knowledge, the
fantastic responds with the possibility of re-enchantment.
In written accounts of the Great War, the fantastic and its associated motifs
frequently represent the young soldier’s naiveté, regarded with disdain by his later
counterpart. This reflects the post-Enlightenment belief, identified by both Tolkien and
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Clute, that fantastic stories were fundamentally suited for children. At George Sherston’s
arrival on the front, for example, Siegfried Sassoon writes:
I had become quite fond of [the country], and the end-of-the-world along
the horizon had some obscure hold over my mind which drew my eyes to
it almost eagerly, for I could still think of trench warfare as an adventure.
The horizon was quiet just not, as if the dragons that lived there were
dozing.189
The fantastic, filtered through the lens of chivalric romance, signifies both the young
Sherston’s imagined version of war, and the older Sherston’s disapproval thereof. The
vanishing point of the continental horizon promises new, heroic experiences, embodied in
the ideal of dragons – implicitly identifying Sherston with a questing knight. The literal
corollary for the dragons, however, is the German guns that wait on the far side of the
trenches. The pairing of these dissonant referents emphasizes the gap between Sherston’s
expectations, derived from chivalric romance, and the reality he will ultimately
encounter. Ironically then, this imaginative framework actually upheld the positivist
assertions that the front itself called into question, by consigning the fantastic to the past.
And yet, it represents the comfort of an instructive mythic system; it is the guns that are
unimaginable.
The fantastic mode enabled the war writers to represent the incomprehensibility
of the front as an otherworldly space, dominated by the distinctly modern forces of
mechanized warfare. And yet, by doing so, it laid bare the contradictions inherent in
representing modern war according to Enlightenment-derived frameworks that its very
nature undermined. The distinctly modern meets its negation in these texts; Sherston’s
guns never quite stop being dragons. The war dramatically recontextualized the
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imaginative space of western Europe: who, since 1916, hears “the Somme” and pictures a
river? Writers utilized the fantastic as a tool for navigating this new space by concretizing
imaginative transformation as an entry into the otherworld. By allowing them to operate
(however tentatively or conditionally) outside of the certitudes imposed by positivist
ideologies, the fantastic offered the possibility of reconfiguring and reclaiming mythic
systems in the context of modern war. Faced with the impossibility of constructing
actionable meaning from the Great War, authors were obliged to erect meaning-making
structures around it.
The three authors I examine in the remainder of this chapter represent three
distinct strategies undertaken to reconcile the representative contradictions engendered by
the front. Each utilizes the fantastic as an oppositional category to modernity via an
otherworld. Effectively, these authors are attempting to resuscitate, discover, or create a
mythic system that is capable of meaning-making within the conditions of industrialized
warfare. Their efforts reflect a desire to connect with an imaginative world in order to
derive instructive meaning from a mythic past whose relevance is no longer apparent.
Their varying degrees of success met by each suggests the challenges inherent in
representing the war, and highlights what many experienced as the ultimate
irreconcilability of past with present in the face of the war. Edmund Blunden portrays the
otherworld as a trip through time, inflecting and emphasizing its difference through the
transformative effect the war visited on the French countryside, ultimately finding the
dissonance too much to overcome. David Jones locates community between the English
soldiers and warriors of mythic history, before withdrawing into the past in the face of
battlefield slaughter. J. R. R. Tolkien literalizes the otherworld by treating modern war as
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a lens through which to render a mythic past capable of anticipating No Man’s Land. The
greater the degree to which these authors invest their writing with the fantastic, the more
they are able to resolve the contradictions they found to be inherent to the front.

Undertones of War and the Transformation of Europe

Edmund Blunden’s Undertones of War creates the front as an otherworld by
literalizing the contradictions it embodies. For Blunden, the crossing to the continent is a
trip through time. The front inhabits a new epoch – one that overturns the positivist
frameworks that shaped prior eras. This is a relatively common sentiment among
contemporary authors: recall Wyndam Lewis’s “B.C. and A.D.” 190 But Blunden is
notable because he concretizes this sensation in his portrayal of the Great War itself.
Blunden’s otherworld manifests primarily through the European landscape and the
transformation it underwent during the war. Undertones of War portrays the nearly two
years Blunden spent on the front between 1916 and 1917. The action of the text is
perhaps nothing so much as transit. Blunden and his company traverse across and along
the front lines, as well as back and forth between forward and rear. As they do, his
portrayal gives the impression of traveling back and forth through time. Throughout the
text, his intense awareness of the transformed state of the continent foregrounds the
effects of industrialized warfare, emphasizing its distinctly modern nature as fantastic –
even unreal. Visiting medieval towns that once would have evoked chivalric romance,
Blunden finds them deserted and damaged by shelling. His awareness of the landscape’s
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formerly pastoral nature lends an alien quality to its current state. Undertones of War
inhabits this contradiction, rather than attempting to resolve it. The text engenders a sense
of what these spaces were, in tension with what they have become. For Blunden, this
tension gives rise to the fantastic.
The fantastic acts generatively by recontextualizing both the war and the mythic
referents in terms of one another. It is hardly novel at this point to observe the presence of
romance and mythic allusion in First World War writing. While early studies tended to
insist that the war was defined by “movement … from a mythologized to a
demythologized world,” recent scholarship has more and more frequently called this into
question.191 Several recent studies have argued that mythic and chivalric motifs inspired
and consoled readers during and after the war, both on the front and at home. 192 But these
studies have tended to treat such material as sterile, stable points of reference that soldiers
turned to for support or guidance before putting them down again. Elizabeth Vandiver
provides a representative example:
traditional modes of expression … were brought into service to express
the otherwise inexpressible … Faced with a kind of war for which recent
history had in no way prepared them, British poets … drew on traditional
modes of expression … to try and define the cataclysm they faced. 193
Vandiver’s revision is a matter of categorization. She concedes that some of the war
writers adhere to the old paradigm, rejecting “traditional modes of expression,” but
argues that an overlooked group repurposed them for the modern war. But Blunden
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makes clear that this practice goes beyond straightforward allusion. By deploying these
elements to address the “otherwise inexpressible,” Blunden and the other war writers
destabilize their mythic signification. In the context of a war that departed so radically
from any available frame of reference, these motifs came to signify the comfort of a
knowable tradition. In short, for Blunden, they become mundane.
Ironically, the fantastic in Undertones of War is represented by the modern and
technological; the pastoral trappings of chivalric romance inhabit the role of the
mundane, precisely because they represent an explicability and comprehensibility that are
absent from No Man’s Land. Visiting Festubert Village in the summer of 1917,
Blunden’s attention is arrested and his impression colored by the changes worked on it by
modern warfare. “In ancient days,” he tells us, “perhaps in 1914, the village had been
bombarded with serious intention by guns of horrid weight, and one gazed wonderingly
into several enormous holes.”194 Blunden’s description does not present the effects of
industrialized war as the predictable, mundane outcome of rational phenomena. Rather,
he “[gazes] wonderingly” into the resultant craters, emphasizing their
incomprehensibility. The redefined space does not operate according to known (or
indeed, knowable) principles; this is what marks it as an otherworld. The resulting
impression imagine the guns not as battlefield materiel, but as monstrous creatures
invested with awareness, even intent. The guns “of horrid weight” are the agents in his
account of the bombardment. The imaginative crossing from one state to another gives
rise to the central irony of the passage: Blunden’s reference to 1914 as “ancient days.”
This gestures toward the common idea that the war had catalyzed or realized some
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fundamental and qualitative change in humanity and its relationship to the world. 195 For
Blunden, the dissonance between the medieval village and its modern, blasted condition
evokes and concretizes this change through its material transformation. The front is not
simply a landscape. Its transformation is ontological as much as physical. The resistance
of its governing principles to interpretation renders it alien in unaccountable ways. This is
the mechanism that robs the soldiers’ mythic systems of their capacity to instruct, and
even to signify meaning.
As Blunden’s company moves toward the front, this alienating quality slowly
becomes the defining characteristic of the landscape. By the time they reach No Man’s
Land, it dominates his impressions. This primacy is signified by the increasing presence
of technological blight in Blunden’s descriptions of the space. Technology’s
transformative effect on the landscape manifests as an omnipresent, almost spiritual
threat. A passage relating his approach to the front reads like a mythic journey into hell,
each feature of the scene ominously threatening:
We passed the last melancholy estaminet on the eastward track, with shellholes round the door, and we tried (at the suggestion of my batman) its
coloured syrups … Here telegraph wires no longer ran aloft in the air, but
lay festooned thickly along the torn-up railway bank, their poles and teethlike rows of insulators leaning this way and that, the several rails here and
there curled up like hurt reptiles into the air … other ruins of industrial
machinery hovered through the throbbing haze; the path became corrupt,
the canal dead and stagnant … Here silence, heat, and blind terror shared
the dominion.196
This passage epitomizes the front-as-otherworld. Although it is the product of mundane
technological activity, the landscape appears aware and hostile. Telegraph poles
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transform into teeth, rail lines into wounded reptiles, and the “throbbing haze” takes on
an aspect of active presence. The ephemerality of objects intensifies the threat they seem
to pose by heightening the unearthly sense of mystery that permeates the space. This
world is at once indistinct and horrifically present. The few concrete references – shell
holes, telegraphs, “industrial machinery” – ground it in the modern period. Were these
absent, the passage would not be out of place in a chivalric romance or The Pilgrim’s
Progress. But the otherworldly nature of the space is created entirely by modern
technological processes. From the objects, to their ruined state, to the haze itself,
everything about the environment is the product of industrialized warfare.
This binarism, which locates an alternative world on the other side of the war’s
imaginative boundary, is not limited to the landscape, however. Rather, the landscape
signifies, or else is a manifestation of, an alternative ordering of the world. Blunden’s
growing fluency in the rules that govern these new paradigms enacts Mendlesohn’s
principle that the portal fantasy sees the protagonist learning to navigate and negotiate
with the fantastic world.197 As in the case of the landscape, it is frequently the antiquated
or overtly fantastic element that represents the mundane world, as an oppositional
category to the inconceivably modern. The following account of a patrol’s report on a
sniper’s nest illustrates how Blunden deploys these oppositional frameworks:
… Kapp’s patrol had been remarkable, and he sent back a long precise
report, full of suggestive information. The Olympian comment was, ‘too
flowery for a military report.’ Our chieftain could not encourage anything
that bore the semblance of a mental method off a world before the war. 198
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Once more, the imaginative epochal shift (“a world before the war”) doubles as a
boundary across which the mundane cannot move. The commanding officer dismisses the
report as “too flowery,” on the grounds that it reflects a pre-war “mental method.” His
critique implies a rationalist insistence on the verifiable and concrete, reducing all things
to quantifiable materiel. But the text itself endorses the report, describing it is “precise,”
and “full of suggestive information.” Moreover, it depicts the relationship between the
commander and his troops with fantastic and antiquated terminology when it refers to
him as “Olympian,” and “chieftain.” Although the text portrays the authority of the postwar “mental method,” the narrator’s ability to critique it in these terms undermines its
totality. Blunden’s capacity to manipulate this alternative order reflects his growing
ability to navigate the otherworld’s epistemological systems.
Because the otherworldly order manifests visibly in the landscape, and because it
is signified through the opposition of antiquated and modern contextual elements,
Blunden experiences his return trip as a passage through time. His journey back reflects
his journey out, but the destabilizing effects of the otherworldly order has spread to the
formerly pastoral landscapes of western Europe. As he travels by train on his return trip
to England, Blunden’s reflections emphasize the epistemological difference of the
otherworld, rather than its physical effects:
We travel … over battlefields already become historic, bewildering
solitudes over which the weeds are waving in the wild moon, houseless
regions where still there are lengths of trenches twisting in and out, woods
like ship-masts where amateur soldiers, so many of them, accepted death
in lieu of war-time wages; at last we come to the old villages from which
the battle of 1916 was begun, still rising in mutilation and liberation. 199
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That the battlefields have “already become historic” highlights the transformative effect
the war has had not merely on the physical features of the surrounding landscape, but on
Blunden’s means of perceiving and imaginatively interacting with it. Western Europe has
become indescribable without the context of its recent history. The “bewildering
solitudes” recall the battles that emptied and historicized them. The trenches emblematize
the material effect of modern warfare on pastoral spaces. The forests evoke the aimless
deaths suffered there. Although Blunden is returning from the front to the mundane
world, his is not freed from the distorting epistemological effects of the front. Traditional
mythic systems fail to regain their instructive capacity; he cannot interpret the world
except in light of its transformed state.
This disruption destabilizes the pastoral ideal that Paul Fussell posits as central to
the epistemological structures of the war memoirs. For Fussell, the pastoral constitutes “a
way of invoking a code to hint by antithesis at the indescribable.” Moreover, it insulates
those who invoke it from the horrors of the war. 200 But the comforting effects of the
pastoral are derived from one’s assurance of its stability and reliability as a point of
reference. It functions in accordance with mythic systems of belief, and its symbolic
efficacy relies on their integrity. By robbing these systems of their capacity to signify, the
front undermines Blunden’s ability to extract comfort or even meaning from his journey
back. The pastoral to which he returns is itself inflected by the knowledge that he cannot
reconcile its mythic significance with the mutual, contradictory presence of the front-asotherworld.
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Undertones at War concludes with an explicit identification of the
epistemological aporia to which Blunden’s passage through the otherworld has led.
During a layover on his trip west, Blunden considers the relatively unspoiled pastoral
landscape of Buire-sur-Ancre. He walks among “willows and waters … so silvery and
unsubstantial that one could spend a lifetime to paint [them].” 201 Positioning this space in
opposition to the front, he deploys fantastic motifs to emphasize the irreconcilability of
the two: “Could any countryside be more sweetly at rest, more alluring to naiad and
hamadryad, more incapable of dreaming of the field gun?”202 Despite their mythic
origins, the “naiad and hamadryad,” ironically represent the knowable and thus the
mundane against the incomprehensibility of the war. But they originate in mythic systems
that cannot coherently represent a world that includes the front. Hence, the land itself is
“incapable of dreaming of the field gun” because the systems that enable Blunden to
render meaning from it do not extend to the technological environment to the east. This
epistemological incompatibility reaffirms the front’s status as an otherworld. What has
changed is Blunden’s capacity to view the mundane without reference to its opposite; he
has rebuilt his mental and representational frameworks to account for the alien nature of
the front. Like the heroes of Mendlesohn’s portal fantasies, Blunden has learned to
operate according to the rules of the otherworld, and to manipulate them to his advantage.
But doing so has hindered his ability to easily return to the mundane world.
Blunden’s representational strategy utilizes the fantastic mode to emphasize the
unreality of the front, and to imaginatively separate it from the epistemological systems
of the mundane world on the other side of the channel. In doing so, however, it reifies the
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irreconcilability of the two. Although he returns from the front, he Blunden is unable to
revert to past methods organizing his experience. He cannot communicate the war across
the boundary established by the otherworld, even to himself. Unable to make the mythic
systems of the past render meaning in the present, he settles instead for documenting an
irresolvable opposition. The fantastic in Undertones of War cannot make modern war
comprehensible, only emphasize those things that place it outside of existing frameworks
of comprehensibility. It does not allow Blunden to place the present in the context of the
past.

In Parenthesis: Talking to the Past

In contrast to Undertones of War, David Jones’s In Parenthesis utilizes the
fantastic in order to seek present-day reconciliation between modernity and antiquity in
the context of the front. In Parenthesis seeks to re-establish the mythic past as a meaningmaking system in the present. The text is a pastiche of Jones’s own wartime experience,
Arthurian romance, and the Welsh Y Gododdin, amalgamated into a single narrative. The
result is a picture of the war that Kathleen Staudt describes “an odd mixture of the
unprecedented and familiar.”203 This description echoes Brian Attebery, who defines
modern fantasy as “a form that makes use of both the fantastic mode, to produce the
impossibilities, and the mimetic, to reproduce the familiar.” 204 If In Parenthesis does not
reproduce the literal barrier between the mundane and the otherworld, as Undertones of
War does, it nonetheless manipulates the contravening associations that define the
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boundary. The fantastical interaction of the two signifying systems reopens the meanings
of Vandiver’s “traditional modes of expression” under the conditions of modern war,
testing their meaning-making capacities in a world whose cultural narratives disintegrated
on the Somme. War provides a mutual signifying context, as a point of both connection
and discord with the past. Although the Great War is “unprecedented in its power,” In
Parenthesis argues that “the men engaged in battle are much the same as they have
always been.”205 If Blunden utilizes the fantastic to interrogate difference in signification
across the home/front boundary, Jones attempts to resolve these differences within the
context of the war.
The otherworld of In Parenthesis differs from that found in Undertones of War
because it is not spatially bounded. Rather, it is palimpsetically overlaid onto the front
itself. The means by which John Ball and his compatriots traverse the boundary are
linguistic and interpretive. Jones creates the differences within his war narrative in part
by intercutting between chivalric prose and modernist formal experimentation. In
Parenthesis thus constitutes a missing link of sorts between the realist war memoirs,
modern fantasy, and the high modernist movement. This liminal quality caused Jones to
long inhabit what Elizabeth Ward has described as an outsider status relative to the
twentieth-century canon, and Thomas Dilworth to lament that “few poets who have been
so highly praised have been so long neglected by the academic establishment.” 206,207 Like
Tolkien, Jones has been accused of what Paul Robichaud calls “romantic nostalgia and
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reactionary ideology” for his writing’s medievalist elements. 208 As noted above, such
critiques stem from a binary logic that defines modernity primarily through its opposition
to antiquity.
Studies of In Parenthesis have been obliged to disregard one or another of its
signifying practices to justify its inclusion or exclusion from literary categories, in the
interest of maintaining stable canonical boundaries. Famously, Paul Fussell’s discussion
in The Great War and Modern Memory treats the mythic elements of In Parenthesis as a
sort of curiosity that needs to be explained away. Fussell characterizes the war as “a
triumph of modern industrialism, materialism, and mechanism,” leaving little or no space
for the soldiers of Welsh and Arthurian myth to signify in the context of the front. 209 As a
result, while he acknowledges the presence of mythic elements in Jones’s poem, Fussell
overlooks or outright denies their capacity to generate meaning. His argument fails to
account for the fantastic. By applying a binary understanding of modernity, Fussell’s
study itself forecloses on the meaning of the text. This is visible his attempt to negotiate
Jones’s authorial status. In the interest of maintaining modern literary boundaries, Fussell
strips the mythic elements from the text:
Jones has attempted in In Parenthesis to elevate the matter of Flanders and
Picardy to the status of the old Matter of Britain. That it refuses to be
elevated, that it resists being subsumed into heroic myth, is less Jones’s
fault than the war’s. The war will not be understood in traditional terms:
the machine gun alone makes it so special and unexpected that it simply
can’t be talked about as is it were one of the conventional wars of history.
Or worse, literary history. What keeps the poem from total success is
Jones’s excessively formal and doctrinal way of fleeing from the literal. 210
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At the core of this passage is an attempt to establish and sustain Jones’s authorial status;
the poem’s failures are “less Jones’s fault than the war’s.” However, to do so credibly, he
must also uphold the foundational principles of contemporary literary criticism, which
proclaim the text’s fundamental unsuitability to its subject matter. Fussell’s core assertion
is that the appropriate mode of writing about the war is the ironic – realistic, and deeply
pessimistic. It “will not be understood in traditional terms,” he insists. Fussell’s use of
“tradition” here is distinct from Eliot’s. Rather than a self-identified and defining literary
lineage, Fussell is using the term in the same way as Elizabeth Vandiver – to describe
antiquated styles and tropes. To treat In Parenthesis as a modern text, therefore, Fussell
effectively disregards a considerable portion of its content.
The premise that Jones’s use of chivalric material constitutes an attempt to
“elevate” the war to “the old Matter of Britain,” rests on the assumption of a one-way
exchange of meaning. In this model, “heroic myth” acts inductively, elevating the Great
War by subsuming the war into itself. But because In Parenthesis comingles the two
registers, the interplay that Attebery identifies as central to modern fantasy causes them
to recontextualize one another. Jonathan Miles, for example, argues that “rather than
ennobling war, [In Parenthesis] re-carnalizes the chivalric tradition.”211 Such a reading
recognizes the ways that modern war reflexively transforms war as an imagined
phenomenon. Because Fussell’s critical model presupposes an appropriate mode for warwriting, he is naturally led to conclude that the fantastic dimensions of the poem
constitute “flight from the literal.” As we have seen, however, literal representation could
not convey the entirety of the war-writers’ experiences. Moreover, Fussell’s phrase
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echoes Tolkien’s own “Flight of the Deserter.” “On Fairy-Stories” contends that this
model misinterprets the type of escape that fantasy affords – willfully, it is implied.
Tolkien argues that the critique emerges from a desire for “acquiescence,” rather than
realism: that the modern subject submit to the primary of modernity, embrace its
rationalist logics, and relinquish efforts to imagine alternatives. By way of contrast, he
offers the “Escape of the Prisoner,” a practice which imagines alternatives in direct
response to unbearable circumstances .212 John Ball’s wartime experience, as portrayed in
In Parenthesis, represents this variety of escape. The fantastic offers the opportunity to
parse and endure modernity by means of antiquity, and in doing so, to revise modernity
in kind.
The otherworld of In Parenthesis is defined less by place than by the distorting
effects the war inflicts on Ball’s experience of it. The boundary between the mundane
and the fantastic is crossed at points when the war provides common context on which
the text’s mutually-interpreting modes can act. The dominant impression conveyed is
thus the sense of occupying an interstice between the past and the present, as the text
transitions freely back and forth between these two inflections. Jones attributes the
poem’s title to this phenomenon. He writes, he says, “in a kind of space between – I don’t
know between quite what … [and] for us amateur soldiers … the war itself was a
parenthesis – how glad we were to step outside its brackets at the end of ’18.” 213 The
impression of being untethered from what comes before and after is itself a characteristic
of the war’s distorting effect. As Ball stands watch on the first night of the Somme, Jones
describes “the ebb time … like no-man’s-land between yesterday and tomorrow and
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material things are but barely integrated and loosely tacked together.” 214 With the
sensation of temporal untethering comes the disintegration of the representational
capacities of concrete signifying systems. Moreover, Jones observes that the soldiers’
“curious type of existence here is altogether in parenthesis.” 215 The distorting effect
persists beyond the end of the war’s end, demonstrating its close connection not to space
but to Blunden’s change in “mental method,” and hindering the ability of returned
soldiers to function in the mundane world.
The mythic material with which In Parenthesis constructs its otherworld is
populated by soldiers who similarly inhabit interstitial moments. This is the trait that
offers Jones the potential to revive their meaning-making capacities in the context of the
early twentieth century. Paul Robichaud describes this as Jones’s fascination with
“cultures in transition: beginnings, ends, and new syntheses.” 216 The use of the fantastic
mode as a transitional apparatus enables Jones to imaginatively identify parallels between
his own experiences and those of the soldiers whose stories had long provided cultural
grounding. This simulates what Kathleen Staudt calls “a continuity of consciousness that
enables these men to survive their increasingly incomprehensible surroundings by
acknowledging their links with sign-makers who fought in past battles.” 217 Bernard
Bergonzi’s Heroes Twilight similarly argues that Jones constructs “an ad hoc frame of
reference from his acquaintance with literature, showing the continuity of human
attitudes in the conditions of battle.”218 Precisely because they exist in the past, therefore,
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these soldiers imply the possibility of moving forward, of exiting the stasis implied by the
“space between” that seems to the returned soldier to be permanent. In other words, they
promise the eventual closure of the parentheses. By using war as common context, Jones
imaginatively creates ancient soldiers and their stories as meaning-making myths,
without the shared cultural assumptions on which they originally relied.
The treatment of the natural world in the poem’s final pages illustrates its use of
the fantastic to repurpose its mythic material in the context of modernity. As Ball, badly
wounded, crawls away from the battle, he enters the domain of the Queen of the Woods.
There, he sees a vision of the dead or otherwise lost members of his battalion. This
passage, derived from Welsh myth, locates in the modern world a version of nature that
predates Enlightenment rationalism. It represents a world ordered by “cycles …
unimpeded by human history.” These cycles promise the return of lost heroes in “a
renewal that transcends the fortunate of battle and arbitrary victories of war.” 219 Nature
here is not a material phenomenon to be quantified, subdued, and supplanted. Moreover,
that the natural world cannot be encompassed by human knowledge, is understood not as
a premodern limitation, but as a comfort. It marks the limits of positivist historical
narratives by positing an ordering principle beyond the rationalist frameworks that
precipitated the front. This natural model is not articulable in a purely modern context; it
can be realized only in an enchanted, premodern world. This illustrates what Jonathan
Miles describes as In Parenthesis “seek[ing] for hope in the ruins” left by the western
front.220 At the same time, however, modern war exerts a disruptive effect on nature myth
through the ways it reevaluates the potency of the natural world. An allusion to the
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destruction wrought by the Boar Trwyth, a mythic Celtic behemoth, evokes parallels with
the effects of industrialized warfare on western Europe. 221 Though mythologized, the
boar represents a fundamentally natural force; yet its closest equivalent is a detonating
chemical shell. Kathleen Staudt argues that this episode calls attention to “magically and
ultimately natural evils of legend, over which no humans had control, and the evils of the
contemporary world order, which are largely human-made, yet which violate our
nature.”222 Thus, if premodern ideas of nature offer hope in modern war, the war calls
attention to the destructive forces of nature.
As the paradigm of the otherworld dictates, however, In Parenthesis is equally
concerned with the differences that distinguish its parallel modes and their associated
time periods. This opposition is the source of Ball’s (as well as the text’s) dilemma: how
best to interpret and thereby navigate the front. For Jones, the essential difference is a
question of epistemologies, and ways of being in the world:
[We] are generally at one with the creaturely world inherited from our
remote beginnings … Yet must we do gas-drill, be attuned to many
newfangled technicalities, respond to increasingly exacting mechanical
devices; some fascinating and compelling, others sinister in the extreme,
all requiring a strange and new direction of the mind.223
Jones’s description suggests a novel alienation from the patterns and orders of the natural
world, distinguished by the reordering of mechanization, and the change it effects in the
minds of those obliged to navigate it. Because this reordering occurs through willful
human action, and yet without a viable humanist framework through which to
comprehend it, it defies claims of continuity. The “new and strange direction of the
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mind,” which emerges in response, “makes nonsense of the unity that an older culture
saw between the embrace of lovers and the embrace of battle,” as the epistemological
parallels that govern the representation of war disintegrate. 224 Thus, though the text
passes freely back and forth between its two signifying frameworks, it cannot inhabit
both in the same breath. The effect is to demand a choice between the two – to insist that
Ball, and the reader, select an actionable mode of interpretation.
The preface of In Parenthesis gestures this dilemma, and to the ultimate
irreconcilability of the text’s dual modes. The preface emphasizes that In Parenthesis
confines itself to the early years of the war, concluding “early in July 1916.” After this
date, it tells us, the war “hardened into a more relentless, mechanical affair.” The early
portion featured “elbow-room for idiosyncrasy that connected one with a less excited past
… [which] seemed to terminate after the Somme.”225 This suggests that the capacity of
the fantastic to render meaning through traditional mythic systems in the context of
modern war is negated by later events. It is thus a tacit admission of the limits inherent in
the representational strategy of In Parenthesis. Deploying the fantastic in parallel with
the mimetic necessarily arrives at an impasse where a choice must be made between the
two, as one or the other loses its capacity to signify. Ending the narrative at this point
suggests either an inability or unwillingness to foreclose potential meanings by settling
on a single interpretive lens. The ambivalence this creates reflects contemporary cultural
searches for meaning. Paul Robichaud has argued that Jones emphasizes “cultural
transformation [that] addresses the upheavals of mid-twentieth-century Europe, but also
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potentially speaks to our own sense of being postmodern, but not yet something else.” 226
Through its refusal to narrate beyond the Somme, In Parenthesis emblematizes the
uncertainty of a culture whose available myths have ceased to provide meaning, but
which has yet to produce viable replacements.
The final chapter of In Parenthesis presents John Ball with the dilemma of
choosing between these two unsustainable signifying schemas. The text concludes with
an extended account of the Somme assault on Mamet Wood. During the battle, Ball’s
battalion is sent to dislodge a German gun emplacement. Ball is seriously wounded (as
was Jones), and he escapes back into the woods. In this passage, the various linguistic
registers of the text intermingle and collide. Modernity blends with antiquity, bringing
their contradictions to a crisis point. The elevating language of myth intermingles with
cockney slang. The naturalistic landscape of the woods becomes indistinguishable from
the technologies of war operating within it. The soldiers’ bodies intermingle with the
technology used to make them appear whole: “glass eyes to see/and synthetic space parts
to walk in the Triumphs.”227 Even the physical shape of the poem blurs the boundaries
between its competing registers. Lines are arranged as if they belong to an epic poem, but
they follow no consistent meter, and later abandon this organization in favor of prose. As
a result, the account resists evaluation in terms of any single standard or set of
expectations. But it also displays the unsustainability of a war account that operates on
multiple, contradictory signifying systems. As the text shifts between interpretive lenses
at increasing speed, and ultimately undermines the distinction, the effect on the reader is
dizzying. Neither the modern nor the antique context can be understood without the
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other, and yet the meaning-making structures do not transfer. These clashing contexts,
and the tipping point to which they bring the text, are embodied in the time and space of
the Mamet Wood assault.
Ball’s rifle exemplifies the affinities and contradictions that create tension
between the modern and antique models of war. It thus comprises the focal point of
Ball’s choice between fantasy and reality. The rifle is invested with the various contexts
that define the Great War: positivist ideology, relationships between human and
technology, and heroic virtue. When Ball is wounded during the assault, he is obliged to
abandon the rifle as he makes his way to safety. The momentousness of his decision is
marked by an extended reflection on the weapon’s value and significance. The text
presents the rifle in terms that endow something like personal weapon of a chivalric hero,
but which also mark it unmistakably as a product of industrial manufacture.
It’s the thunder-besom for us/
it’s the bright bough borne/
it’s the tensioned yew for a Genoese jammed arbalest … It’s R. S. M.
O’Grady/
says, it’s the soldier’s best friend if you care for the working parts and let
us be/
‘aving those springs released smartly in company billets on wet forenoons
…’228
The successive parallel definitions evoke correlative weapons of history and myth.
“[T]hunder-besom” suggests an ancient, mythic weapon that draws on the power of
nature, reflecting the problematic conflation of nature and technology that helped to
create the representational challenges of the front. The alliterative structure of “bright
bough borne” mimics the chivalric romance, hinting at a sacral character to the weapon’s
potency. On the other hand, the “Genoese jammed arbalest,” an early predecessor of the
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gun, points toward the beginnings of mechanization in warfare while still maintaining an
ironic distance from the mass-produced materiel of the Great War. The effect is an almost
biblical recitation of the rifle’s epistemological ancestry, which then collapses into R. S.
M. O’Grady’s affected, civilian cockney. The rifle’s mythic weight collides with the
banality of modern, industrialized war. It is both deeply personal and standard issue. The
passage comprises Ball’s elegiac reverie for the weapon when he is obliged to abandon it.
Yet O’Grady’s apparent interruption of this reflective moment actually continues the
catalogue by carrying on the rifle’s redefinition. Although his entry is marked by an
ironic/realist turn in language, it is only the competing modern framework – the “mental
method” – that meaningfully distinguishes it. The disjunctive effect is the result of
irreconcilable interpretive lenses. These collaborate in the creation of the meaning with
which Ball’s rifle is invested, but they likewise demand a determination on the part of the
reader and Ball himself.
The text attempts to solve this crisis by further integrating its interpretive lenses in
the character of the rifle. As Ball continues to reflect on his dilemma, the rifle’s dual
natures begin to collaborate in the construction of meaning. Its technical specificities are
cast as the source of its distinctiveness. It is through the mechanical particularities that
Ball recognizes the rifle as his own. As it more greatly emphasizes minute, technical
details, the text personifies the rifle, and references shift from the use of “it” to “her,”
seeming briefly to take on the character of a romantic ode:
You’ve known her hot and cold.
You would choose her from among many.
You know her by her bias, and by her exact error at 300, and by the deep
scar at the small, by the fair flaw in her grain, above the lower sling-swivel
– but leave it under the oak.229
229

Jones, 184.

129

The affection expressed is not realized through the weapon’s accomplishments or sacred
character, but through its seemingly insignificant details – even, and perhaps particularly,
through its flaws. And yet, because they mark the weapon as Ball’s, they cause it to take
on a personal weight more often associated with the hero’s weapon. The rifle’s
uniqueness, along with the attendant personification, emerges through the remnants of
mass production that mark it. In effect, this passage constitutes an attempt to derive
traditional mythic significance from the modern. It practices Attebery’s “yoking [of] two
incompatible systems of belief” by locating the rifle at the intersection of two cultural
frameworks.230 Without traditional mythic context, the idea of a personified weapon
would be unintelligible; Ball’s decision to leave it behind would be meaningless. Without
the context of the modern, the rifles would be unremarkable; modernity provides it with
specificity and thus distinctiveness. Because these competing contexts conspire to
provide the weapon with its unique significance, Ball’s decision to abandon it is
momentous, and disrupts their momentary, unstable equilibrium. The return to “it” in the
final line resonates because it signifies a disavowal of the tensions the rifle exemplifies.
That the rifle’s distinctiveness emerges from its apparent interchangeability
evokes the fungibility with which industrialized war endows soldiers. Recalling the later
portions of the war, Jones remarks “how impersonal … each new draft” of incoming
soldiers began to appear.231 The relationship between Ball and his rifle calls into question
the concept of standard-issue materiel, implicitly critiquing the anonymity of and the
soldiers who will step in to replace Ball. Bergonzi’s Heroes Twilight argues that Ball
himself epitomizes this fungibility in the form of an everyman status that is itself derived
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from mythic sources. Through Ball, Jones “reproduces a set of shared experience and
transcends the limitations of the purely individual standpoint.” But, in keeping with the
pattern identified above, he notes that the modern world lacks “a shared scheme of
communal values and assumptions,” preventing the reader from fully identifying with
Ball.232 What we have, then, is two distinct models of anonymity, which once again
collaborate and clash in constructing meaning around Ball. Anonymity in the traditional,
everyman sense, mingles with anonymity as interchangeable human materiel. Ball, like
his rifle, is suspended between these two interpretive possibilities. Either his anonymity
makes him representative, or it makes him replaceable. Even if both are true, they are
mutually unsustainable; one must ultimately win out. Neither interpretive framework
provides a definitive guide to action.
By abandoning the rifle, therefore, Ball rejects the interpretive dilemma it
represents. Though it is tempting to read his choice as a straightforward pacifist rejection
of warfare (and certainly this dimension is present), this ignores the meanings with which
the text invests the rifle. It has been interwoven with the contradictory cultural
frameworks that instruct Ball on his relationship with war as such. Moreover, his decision
does not proceed from a rational evaluation of his dilemma. Indeed, “but leave it under
the oak” seems to interrupt his contemplation, apparently without proximate cause. Ball
acts on a pre-rational desire for survival, which effaces his deliberative process entirely.
Emphasizing this, Ball’s decision is portrayed concurrently with his vision of the Queen
of the Woods, perhaps the most explicitly fantastic moment of the text. The Queen,
whose closest corollary is the traditional fairy queen, holds court over Ball’s killed and
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otherwise lost comrades, standing vigil for the dead and honoring the living. Staudt
argues that she represents the culmination of a cycle of renewal, contrasting the rituals of
the front, “in which human sacrifice takes place without a consequent renewal of the
land.”233 But we might rather see the literalization of both sides of Tolkien’s Escape of
the Prisoner/Flight of the Deserter dichotomy. Ball’s retreat certainly suggests desertion,
fleeing the front to the relative safety of the fantastic forest. At the same time, however,
he acts in response to the unbearable circumstance of modern war, in the interest of his
very survival. Ball’s course manifests the fraught status of the fantastic in the modern
world. It is both necessary and suspect, a retreat and an escape.
Moreover, the text rejects the fantastic as a livable state. The Queen’s dominance
over the scene quickly gives way to the mundane again. In seeming response to his
vision, Ball finally discards the rifle, giving way to the relative peace provided by a tree
trunk to slump against. There he waits, “next to the Jerry/and Sergeant Jerry Coke,”
waiting for stretcher-bearers to carry them further from the battle. 234 The text concludes
with an ironic declaration of its significance, having failed to derive actionable guidance
from the events it portrays. This is true whether they are cast as fantastic or mundane; the
Queen of the Woods is no more viable in a modern context than the madness and
violence of the front. Although a comfort, the renewal she offers is not sustainable, nor
does the text provide any clear means to attain it in the first place. The idea of renewal,
with its attendant return to a pre-modern relationship to nature, is only expressible via
imaginative access to the unreal.
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In Parenthesis constructs an otherworld from linguistic registers that represent
opposing epistemologies, but their mutual irreconcilability prevents Ball from learning to
navigate either one. The cultural beliefs that underpin genuine myth and make it
actionable are absent in the modern world. The realities of modern war, on the other
hand, are incomprehensible precisely because they lack these contexts. The existing
myths on which Jones draws are incapable of maintaining a meaning-making balance
with modernity. The text thus concludes with an aporia. Ball, unable to make rational
sense of the war, finds that myth is only accessible via the fantastic. He thus rejects the
question. All that remains as a motivating force is survival instinct, giving way to
resignation when he exhausts himself.

J. R. R. Tolkien: A Mythology of Modernity

Like Blunden and Jones, J. R. R. Tolkien was trouble by the inability of
traditional frameworks to render modern war comprehensible. In contrast, however,
Tolkien circumvented representational strategies as a primary solution. Instead, Tolkien
constructed a speculative otherworld, located in the past, and capable of anticipating the
uniquely modern horrors of the First World War. The resultant texts inscribe the
destructive potential of industrialized warfare backward into mythic antiquity. Blunden
and Jones draw on traditional mythic material to represent the war, and both ultimately
arrive at a limit to myth’s capacity to render meaning from the experience. Tolkien’s
contemporary work, on the other hand, invests the mythic tradition with the disruptive
lessons of modernity. These early writings utilize the fantastic to revise civilizational
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narratives constructed around positivist ideologies. They imagine a cultural myth that is,
from its inception, seeded with the potential for the Somme. Nature in these texts is
portrayed in technological terms, retroactively creating a precedent for modern advances
that elevated technology to the level of natural phenomena. This enables a strategy that
does not seek to render the war on its own terms, in which it appears to be an
impossibility. By allowing the modern to reevaluate and revise myth, the fantastic
permits Tolkien to engage directly with the epistemological conflicts the war engendered.
These writings, in other words, constitute an attempt to construct a mythic system
capable of providing structure to, and extracting meaning from, modern war.
By abandoning realistic representation, Tolkien’s work in part occludes its own
connection and response to the front. The influence of the war on his writing can thus be
difficult to detect. This is particularly true of his later work, which exhibits a tendency to
suppress even further those affinities that are detectable in earlier versions. But even in
these texts, the Great War at times peeks through, and when it does, it is often in the
landscapes that make up Tolkien’s otherworld. Ironically, much as Blunden’s landscape
is a vehicle for the fantastic, in Tolkien’s fantastic narrative, the landscape suggests
something of the real. Each gestures toward the other by its disruptive present. Tolkien
has famously acknowledged, for example, that “The Dead Marshes and the approaches to
the Morannon owe something to Northern France after the Battle of the Somme.” 235 The
two landscapes – one a sunken, corpse-choked mire, the other a rocky, barren wasteland
– certainly conjure images of No Man’s Land. It is fair to suggest that many young
people first encounter the imagery of the Somme in Mordor, or first imagine the
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sensation of barbed wire in its brambles and their “long stabbing thorns … hooked barbs
that rent like knifes.”236 But representation here merely gestures at deeper affinities.
Mordor realizes the dominance of technological systems over the natural world. By the
time of its conception, however, this affinity had been concealed both by Tolkien’s
decades of revision, as well as the expectations of twentieth-century literature that had
been established by modernist literary criticism.
Tolkien’s wartime writing more clearly presents a historical narrative that creates
an imaginative line of identification between the soldiers of the Great War and their
mythic counterparts. In these early texts, explicitly located in the ancient past of earth,
violence and glorious battle repeatedly diminish the world, only for the diminished world
to forget the lessons of the past. John Clute refers to this process as “thinning” – the
perpetual process by which modern high fantasy worlds forget and fail the promise of
their pasts. In this light, positivist historical narratives only appear coherent because of
the recurrent forgetting that effaces their consequences. The Book of Lost Tales embodies
this dynamic because it is presented as a historical narrative, told by a defeated people to
an uninitiated listener. The listener – Eriol or Ælfwine, varying according to time of
writing – is an explorer from mainland Europe. At the opening of the narrative, he is
shipwrecked on the shores of ancient not-yet-England. The majority of the text
reproduces the mythic prehistory of his own continent that he learns from the island’s
elven inhabitants.237 Ælfwine’s ignorance of his own history thus appears as the result of
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a long process of cultural forgetting. This prehistory is comprised of a series of stories in
which an immense, extended war coincides with the downward trajectory of Tolkien’s
diminishing world. In effect, The Book of Lost Tales is the story of Ælfwine re-learning
the disastrous consequences of warfare, millennia before Tolkien’s generation believed
itself to have made the discovery. Because it presents the narrative from the perspective
of an uncomprehending learner, The Book of Lost Tales argues that the inhabitants of
history always experience their present as an upheaval – a moment defined by the
overthrow of what has come before. Tolkien locates common ground between
contemporary soldiers and his mythic figures precisely in the uncertainty of
unprecedented experience, and the attendant imperative to re-evaluate and revise the past.
The text highlights their own sense of being modern, of inhabiting a transitionary state in
the way described by Paul de Man. Like Blunden and Private Ball, Tolkien’s characters
perpetually renegotiate frameworks that no longer provide guidance in new and
unimaginable contexts. The potential for the seeming break with continuity experienced
in the First World War is made implicit in his mythic structure.
Similarly, The Book of Lost Tales seeds its mythology with technology’s potential
overthrow of nature by creating linguistic affinities between natural and technological
processes. Nature and technology are intermingled into a single ordering principle,
distinguished from one another primarily by interpretive framework. Once again, because
this is established in a mythic context, located in the imaginative past, the Tales create a
precedent for the apparent upending of natural hierarchies by the front. This is evident
from the beginning of the narrative – Tolkien’s take on the biblical Genesis story. This
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story of Arda’s creation might better be described as the story of its “construction.” The
account reads as much like an artisan’s undertaking as it does a mythic narrative. The
Valar, Tolkien’s deific pantheon, are granted a vision of the world as it is meant to be.
Taking this vision to be a sort of blueprint, they descend into the primordial world in
order to implement it. They construct “two towers” to light the world, one each “to the
North and South … upon them mighty lamps one upon each.” 238 The source of light for
Tolkien’s prehistoric world is thus technological – produced by ingenuity, rather than
decree or natural inclination. To a twentieth-century reader, the lamps are neither magical
nor mysterious: they differ only in scale and potency from commonplace modern
technology. The text further demystifies the lamps by focusing on minute details, such as
the material from which they are constructed: “fashion[ed] of gold and silver, and the
pillars … shone like blue crystal; and … rang like metal” when struck. It is Melko,
Tolkien’s Lucifer analog, who attempts to observe the mundane utility of the lamps. He
claims to have made the pillars from “an imperishable substance that he had devised; and
he lied, for he knew that they were made of ice.” 239 This lie is an attempt to elevate
himself by concealing a fundamental truth: the natural world of Arda is a sort of
superlative technological system, rather than something ontologically distinct. These
primordial light sources differ from floor lamps in their substance in scale – not in their
essential type. By this logic, dominance over the natural order simply constitutes access
to higher technology. According to this mythic logic, the “demonic world” of the front is
explicable because its potential is implicit in the creation of the earth.
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What we might call the technologizing of the natural order is a consistent trope in
The Book of Lost Tales, particularly those sections that deal with the actions and methods
of the Valar. These divine beings operate less like gods enacting their wills than like
artisans of immense scale and skill. They shape the world via direct interaction on the
material level, manipulating matter much as a craftsman might, despite operating on a
mythic scale. The sun, for example, is created by enclosing the celestial body inside the
rind of an enormous fruit. But even as it advances this fantastic premise, the text devotes
particular attention to the material properties of the object and the physical demands of
the task:
Thereupon began the great smithying of the Sun, and this was the most
cunning and marvelous of all the works of Aulë … Of that perfect rind a
vessel did he make, diaphanous and shining, yet of a tempered strength,
for with spells of his own he overcame its brittleness nor in any way was
its subtle delicacy thereby diminished … [He] fashioned that vessel like a
great ship broad of beam, laying one half of the rind within the other so
that its strength might not be broken.240
Described explicitly as a “smithying,” the process is portrayed chiefly as the overcoming
of a series of technical challenges. In effect, the text describes a feat of engineering. The
brittleness needs to be addressed. It needs to be both beautiful and strong. The solutions
blend the fantastic (“spells of his own”) with the mundane (laying the rinds together to
double their strength). Neither is obviously privileged above, or even clearly
differentiated from, the other. At such an extreme remove from twentieth-century
modernity, interpretive lenses coalesce in a way like that experienced by soldiers on the
front. The concluding image inverts the epistemological hierarchy that we might expect.
The sun’s fashioning is compared to the manner of a ship, rather than vice versa; the
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technological referent is given primacy in the construction of meaning. 241 By presenting
nature as a system subject to technological frameworks, the text anticipates the upending
of Enlightenment hierarchies that is observable in accounts of the front.
This reading complicates portrayals of Tolkien that cast him as simply antimodern. Such arguments tend to assert that his work is “largely born out of a reaction
against the modern world in which he lived: nostalgia and wish-fulfillment.” 242 These
readings, however, rely on the assumption of a clear distinction between past and present
within Tolkien’s writing. Rather, in my reading, the conditions that give rise to the crises
of twentieth-century modernity, particularly those that characterize writing of the Great
War, are written into Tolkien’s mythic past. Broadly speaking, the arc of history in The
Book of Lost Tales represents the process by which these conditions manifest in the
changing relationships between the world’s peoples and the natural world. Consequently,
rather than an unprecedented upheaval, contemporary modernity is cast as the latest
manifestation of a process that is synonymous with the positivist march of civilization.
Tolkien’s narrative draws a straight line between the mythic past and the Great War. This
is distinct from a simple equation in which technological progress invariably signifies the
downfall of civilization. Such a worldview could justifiably be called regressive. Rather,
technology in Tolkien’s cosmology has something of an ambivalent status; the value of a
given technological innovation is derived from the type of relationship it engenders with
the world at large. The undertakings of the Vala, Aulë, model technological innovation as
craftsmanship, which is defined by mutual accomplishment and enrichment. As is the
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case with the Sun, Aulë’s inventions are intended for general betterment. This model is
contrasted by the works produced by Melko, which engender dominance. 243 His creations
most often facilitate the pursuit of war – a version of war that bears striking similarities to
modern industrialized warfare. Melko’s invention of weaponry epitomizes this dynamic.
Weaponry first appears in the Tales when Melko arms himself with “swords very sharp
and cruel” in order to murder a contingent of guards and make off with the Silmarils –
holy heirlooms of an Elven family. 244 This murder and theft precipitates the extended
downfall of the elves that Galadriel describes in The Fellowship of the Ring as “the long
defeat.”245 In contrast to Aulë’s work, the passage describing the theft emphasizes the
violence and violation for which weaponry was invented. The Book of Lost Tales thus
contextualizes technology by its use, rather than its function or categorization. The
demonic in Tolkien’s otherworld is thus a manifestation of the same Enlightenment
ideology that “seeks [only] to learn from nature … how to dominate wholly both it and
other human beings.”246
In “The Fall of Gondolin,” Tolkien’s mythic narrative explicitly positions an army
of chivalric romance against a modern, mechanized force. The tale clearly manifests the
ambivalence of weapons of war in Tolkien’s writing, and also contains the clearest
reference to the Great War in any of his fiction. It constitutes an exploration of the
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contradictions between traditional ideals of war and the carnage of the western front.
Among the first sections of The Book of Lost Tales to be written, the story was (perhaps
apocryphally) begun in the trenches, and completed during Tolkien’s recovery from
trench foot in an English hospital. It is the first of several texts that describe Melko’s
sudden offensive against the heretofore hidden city of Gondolin, the last stronghold of the
elves in Beleriand. The account includes an extensive epic catalogue of the arms and
insignia of eleven noble houses within the city’s forces. This includes each house’s
colors, insignia, leader, and character, all rendered in language that emphasizes their
beauty, nobility, and heroism. Tolkien dials up his signature archaic language, as well,
including the frequent inversion of syntax. The effect is to elevate and aestheticize the
army, and to emphasize its antiquity in contrast to Melko’s forces. The house of
Echthelion is representative:
the people of the Fountain, and Echtelion was their lord, and silver and
diamonds were their delight; and their swords very long and bright and
pale did they wield, and they went into battle to the music of flutes. 247
We picture a highly aestheticized scene. The description emphasizes artistry and
craftsmanship in their equipment, even including music. To a twentieth-century reader,
this image is naturally suspect. In fact, Fussell has described such language as one of “the
ultimate casualties of [The Great War].”248 In part because of the lessons of the war, we
have learned to see such high-minded language as a contrivance to conceal horrific
realities and render them tolerable. Tolkien’s use of such language thus exposes him to
potential accusations that he is complicit in perpetuation of such horrors. But by locating
his conflict in the mythic past, Tolkien emphasizes the commonality between the armies
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of Gondolin and twentieth-century subalterns. Both are the helpless victims of
industrialized warfare. The aestheticization of the elven army contrasts and thus
emphasizes the violence of modern war, rather than concealing it.
Melko’s forcers are perhaps best described as a technological demonic horde. His
weaponry amalgamates fantastic creatures with modern technology, recalling Sassoon’s
dozing dragons and Blunden’s monstrous field guns. These passages emphasize the
lethality and ingenuity of Melko’s war machines:
[Of] iron and flame they wrought a host of monsters … Some were all of
iron so cunningly linked that they might flow like slow rivers of metal …
and these were filled to their innermost depths with Orcs … others of
bronze and copper were given hearts and spirits of blazing fire … yet
others were creatures of pure flame that writhed like ropes of molten
metal.249
This passage is perhaps the closest Tolkien comes to over reference to industrialized
warfare at any point in his mythology. We discern echoes of troop transports, tanks, and
perhaps even flamethrowers. The chivalric romances that British soldiers relied on to
navigate war are pitted against the violent reality that they encountered on the front. The
city is ruined, and its inhabitants slaughtered, effectively consigning the last bastion of
chivalric romance to the past. As Melko’s army overwhelms the city’s defense, the text
metonymically emphasizes those traits it shares with modern war machines. The house of
Rog is overcome by “iron and flame;” “serpents of bronze with great feet for trampling
… [climb] over those of iron.”250 The traditional heroic image of combat is overwhelmed
by the modern army.
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The temptation to read this as a simple nostalgic allegory of an idealized past and
an inglorious present is complicated by the origin shared by the elves’ and Melko’s
weaponry. Melko is no less responsible for the creation of swords than for his iron
monsters. He is likewise the first known to wield a weapon of any sort in violence.
Despite the apparent nobility of their bearing, the elves’ weapons are of the same
essential type as Melko’s. The aestheticizing lens through which the text portrays them is
undermined by and exposed as precisely what it is – a lens applied to the object, an
interpretive framework. The swords manifest the same relationship of dominance to the
world at large as iron serpents and field guns, only less effectively. Only because they are
comparatively primitive, and therefore inferior in positivist terms, are they imaginatively
differentiated. Recall also that the accounts in The Book of Lost Tales are contextualized
within the narrative as stories of the distant past. The aestheticizing lens is thus the
manifestation of a nostalgic perspective within the text, and like the narrative to which it
is applied, is dismantled via the destructive potency of modernized, material power.
“Turambar and the Foalókë,” which appears in close proximity to “The Fall of
Gondolin,” demonstrates the ambivalence of traditionally chivalric weaponry within
Tolkien’s mythos. Like Private Ball, Turambar carries and identifies with a personified
companion weapon – a sword, in this case, rather than a rifle. The sword, known as
Gurtholfin, exhibits the characteristics of a traditional hero’s weapon far more than does
Ball’s rifle. It is a sword, rather than a mass-produced, standard issue rifle. Unlike Ball’s
rifle, Gurtholfin is not distinguished by minute imperfections. It is remarkable from its
very creation. Gurtholfin is forged at Turambar’s request by an elven king, “made by
magic to be utterly black save at its edges, and those were shining bright and sharp as but
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Gnome-steel may be.”251 It is furthermore forged not for a random battalion member on
an indeterminate assignment, but for the classical hero to reclaim the homes of the king’s
people. Gurtholfin is possessed of narrative weight; it lacks the arbitrariness of the massproduced modern weapon. This is reinforced by giving it a name, rendering it singular,
and placing it in the literary tradition of swords like Excalibur and Beowulf’s Hrunting.
On the surface, therefore, Gurtholfin embodies a tradition that elevates and ennobles
combat, that emphasizes heroism and conceals brutality.
However, more even than Ball, Turambar finds his weapon unsuited for heroic
undertakings. Rather than nobility, Gurtholfin comes to emblematize the amorality and
ambivalence inherent in weaponry and warfare. Its name, we are told, translates to
“Wand of Death.”252 The name emphasizes the sword’s destructive power, rather than the
nobility of its purpose. But this is occluded by adherence to the tradition of the named
weapon, concealing its meaning behind the translation. The uses to which Turambar puts
the sword over the course of the narrative similar emphasize its violent nature. The intent
with which he wields the weapon is frequently compromised. The campaign for which
the blade is forged draws undue attention from his enemies, and exposes the secret
kingdom of the elven king, Orodreth, resulting in its assault and downfall. Turambar’s
defense of the stronghold recalls the heroic last stand of any number of honorable
warriors, but it is distinguished primarily by brutality and irrelevance. With Gurtholfin in
hand, the attackers “fall thick about him,” but he is neutralized somewhat pathetically
when a battalion of archers fire on him. He is then unceremoniously driven off by the
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approach of Glorund, the Foalókë (dragon) of the title.253 As one might expect of the
hero, Turambar does return to slay the dragon, but even this is a compromised, and
distinctly a-heroic victory. Having settled in (and taken over) a woodsmen’s village,
Turambar is given the task of protecting them from Glorund, who is expanding his
territory. On his approach, Glorund is obliged to throw himself across a narrow gorge in
order to cross a river below. Rather than confront the dragon in an appropriately heroic
battle, Turambar climbs into the gorge, and clings to the wall as he waits for Glorund to
pass. When the dragon crosses over, exposing his underside, Turambar thrusts Gurtholfin
“into the vitals of the dragon even to the hilt.” 254 This ultimate heroic act instead takes on
the character on an a-heroic, even cowardly ambush. Once Glorund has stopped
thrashing, Turambar retrieves the sword, not out of loyalty or affection, but because he
“[cherishes it] beyond all his possessions, because all things died, or man or beast, whom
once its edges bit.”255 Both the selfishness of his motive and the nature of Gurtholfin’s
value here emphasize Turambar’s violent, rather than heroic, character. The passage
moreover inverts the interaction between Private Ball and his rifle. Where Ball abandons
the rifle despite his affection, for the salvation of his own life, Turambar retrieves the
sword, despite feeling no affection toward it, because of its efficiency in taking the lives
of others.
When Turambar puts Gurtholfin to purely aggressive use, however, it is
remarkably effective. When he embraces the violent intent inherent in the sword’s
function, the text tends to validate the action by describing it in explicitly violent terms. (I
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mean here “validate” in the sense of illustrating consistency between action and intent,
rather than endorsing the morality of the actions themselves). When Turambar kills the
Easterling Brodda, who has taken over his childhood home, he “[leaps] upon the high
place and ere Brodda might foresee the act he drew Gurtholfin and seizing Brodda by the
locks all but [smites] his head from his body.” 256 The language emphasizes both the
violence and unjustified nature of Brodda’s killing. The account makes clear that he is
attacked without warning, and given no chance to defend himself. Moreover, Brodda has
invited him to the table and offered him food. Brodda’s murder (it clearly is murder), is
therefore also a violation of the principle of hospitality. To emphasize this, the text
explicitly describes Turambar’s actions as “violent and unlawful.” 257 That the strike
(nearly) takes Brodda’s head off his shoulders both demonstrates the force of the blow
and gives a visceral impression of the death itself. The brute physicality of the act lends it
something of the grotesque character that accompanies death in accounts of the Great
War. Gurtholfin finds its greatest efficacy in amoral, mundane slaughter, its nearest
affinity with the bayonet.
Gurtholfin’s final act confirms its essentially violent character, and confirms the
ambivalence with which such violence operates. Following Glorund’s death, Turambar is
made to see through his own heroic pretensions, perceiving himself as a self-important
dupe of fate. Despairing of his futile and ultimately destructive life, he begs the sword to
kill him. This is the only instance in which the sword speaks for itself, and it takes the
opportunity to assert its own motivation:
“Hail, Gurtholfin, wand of death, for thou art all men’s bane and all men’s
lives fain wouldst thou drink… [S]lay me therefore and be swift, for life is
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a curse…” And Gurtholfin said: “That I will gladly do, for blood is blood,
and perchance thine is not less sweet than many a one’s that thou has
given me ere now.”258
Gurtholfin’s declaration confirms the indifference of violence and weaponry to loyalty or
intent. We see here another inversion of Private Ball and his rifle: where Ball chose to
abandon its rifle, Gurtholfin here abandons its master. Or perhaps more accurately, it
refutes that idea that it had a relationship to Turambar at all. In fact, this is a much more
radical rejection of traditional chivalric romance than that undertaken by Jones. Ball is
obligated by the circumstances and dangers of modern war to forego his feelings of
attachment to his weapon. Turambar, in contrast, is not forced to consign his ideals to the
past by new or unique circumstances. Rather, he finds that the ideal of noble violence has
always been a fiction. Through the apparatus of the fantastic past, Tolkien projects the
patterns and lessons of modern war backwards, revising the mythic systems on which
traditional models of noble warfare depend.
If the tales project recurrent knowledge backward, the figure of Ælfwine allows
the text to project it forward. He functions as a link between the fantastic past and
modernity – “a witness and participant who observes, often experiences, and in some
fashion transmits to others the stories in which he appears.” 259 As the naïve hearer of the
tales, Ælfwine is the lens through which the reader gains access, both to the stories and to
the disruptive affect they have on received narratives of progress. The reader learns as he
learns. But Ælfwine is positioned in the distant past as well – just not as distant as the
tales. The reader is effectively ignorant twice over, both to the tales and to Ælfwine. His
lessons have apparently been lost by to the reader, just as the tales were lost to him. The
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text establishes a continuity between the reader and Ælfwine through the perpetual and
ubiquitous process of forgetting. At any single point in time, one feels oneself in a state
of relative discontinuity. In fact, they are failing to properly conceptualize the past,
projecting illusory ideological narratives backward, with themselves as the imaginative
locus that links the past to the future. The Book of Lost Tales imaginatively constitutes a
secret prehistory that ultimately recodes and recontextualizes traditional mythic systems.
The ideals derived from these traditions appear to be misinterpretations, even delusions.
The positivist narratives that drove hundreds of thousands into No Man’s Land are
exposed and revealed to be grounded in fundamentally distorted images of the past.
The consequences of this distortion are explored in the final, unfinished chapter of
The Book of Lost Tales. The remaining fragments appear to return to the ruined landscape
of the Western Front. Ælfwine is given a glimpse of the future; the images recall realist
accounts of No Man’s Land and its “demonic world.”
[A]ll the beauty that was yet on earth… now goeth it all up in smoke… the
setting of the Sun was blackened with the reek of fires, and the waters of
the stream were fouled with the war of men and grime of strife… the
destroying hands of men had torn the heather and the fern and burnt them
to make sacrifice to Melko and to lust of ruin.260
Such a scene would not be out of place in Blunden or Sassoon. Human activity is
elevated to such an extreme that it is able to fundamentally alter the natural world. The
sun is occluded, streams are turned foul, and “all the beauty on the earth” is negated by
violent industrial activity. Imaginatively located at the end of Tolkien’s tales, however,
the scene is no longer inexplicable as it was for the British army. Rather, it represents the
logical endpoint of a practice of domination reaching back to antiquity, whose origins and
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consequences have been concealed by time and illusion. This demonic landscape is no
longer a violation of the principles of civilization; it is their ultimate realization. It is not
clear, however, whether Ælfwine is witnessing a future that is the result of his meeting
with the elves, whether it is something his knowledge empowers him to prevent, or
whether the unfolding of history is indifferent to his actions. Thus, while the fantastic
allows Tolkien to speculatively construct a mythology that anticipates modern war, it
nonetheless remains unclear whether it offers any actionable guidance for living in
modernity.
Because it imaginatively freed language from the demand of verifiability, the
fantastic provided a means by which to imagine new logics that had the potential to
resolve the dilemmas of modernity. But in so doing, it altered the sources from which the
imaginative frameworks emerged. This in turn created a new dilemma: how to address
the transformative effect that their experience has on the myths which previously offered
guidance? Blunden and Jones, each in his own way, respond by spatially and
linguistically coding traditional material within and against fantastic otherworlds, located
alongside the modern. Each, however, ultimately encounters limits to this strategy.
Blunden is obliged to settle for an irreconcilable binary; Jones disavows the question
entirely. Tolkien’s early writings suggest an attempt to concretize the ways in which
modern violence revises mythic imagination. The present inflects his imagined past,
redefining it via the mechanism of the fantastic, thus opening it to the generation of new
meanings. But while Tolkien finds the means to make modernity explicable via myth, he
nonetheless appears at a loss for actionable guidance in the modern context. If the
transition to the fantastic renders the war in some way communicable, the transition back
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seems to negate the meanings created. It is as if, like the traveler who stumbles into the
otherworld, and the soldier who finds himself on the front, the stories cannot pass through
unchanged. What remains is the question: how are we to grapple with these irrevocably
changed epistemologies? What new significance do these works take on if they represent
not merely a break with the past, but a deep and permanent reimagining of it? What new
shape does In Parenthesis take if Private Ball is a lens on the story of King Arthur or Y
Gododdin, rather than the primary subject? If we can no longer think of the Somme River
without conjuring images of tank warfare, we can equally no longer think of Excalibur
without invoking Private Ball’s abandoned gun. Each renders the other in new terms in
order to better represent new conditions. And, as we will see in the next chapter, to better
respond to new needs.
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Chapter 3: War Trauma and the Fantastic

Although the realities of the Great War defied mimetic representation and thus
compelled recourse to the fantastic, this does not sufficiently explain why writers so
regularly (and in the cases of Jones and Tolkien, to such extreme degrees) turned to the
fantastic as a lens through which to interpret their experiences. High modernists, for
example, relied on formal novelty to address modern disruptions without abandoning
mimetic representation. Why, then, did the war writers select the fantastic from the
variety of available representative strategies? Trauma theory provides the context
necessary to answer this question. The war was rendered unspeakable for many veterans
by social and personal imperatives. These were so potent that Wyatt Bonikowski
identifies them as the major cause of the years of relative silence from the eventual war
memoirists.261 When war memoirs began to emerge in large numbers during the late
1920s, their authors had developed strategies to resolve the conflict between the need for
silence and the compulsion to speak. They empowered themselves to express to an
uncomprehending audience a truth that they themselves often could not acknowledge.
These strategies frequently held the experience at a distance, navigated the complexities
of traumatic memory, and inhabited the space between concrete experiences and
fictionalized storytelling. The populations of England and the western world interpreted
as trauma not only the personal experiences of veterans, but the attendant social and
cultural upheavals they engendered. The value of the fantastic to writers in the interwar
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period becomes clear when we apply the logic of trauma and traumatic recovery to the
texts that the war writers finally produced.
War writers drew on the fantastic, as well as other forms of fictionalization, to
fulfill what Judith Herman has called “the twin imperatives of truth-telling and secrecy”
imposed upon those who undergo traumatic experiences. 262 Herman describes the need of
trauma survivors to articulate and communicate their experience, coupled with the social
stigma that attends public acknowledgement of trauma. During the war, the public’s
material and ideological investment in the imperial project coalesced in a multitude of
discursive practices designed to support the national war effort. The realities of the front
threatened to undermine political and cultural rationalizations of the war at home. As
such, even among sympathetic listeners, no public discourse existed that was designed to
accommodate overt objection to the war itself. There was a socially-enforced limit on the
traumatized soldier’s ability to convey the totality of his experience. For war writers, this
exacerbated the stigma associated with traumatic experiences that ran counter to accepted
ideological narratives. Moreover, both because of the nature of the front and the vague
and distorting nature of memory, much of their experience was not knowable or
interpretable through rational means.
With its long history of rendering the unspeakable into language, the fantastic
offered an alternative to the ideologically-defined rational. Consider, for example, the
pervasiveness of the ghost story’s use in representing the disruptive presence of
unacknowledged violence located in the past. Colin Davis has described ghost stories as
“a temporary interruption in the fabric of reality, a glitch in the matrix,” which demands
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that “the proper moral and epistemological order of things … be put back to rights.” This
suggests that the damage of trauma not only to the individual, but precisely to the
epistemological frameworks that underlie morality and knowability, is implicit within the
disruptive effects of the fantastic.263 The fantastic provided, in a way that realism could
not, the ability to faithfully render the experiences of the front without laying explicit
claim to the trauma at their core. By circumventing the questions of fact versus fiction,
and ultimately rendering it irrelevant, the fantastic enabled writers to simultaneously
reveal and conceal their wartime experiences. Tolkien’s early writing applies this practice
on a civilizational scale by constructing a world whose history is wrought with trauma.
These traumatic histories manifest in both the landscape and the narrative, transforming
the present into a world coded in terms of its past atrocities. Rather than a single,
exceptional ghost story, trauma permeates Tolkien’s world – a ubiquitous, haunting
presence. The action of Tolkien’s extended legendarium is thus interpretable as a
civilization’s attempts – both successful and otherwise – to cope with the determinative
power of its own traumatic history.

Memory and Traumatic Narrative

Memory of trauma is defined in part by a lack of the continuity that allows us to
derive meaning from past events. For the war writers, trauma was recognizable by the
distortions it imposed on the memories of its occurrence. In contrast to normal memory,
traumas that manifest in this way tend to be remembered as a series of disconnected
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sensations and images – a collection of instants, rather than a single coherent event. 264
Recall Ford Madox Ford’s description of the “little pictures” that comprised his
memories of the front: “towers, and roofs, and belts of trees and sunlight … men, burst
into mere showers of blood and dissolving into muddy ooze.” The fragmentary nature of
Ford’s recollections illustrates the effect that trauma can have on memory. Although
vivid, the images lack context. Ford is unable to situate them firmly in the larger world of
his experiences. The memories likewise resist his attempts to render them into language.
“[T]he mind,” he says, “stops dead, and something in the brain stops and shuts down.” 265
There is a difficulty of representation, but beyond that, something within Ford himself
that thwarts any attempt to write his experiences. If representative challenges render the
events of the Great War incommunicable, trauma makes them what Herman calls
“unspeakable” – “violations of the social contract … too terrible to utter aloud.” 266 This
combination of resistance to language with an utter lack of available context means that
traumatic memories cannot be easily conveyed as narrative. They are “wordless and
static,” do not “develop or progress in time … [or] reveal [the survivor’s] feelings or
interpretation of events.”267 The traumatic event exists in the memory as if it belonged to
a third party; it is incapable of being reconciled into the narrative of one’s life. The goal
of recovery is thus “to reconnect fragments, to reconstruct history, [and] to make
meaning of … present symptoms in light of past events.” 268 By disrupting the unity of
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recollection in this way, the effects of trauma make continuity impossible, and render the
present illegible in terms of the past.
This disruption of continuity was reflected in the sense of a break with that past
that overwhelmed many modernist authors. The war writers found affinity between the
state of their culture and their personal experiences of trauma. The process of
narrativization was uniquely suited to addressing both. The act of telling their story
rebuilds a connection to the past self. The arduous task of putting the experience into
words allows it to be “integrated into the survivor’s life story.” 269 Narrating the traumatic
event allows the survivor to write back into their memory an experience that previously
existed primarily as an instance of disjuncture between past and present, effectively
restoring a sense of continuity between their life before the trauma and after. 270
Narrativization makes disconnected events accessible to interpretation by creating
context and simulating the presence of causation. In this way, it is a distinctly literary act.
Ricoeur argues that narrative as a practice constitutes a schema that facilitates
“intelligible signification” on the part of otherwise “multiple and scattered events.” This
does not mean, for example, that a traumatic event becomes justified or even rationally
explicable. Rather, it simply means that the event is situated in its proper chronological
place in the memory. By consigning trauma to the past in this way, it is robbed of its
ongoing deterministic power, its persistent disruptive presence in their life. Laying claim
to trauma by writing it into their past therefore opens possibilities for the future not
determined by the paralysis that comes with a loss of continuity. 271
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By telling the story of their trauma, however, the teller integrates it into their life
and thus lays personal claim to trauma its effects. In doing so, they risk social stigma.
Because traumatic events so dramatically violate social mores, they compel denial. This
is true not only of the survivor, but of the audience who hears their story. Those who
share their stories as narrative often encounter an audience unreceptive to their message,
either because they are unwilling or incapable. Their alternative is therefore to reject the
teller who delivers the message and appears to embody its disruptive effect.
Consequently, public responses to stories of trauma often question the value of the
survivor:
whether … [they] are entitled to care and respect or deserving of
contempt, whether they are genuinely suffering or malingering, whether
their histories are true or false and, if false, whether imagined or
maliciously fabricated.272
The result of forthrightness is often outright rejection by the listener. The speaker is
yoked to the trauma and the disruption it represents. Rather than contemplate the
consequences of the story, the choice is to banish both story and the speaker who tells it.
The question of truth that attends the trauma narrative is thus less about the facts and
details contained within the story. Instead, it concerns the more fundamental threat
trauma narratives represent to social truths. Survivors are silenced by marginalization.
Even if their story is not unspoken, it can remain unheard as “the most traumatic events
of [their lives] take places outside the realm of socially validated reality.” 273 The
necessary act of putting their experience into words thus poses the very real social risks
for survivors; laying explicit claim to traumatic experience threatens to mark them with
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trauma’s stigma. By utilizing narrative to construct meaning, they create the conditions to
be seen as a manifestation of that meaning’s implications. Despite the personal necessity
of truthful narration, survivors face similarly powerful social pressure to conceal their
traumatic experiences.
For soldiers returning from World War I, the compulsion to conceal was perhaps
even greater. In Britain, the traumatized soldier signified not merely the experience of an
individual. Rather, the soldier – with his traumatized mind and wounded body – came to
represent the post-war state of England itself. The shell-shocked soldier threatened not
only personal, internalized truths. His existence also called into question many of the
ideological frameworks that upheld the war, the nation, and the empire. These included
the closely-intertwined concepts of national honor and masculinity. Leo Braudy argues in
From Chivalry to Terrorism that during the British war years, “military masculinity was
the core of national consciousness.” 274 The soldier discursively embodied the ideal
national character as a masculine warrior. In contrast with what many saw as a
degenerate modern world, the war was widely expected to “rescue the nation from moral
decay and bring men back to the basic truths from which they had wandered … under a
new banner of purity.”275 By imparting on England’s young men the role of the honorable
chivalric warrior, the war would re-establish traditional western cultural dominance. The
outward symptoms of traumatized soldiers, however, bore a clear resemblance to
traditionally feminized symptoms of hysteria. 276 Their visibility thus “endangered the
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clear distinction between genders … regarded as an essential cement of society.” 277 This
led war trauma to be interpreted as what George Mosse refers to as a “social disease.” In
this synecdochic relationship between the individual(s) and society, the individual’s
symptoms emblematize a larger social degeneration. The reverse also became true: the
symptoms of war trauma were discursively transformed “from a battlefield disease into a
social indicator,” determining the status of those who exhibited them.278 There was thus
considerable motivation for the public to delegitimize the soldier’s condition, and for the
soldier to conceal his traumatic experiences.
These ideological stakes inflected the ways that war trauma was named,
discussed, and treated during and after the war. Many of the initial discursive reactions to
traumatized soldiers reflect an effort to isolate ideological and social frameworks from
trauma’s disruptive effects. The term “shell-shock” was coined by psychologist Charles
Myers for widespread symptoms he attributed to the concussive force of exploding
shells.279 Ill-defined, the term was an all-purpose descriptor for “a bewildering array of
anxiety disorders – mental tics, nightmares, confusion, fatigue, obsessive thoughts
inexplicable aches and pains … mutism, paralysis, hysterical blindness, and hysterical
deafness.”280 It reflected the medical community’s inability to provide a satisfying
diagnosis for the staggering number of mental casualties, but it also served the purpose of
suppressing the condition’s socially-disruptive potential. By consolidating such a wide
variety of manifestations under this single term, medical practice effectively silenced a
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multitude of experiences under the aegis of a comforting, physical cause. Once it became
clear, however, that no connection could be established between the symptoms and
proximity to exploding bombs, the public came to acknowledge that they resulted from
the “emotional stress of prolonged exposure to violent death.” 281 It followed that those
who displayed the effects of shell-shock were deficient in some way – “of a weak
disposition, fearful … [or] weak of will.” 282 Excepting traumatized soldiers in this way
discursively excluded them from the ideal of the soldier. Traditional models of
masculinity and warfare were quarantined from the disruptive effects of trauma in an
attempt to sustain their social potency. By categorizing the experiences as the exceptional
effect of devalued soldiers, it was ensured that their narratives of trauma occurred, as
Herman says, “outside the realm of socially validated reality.” 283 The epistemological
disruptions they represented were held at arm’s length by virtue of the marginalization of
the survivors.
Much early treatment of shell-shock was likewise centered around sustaining the
masculine category of the soldier. Above all, it was designed with the goal of returning
the soldier to the battlefield, rather than the well-being of the soldier. At the most
extreme, this included physical manipulation of soldiers’ limbs, attempts to shame and/or
cajole soldiers out of exhibiting their symptoms, and in the case of Dr. Lewis Ralph
Yealland, application of electric shock.284 However, even more progressive approaches,
such as those employed by Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, had the objective of returning the patient
to combat readiness. Psychiatric treatment during the war was not about the soldier’s
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mental health, but about “restoring his proper relation to authority” in the context of the
imperial system.285 Treatment was judged to be successful in as much as it re-inscribed
the subject with ideals of masculinity, or at least with the inclination to perform them in
the combat theater. By doing so, it suppressed the disturbances caused by the survivor’s
condition, and reaffirmed the integrity of nationalist and imperial ideologies. Regardless
of method, therefore, psychiatric practice was effectively a part of the state apparatus,
constituted around the goal of silencing the disruptive narratives of trauma victims. In
other words, the psychology of the veteran was deeply entangled with – indeed,
inseparable from – the political imperatives of the empire.
Because restoration to the role of citizen-soldier performed the role of a social
substitute for actual rehabilitation, there was considerable conflict between the interests
of empire and the needs of the traumatized soldier. The ideological demands of the state
conflicted with the need reclaim the trauma through narration, instead substituting the
reestablishment of an approved subjectivity. Moreover, the discursive presence of the
traumatized soldier necessarily constituted either a rebuke to the collective myth of
combat masculinity or a sign of individual failure. The war writers’ desire to express the
realities of war to an uncomprehending public thus constitutes not only a personal need
for healing through narration, but also a refutation of imperial ideologies. Because of this,
there is an unavoidable ethical component to the strategies undertaken in representing
their experiences. We must ask to what degree a given method provides cover not only
for the sufferer of trauma, but to the forces and events that give rise to trauma itself. Does
the fantastic perpetuate the conditions of silence by obscuring the practical and material
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realities at the root of trauma? Questions like this are implicit in accusations of nostalgia
that have historically been leveled against Tolkien’s fictionalized mythic past. Can we
assert that Tolkien (and the fantasy genre by extension) both interprets historical trauma,
and avoids complicity in the forces that catalyzed that trauma? We will find that the
public and private dimensions of the war writers’ dilemma frequently contradict one
another. The writers employ strategies that attempt to negotiate between these demands,
with varying success. The texts they produced often reflect the inability to completely
reconcile these conflicting priorities.

“For God’s sake burn my diary”: War Stories and Disavowal

The delicate balancing act between expression and silence shaped the ways that
the war memoirists presented themselves and the ways that they rendered their
experiences within their accounts. An extreme manifestation of this dilemma is visible in
a passage from Robert Graves’s Good-Bye to All That. The officer who preceded Smith –
Graves’s second sergeant – is convinced that he will die in the next day’s battle. In
preparation the night before, he makes the following request of Smith:
see that my kit goes back to my people. You’ll find their address in my
pocket-book. You’ll find five hundred francs there too … you keep a
hundred francs yourself and divide up the rest among the chaps left …
Send my pocket-book back with my other stuff … but for God’s sake burn
my diary. They mustn’t see that.286
Mingled among practical instructions on what to do with his possessions is the
particularly urgent injunction to burn the soldier’s diary. In fact, this seems to be his most
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pressing concern, because it poses the threat that someone (in this case, his family) will
read it. This raises the question: why keep a diary at all? The existence of a diary after all
creates the potential that it will be read and the events that it records communicated. If
the diary’s contents are too shocking or shameful to share, one might reasonably
conclude that they would be better kept to himself, unwritten. This assumes, however,
that the contents serve only a social, communicative purpose. The diary fulfills the need
for narrativization by allowing the soldier to tell his story to himself. It is a medium of
antisocial communication – spoken to no one, but recorded in an empty book, destined
for annihilation. In this way, the diary accommodates the competing demands laid on the
traumatized. It allows the soldier to claim and control his experience by representing it in
language, while simultaneously distancing himself from it through concealment, thereby
evading the stigma associated with trauma. The diary is the mechanism by which Smith’s
predecessor simultaneously reveals and conceals the reality of war.
The war memoirists faced a more complicated dilemma: though under the same
demands of truth and secrecy, the public nature of memoir precluded literal concealment
of their narratives (whether through destruction or silence). The genre after all elevates
factuality not only as earnest recollection, but as a direct opposition to concealment.
Evelyn Cobley argues that the memoir constitutes an act of recollection that “implies
accuracy in the depiction of events; the writer wants to recall and reproduce as honestly
as possible what he has witnessed.” 287 The memoir reveals to the public that which was
previously known only to the individual. By doing so, it simultaneously lays personal
claim on the events narrated; it is through the authority of personal experience that the
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veracity of the memoir is maintained. The war memoirs thus embody the dilemma
suffered by soldiers as survivors of trauma by publicly claiming trauma through the act of
narrativization. Consequently, despite this implicit claim of factuality, many of the war
writers practiced strategies designed to conceal or disavow the reality of the experience
even as they sought to communicate it. These frequently take the form of layers of
fictionalization that are applied to the texts. Such tactics have the effect of distancing the
author from the content of the text and the implied stigma of laying claim to the events.
They invest an element of deniability even into texts that rely on veracity.
Broadly speaking, these tactics function by exploiting the ambiguity generated by
fictionalization. Although the chosen tactics vary in their complexity, each creates the
potential for imaginative separation between the memoirist and the memoir. In his
introduction to the published text of Good-Bye to All That, Paul Fussell suggests that the
war writers as a group were engaged in “[blurring] the line formerly distinguishing
fiction from nonfiction.”288 The simplest is Max Plowman’s use of the name Mark VII
for the initial publication of A Subaltern on the Somme. The pseudonym creates a literal,
albeit superficial, separation between the actual Max Plowman, in the character of a
fictional author. This figure lays claim to the events of the memoir, effectively adding a
layer of fictionalization to the narrative itself; Plowman remains safely anonymous. A
similar impulse is detectable in Graves’s Good-Bye to All That. Graves famously extolled
the virtues of factual representation when it came to the front. Chided by Siegfried
Sassoon that “war should not be written about in such a realistic way,” Graves replies “in
[his] old-soldier manner, that he [will] soon change his style,” reminding himself that
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Sassoon “[has] not yet been in the trenches.” 289 Graves sought to reproduce the realities
of the war for a largely-ignorant public readership. This was not, however, his first
impulse. His earliest account of the war was written while recovering in Harlech from
wounds suffered on the Somme; this earliest version was written as fiction. Graves
describes “having stupidly written it as a novel,” having now “to re-translate it into
history.”290 The choice implies a rejection the artifice associated with fictional narrative
in favor of a more objectively accurate recounting of events. 291 Regardless, the published
version of Good-Bye to All That employs the tropes and conventions of various fictional
practices, ranging from satire to melodrama and even ghost stories throughout. Graves
furthermore acknowledges selecting and emphasizing events that he perceives the reading
public to desire.292 Having ostensibly disavowed the impulse toward fictionalization,
Graves nonetheless persists in deploying its organizing strategies to construct his wartime
narrative.
These strategies, however, are not innocent, particularly in the context of war.
Their use is curious for a group of writers broadly dedicated to delivering a factual
account of the war to a public they viewed as ignorant, due to the propaganda on the
home front. As Evelyn Cobley reminds us, fictional conventions inflect the way that
readers acquire and interpret the information contained in the text:
tropes both manifest and conceal history, without allowing the reader to
either collapse reality and text into each other or to overcome their
opposition dialectically. Attempts to reproduce the front-line experience of
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the First World War reveal that tropes construct the event in certain
specific ways.293
The presence of fictional practices as organizing principles obscure precise nature and
location of the reality gestured toward by the text. Cobley argues that, in an attempt to
counteract this, many war writers emphasize descriptive language over narrative, in order
“to create an illusion of reality.”294 Descriptive discourse appears to avoid the interpretive
dominance that Paul Ricoeur describes as the “faculty of mediation, which [conducts] us
from the one side of the text to the other, transfiguring the one side into the other through
its power of configuration.”295 In contrast to narrative, descriptive discourse appears not
to have been organized with the goal of lending order and causality to the events it
relates, and thus seems not to have been designed to facilitate particular conclusions
about them. However, both the process of selection that underlies descriptive language,
and the challenges that emerged from a lack of available descriptive referents that were
discussed in the previous chapter, mean that description shapes interpretation in ways less
visible but no less powerful than narrative. If description operates by invoking memory of
things the reader already knows, the choice of what to invoke necessarily shapes the
meaning of the text. Even apparently objective literary practice thus shapes interpretation
precisely by its claim to objectivity.
Siegfried Sassoon’s Memoirs of George Sherston illustrates the dilemma of a
soldier attempting to lay overt claim to his traumatic experiences. Rather than rather than
simply employing novelistic practices as Graves does, Sassoon maintains a fictionalized
distance from the events of the text, which persists in the published form. The memoir
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explicitly fictionalizes Siegfried Sassoon’s life – from fox hunting in the English
countryside, to the anti-war letter that ultimately led him to enter intense psychiatric care
– by replacing the figure of Sassoon with the fictional George Sherston. The primary
distinction between Sassoon and the eponymous main character is that Sherston shows
none of Sassoon’s inclination toward poetry or creative writing. 296 The text, however, is
presented as an autobiography; the only other change appears to be the names of
characters. The reading public was generally aware that the experiences portrayed were
Sassoon’s. His publication of an explicitly pacifist letter titled “A Soldier’s Declaration”
had drawn national attention in 1917. The same letter serves as the climax to the
memoir’s second volume, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer. Despite the public knowledge
of his affiliation, the fictionalization of the text creates and sustains a degree of distance
between Sassoon and Sherston. That the trait Sassoon chooses to withhold is the practice
of writing emphasizes this distance, because it is the trait that enables Sassoon to produce
the Memoirs to begin with. By distinguishing Sherston from himself in this way, Sassoon
calls the authorship of the (fictional) text into question. The Memoirs of George Sherston
are written as memoir throughout, complete with a consistent first-person perspective,
and covering roughly the first twenty-five years of Sherston’s life. And yet, within the
narrative, the text is attributed to a character whose chief distinction from the author is
that he has no apparent inclination to write. The creates two possible relationships
between the imagined narrator and the author. In the first, Sherston, despite appearances,
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has resolved to tell his own story, in which case Sassoon inhabits the imaginative role of
Sherston’s biographer. Or, Sassoon is creating the story of Sherston, in which the firstperson perspective constitutes a fictional invention. Each prevents a direct identification
of Sassoon with Sherston by injecting the narrative with an element of fiction. The text
thus maintains a distance between Sassoon’s experience on the front and the account
received by the reader, however factually accurate it might otherwise be.
Sherston’s Progress, the final volume of the memoir, demonstrates the
effectiveness with which public institutions compelled silence from traumatized soldiers.
Following the publication of “A Soldier’s Declaration,” Robert Graves had Sassoon
placed into psychiatric care under W. H. R. Rivers, fearing that the alternative was a
court martial. The approach taken by Rivers was far less punitive than that of many other
therapists at the time. Unlike contemporaries such as Lewis Yealland, Rivers refused to
treat shell-shock as a character flaw deserving shame. Instead, he practiced what he
called a “talking cure.”297 This approach is not unlike contemporary ideas of therapy.
Rivers represented an alternative to public disgrace in an environment where women
“publicly mocked noncombatant males by handing them white feathers on the street.” 298
The reader has seen Sherston encounter this attitude as a publicly known pacifist in
wartime London. These range from a barfly who remarks that pacifists “are worse than
Germans,” to civilians who explain that they “are better able to judge the War as a whole
than … soldiers.”299 This is institutionalized by the war office, according to whom
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Sherston as “either wounded or well unless he [has] some authorized disease.” 300 There is
precious little sympathy for the experience of the traumatized or disillusioned soldier.
This is at the core of the text’s admiration of Rivers. Nonetheless, the Rivers of the text
does not offer an escape from the discursive force that silenced open critique of the drive
to war.
Although Rivers is presented as relief from the contempt of the public, he
nonetheless constitutes a component of the apparatus that facilitates the flow of young
men to the front. Rivers himself was an avid supporter of the war; the Rivers of the text
shares this trait. He is sympathetic and works to help Sherston recover from his shellshock (as the real Rivers did for Sassoon). But his practical goal is not to heal Sherston’s
trauma, but to enable his return to active duty. 301 Relieving Sherston of the need to return
to the front – the experience that gave rise to his condition – is not a possibility. The
clinic works toward recovery, but “recovery” here refers to the patient’s acceptance of
those logics that sustain public support for the war effort. With the legitimacy of medical
practice, Rivers’s treatment operates under the fundamental assumption that Sherston’s
pacifism is inherently misguided – that it is a pathology, symptomatic of the
psychological trauma he suffered on the front. In Sherston’s account of therapy sessions,
Rivers’s expertise frequently delegitimizes Sherston’s objection to the war as a valid
response: “Sometimes [Rivers] gently indicated inconsistencies in my impulsively
expressed opinions, but he never contradicted me. Of course, the weak point about my
‘protest’ was that it was evoked by personal feeling.” 302 Even this – the most positive and
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sympathetic official response to the traumatized soldiers – ultimately reinforces the
discourses that sustain and justify the war effort. Rivers performs the role of sympathetic
therapist, but the authority of his position permits him to critique Sherston’s arguments
while still fulfilling the role of healer. He does so in the language of rationalism, pointing
out “inconsistencies” through institutionally-authorized logic and legitimacy.
Curiously then, we have a situation in which a therapist, ostensibly concerned
with Sherston’s emotional wellbeing, is working to delegitimize his response, precisely
because it is based in emotion. Rivers goes so far as to uphold the war on patriotic, and
borderline jingoistic grounds, arguing that “peace at that time would constitute a victory
for Pan-Germanism and nullify all the sacrifices we had made.” 303 This position relies on
the assumption of the sacrificial value of those lives lost thus far. Such a belief is more
akin to the propaganda dispensed on the home front than to soldiers’ accounts of
mechanized carnage.304 But Sherston, by way of his respect for and acceptance of Rivers
as a sympathetic medical practitioner, begins to accept and internalize these logics. He
characterizes his own opinions as “impulsively expressed,” and tacitly endorses the idea
that their emotional basis is an inherent flaw. At a particularly heightened moment in his
treatment, this sense of inferiority produces intense self-inflicted shame without explicit
critique from Rivers:
… when the pros and cons had got me well out of my depth as a debater, I
exclaimed, ‘It doesn’t seem to me to matter much what one does, so long
as one believes it is right!’ In the silence that ensued, I was aware that I
had said something particularly fatuous.305
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Even the most charitable therapeutic practice available is constructed to fulfill the
ideological demands of the state. Whatever its other purposes, Sherston’s treatment is
designed to rebuild an authorized form of subjectivity – the citizen-soldier. Within the
context of his “talking cure,” Rivers reinforces the rationalist discourse that upholds the
war effort and delegitimizes the experiences of the traumatized veteran. Judith Herman
argues that “[the] study of war trauma becomes legitimate only in a context that
challenges the sacrifice of young men in war.”306 Rivers, however, utilizes his position to
uphold such practices. Therefore, even such a sympathetic approach as his cannot
overcome the reality that there is no discursive framework that can accommodate the
validity of Sherston’s explicit critique of the war effort. But because it comes in the
context of curative medical practice, he internalizes the attendant critique of both his
experiences and the convictions that derive from his emotional response.
Perhaps more than any other part of the Memoirs, the chapters concerning Rivers
display the ambiguous interactions between layers of personal testimony and
fictionalization. The account is presented as the process by which Sherston confronts and
overcomes his trauma. But the structure obscures the narrator, and in doing so it
compromises our ability to draw conclusions about the narrative. In reality, Sassoon is
telling the story of himself, telling his story to Rivers. But he is doing so through a textual
performance in which Sherston tells his own story, that story being essentially identical to
Sassoon’s. This is further complicated by narrator-Sherston’s recognition that he is
engaging in a sort of fictionalization by withholding information. He refers obliquely to
two well-known novelists who write him to critique “A Soldier’s Declaration.” Sherston
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(or Sassoon?) acknowledges his coyness in an aside to the reader: “(How tantalizing of
me to omit their names! But somehow I feel that if I were to put them on the page my
neatly contrived little narrative would come sprawling out of its frame.)” 307 The hostility
he is seen to encounter helps to contextualize this ill-defined anxiety. Despite being
himself fictional, Sherston values the distance between the textual space of his narrative
and the concrete consequences of its relationship to the world outside.
The fictionalized dissonance between Sherston and Sassoon intensifies once
Sherston has begun to internalize the ideological critique that is so mildly delivered by
Dr. Rivers. Though it is perhaps only more explicitly signaled. With increasing
frequency, Sherston makes reference to his own choices and exclusions within the text.
These references generally reflect anxiety at the prospect of the fiction drawing too near
reality, as well as at the potential implications and consequences of such contact. They do
not seem to reflect practical or legal concerns: neither Sherston nor Sassoon seems
especially concerned, for example, that the authors whose names he omits above would
otherwise take action against him for libel. Rather, the anxiety arises in response to a fear
that by violating the fictional frame, the narrator relinquishes the protection it affords
him. The descriptors used – “neat,” “contrived,” and “little” – paint a picture of a
fictional apparatus that has been constructed with extreme limits as a quarantine of sorts,
a discrete barrier to isolate the narrator from the narrative. The perceived security of this
barrier is reflected by the narrator’s psychological state. As the fictional boundary blurs,
the ability of both the reader and narrator to distinguish between Sherston/Sassoon, as
well as between the thoughts of the character/the influence of Rivers, is diminished:
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I told myself that I was ‘really feeling fairly fresh again.’ And I could have
sworn that I heard the voice of Rivers say ‘Good!’ I mention this to show
the way my mind works, though I suppose one ought not to put that sort of
‘aside’ in a book, especially as I am always reminding myself to be ultracareful to keep my story ‘well inside the frame’. But I begin to feel as if I
were inside the frame myself, and that being so, I don’t see why Rivers
shouldn’t be inside it too – in more ways than one. 308
The quoted phrases in the above section suggest the narrator is formulating his internal
discourse via language received from Rivers in order to structure his personal narrative.
When he chides himself for putting such an “aside” into his book, he enacts an
internalized critique derived from genre orthodoxy. The conventions of the memoir
conflict with the psychological demands of confronting and narrating trauma. The genre
is designed to provide unimpeded access to the experiences of the author: forthright,
accurate, and meaningfully organized for the reader. When this threatens the need for
secrecy, Sherston attempts to dissemble by emphasizing his health; he is “feeling fairly
fresh.” The internalized presence of Rivers reassures him, but it violates the genre by
interceding between the reader and the events. The narrative frame loses coherence, and
the line between Sherston and Sassoon blurs. The narrator himself is “inside the frame.”
At this point, however, it is difficult to say whether this is an admission of Sherston or
Sassoon.
Sherston is not Sassoon, or at least it is difficult to declare with certainty to what
degree Sherston is Sassoon. Thus, there are three ways to read the above passage. First,
as I have done, we might read the voice as that of Sherston, fictional memoirist,
commenting on his own (fictional) writing process, isolated from that of Sassoon. In this
case, the acknowledgement of anxiety stemming from trauma belongs to Sherston alone;
the degree to which it imitates Sassoon’s experience is indeterminable. Second, we can
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read Sherston as a near-literal stand-in for Sassoon. If we read Sherston as an avatar of
Sassoon himself, the passage is a narrativization of experiences and anxiety that Sassoon
suffers or suffered in the act of writing, but has chosen to attribute to Sherston. In this
case, the acknowledgement is Sassoon’s, but it operates between a fictionalized barrier
that prevents direct identification and lends deniability. Third, we can read the voice as
that of Sassoon himself, intruding into his fictionalized narrative. Here, Sherston himself
is the “frame” to which the narrator refers. By revealing himself to the reader, Sasson
acknowledges the flimsiness of the fiction he has constructed – exacerbated, perhaps,
because in making Sherston a fictional memoirist, Sassoon has made him a writer and
thus undermined the primary distinction he sought to place between them. In this case,
the acknowledgement is genuine; the sensations and anxieties being claimed are
Sassooned, experienced at the moment of writing. The indeterminacy of the speaker’s
identity in this moment enables Sassoon to present the anxieties of the traumatized author
seeking to express his disrupted sense of self to the reader, without definitively laying
claim to his own trauma.
Clearly, there is an urge, visible in many writings of the war, to resist direct
personal identification with the realities of the experiences written, despite the value they
placed on fidelity to truth.309 Often the fictionalizing tactics employed by authors to
achieve this separation brought the narrative into tension with its ostensible genre. Genre
is, among other things, one of the sets of codes with which we delineate realistic and nonrealistic narrative. To convey the reality of the war to a largely ignorant public, the war
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writers were obligated to participate in genres, like memoir, that signaled authenticity to
the reader. But it is precisely this authenticity that threatens the authors by requiring them
to lay explicit claim to those traumatic experiences which upended their sense of shared
reality with their readership and thus stigmatized them. The logic of mimetic literary
codes like non-fiction genres is predicated on the knowability of events, but the events of
the front violated the epistemological and ideological frameworks that made war
knowable. This was the source of the stigma visited on those who experienced them. As a
result, many of the authors employed a strategy that intermingled fiction with non-fiction
genres, facilitating expression while maintaining a kind of silence.
This is not simply a defensive act, however; some degree of fictionalization was a
necessary component for soldiers to tell their stories at all. The indeterminacy of fiction is
inherent to the experience as their first-hand accounts. Indeed, Evelyn Cobley argues that
the war memoirs illustrate Derrida’s contention that the dichotomy of remembering and
forgetting is inherent in the idea of the memoir.310 The distortion of the experience is as
much a part of the story as names, dates, and places (all of which are themselves
obscured at times by the authors under consideration). Though the genre claims its
authority through first-hand experience, it represents not the experience itself, but the
memory of it. In the case of the war memoirs, this remembrance often reached back
across a significant period of time. They are therefore subject to the problems of memory:
the slippages and uncertainties, the taxonomies and associations that are bound to them in
order to render meaning from them – to integrate them, as Herman says, into the story of
one’s life.311 These distortions act on events almost as soon as they enter into memory;
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how much more prevalent must they be ten years down the line, even more so when
acting upon an experience as unfathomable and traumatizing as the first modern war? In
fact, according to Graves, the space the war occupies in his memory is a necessarily
fictionalized space:
The memoirs of a man who went through some of the worst experiences
of trench warfare are not truthful if they do not contain a high proportion
of falsities. High-explosive barrages will make a temporary liar or
visionary of anyone; the old trench-mind is at work in all overestimation
of casualties, “unnecessary” dwelling on horrors, mixing of dates, and
confusion between trench rumors and scenes actually witnessed. 312
The fictionalizing practices of the war writers are not merely stylistic choices; rather, they
reflect the nature of the war retrospective. The past, already subject to the obscuring
effects of memory, is further warped by the otherworldliness of the experience being
recalled. These transformations are inseparable from the memory; the fictionalization is
as inherent to the experience as the first-hand account. This distortion of memory is what
leads war writers like Tolkien beyond ordinary fictionalization into the fantastic.

Memorial and the Fantastic
Ironically, fidelity to the reality of the lived experience of the front demanded the
distortion of realistic representation. In this, we begin to see the affinity between trauma
and the fantastic. The fantastic, Rosemary Jackson argues, “traces the unsaid and the
unseen of culture: that which has been silenced, made invisible, covered over and made
‘absent’” – precisely the space that traumatic experience inhabits. 313 By its nature, the
fantastic enables distortions of reality because it permits an imaginative boldness that is
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precluded by strictly mimetic literary practice. The value of this to the writer of trauma is
the capacity it offers to induce credulity regarding ideas and events outside what is
accepted as real. If, as Herman asserts, trauma victims find that their narratives take place
outside “socially validated reality,” then the fantastic as I have defined it has a natural
affinity to such accounts. Recall that Kathryn Hume defines the fantastic as the literary
act of departure from consensus reality.314 Where the fictionalizing techniques discussed
above obscure precise conditions, the fantastic sets aside the question of reality entirely.
But this is a discursive function only; the “real” is the implicit category against which the
fantastic implicitly operates, and whose bounds it interrogates. Because of this, the
fantastic occupies an imaginative space in which ideological sureties – which respond to
the disruptive effects of trauma by stigmatizing the traumatized – are not threatened and
thus can be questioned and even reconfigured freely. By operating outside of the bounds
of ideological authority, the fantastic challenges its definitional totality. Categories like
genre that enforce standards of reality are undermined by the fantastic, thereby reminding
the reader how much such categories rely on modes of perception. 315 The fantastic
constitutes a literary space in which such certainties can be called into question precisely
because it assumes a departure from reality. It illustrates the ways in which the categories
“real” and “unreal” are mutually-constitutive, rather than stable structures grounded in
rationalist certainty.
Even more than simple fictionalization within a realistic context, the fantastic
suited the interpretive needs of remembering and redressing the war – both because it
helped to shield the writer from scrutiny so often inflicted on trauma survivors and
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because it reflected the distortions with which they were obliged to recall its events. In
both cases, the operative feature is the fantastic’s ability to delve into and depict the
evidently unreal. This grants the capacity for “rehearsal of alternative scenarios from a
position of safety, allowing them to be developed before being effected.” 316 The fantastic
is permitted to recombine and reconfigure the world in ways contrary to understood
reality because it operates under the auspices of “what if?” Tolkien himself famously
used the image of a green sun to illustrate the capacity of the fantastic to reconfigure
elements of the world without triggering incredulity. 317 Critics have often interpreted this
as a means of wish-fulfillment. In Writing and Fantasy, for example, Ceri Sullivan and
Barbara White argue that the fantastic signifies “a deliberate response to a gap between
the real and desired, under the control of the individual.”318 Rosemary Jackson similarly
refers to the fantastic as “a literature of desire,” arguing that it “seeks that which is
experienced as absence and loss.”319 But the works under consideration here do not
merely portray a desired reality. This perspective is aligned with those who see the
fantastic as fundamentally escapist – as “the Flight of the Deserter,” rather than “the
Escape of the Prisoner.”320 Likewise, it invites another reading that dismisses Tolkien as
fundamentally nostalgic. Rather, these texts utilize the fantastic as a tool to reconfigure
reality in an attempt to render meaning from events that defy interpretation under the
auspices of reality.
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Because it can reconfigure reality in this way, the fantastic is a means to make
traumatic loss comprehensible and thus instructive. It is because of this that I describe the
modern fantastic as an aesthetic of mourning. The capacity the fantastic offers to repair
the damage done by trauma is the capacity to rebuild connections in new configurations
when prior certainties collapse and possibility defies the necessary reordering. It does not
attempt to recreate or reclaim “that which is experienced as absence and loss.” Rather, it
renders meaning from the absence. George Johnson argues that the contemporary
resurgence in popular mysticism and fascination with ghostliness filled a similar role for
the British populace, by facilitating mourning and enabling recovery. Taking a
deliberately sympathetic position, Johnson finds that “the attraction to mysticism …
made perfect sense within a culture of mourning, of large-scale loss and bereavement …
particularly during the First World War.”321 Mysticism, as a fundamentally irrational set
of practices, provided a means to navigate and confront tragedies that defied rational
comprehension. Imaginative activity like writing – particularly fiction writing – likewise
serves a special function in the context of overwhelming and traumatic loss:
Writers can develop the capacity to renegotiate severed or damaged
attachments in the imagination … [They] have the facility to manipulate
imagery and symbol in order to manage anxiety by shifting it into fictional
situations and in some cases onto fictionalized characters within the
ordered form of a [written work].322
If fiction permits the sufferer of trauma to re-narrate the world from a position of safety,
the fantastic – that is the purely, explicitly imaginative – enables them to “renegotiate
severed or damaged attachments” and organize them into new, beneficial configurations.
The fantastic offers the opportunity to recover impossibly from in the face of seemingly
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irrecoverable loss. We must emphasize – opportunity, not guarantee. This argument does
not posit the fantastic as a panacea for large-scale trauma. Rather, on the civilizational
scale, the remove provided be the fantastic is sometimes necessary in order to confront
trauma at all.
Trauma tends to distinguish itself by its inexplicable and persistent presence,
where regular experiences confine themselves neatly to the past. The supernatural tends
to appear in association with this sort of mourning because of its capacity to signify the
unknowable and that which does not conform to rationalist epistemologies. For the author
and the mourner both, the intrusion of the supernatural is a symbolic manifestation of
what Cathy Caruth calls “the impact of [traumatic violence’s] very incomprehensibility
… the reality of the way violence has not yet been fully known.” 323 This is both symptom
and source of trauma’s status as “a crisis that is marked, not by a simple knowledge, but
by the ways it simultaneously defies and demands our witness.” 324 Like trauma, the
supernatural disrupts by surfacing where it is neither expected nor welcome. We have
seen the frequency with which the front is represented by memoirists as a ghastly,
haunting otherworld; this ghostliness similarly invokes the persistence of memories of
large-scale slaughter. Colin Davis argues that ghosts in particular enact their own type of
knowability that replaces “the priority of being and presence with the figure of the ghost
as that which is neither present nor absent, neither dead nor alive.” This irreconcilability
is what lends the ghost its fantastic potency as a presence that defies rational insistence
on its impossibility. To haunt is to be “a wholly irrecuperable intrusion in our world,
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which is not comprehensible within available intellectual frameworks, but whose
otherness we are responsible for preserving.” 325 The haunted landscape is unique in its
ability to represent a world defined by immense loss, shaped by the distorted lens of
distant memory. It is a past that haunts the present with its persistent, unforgettable
intrusion on the mind, and in this way continues to exist despite its long absence. It
signifies the lingering effect of events that cannot be thought to have happened, a space
that cannot be thought to have existed, and yet did.
Ghosts and ghostly figures haunt Tolkien’s well-known works (perhaps most
explicitly in the “Fog on the Barrow-downs” chapter of Fellowship), but throughout his
work, the landscape itself constitutes a haunting presence. This is frequently visible in the
ruins that litter the landscape of Middle-Earth, evoking their own destruction like the
Albert Basilica in wartime France. However, its operation is most clearly visible in the
epilogue of The Children of Hurin. This text, whose earlier version, “Turambar and the
Foalókë,” was discussed in the previous chapter, was composed around 1930 and a
contemporaneous abridged version published in 1977 as part of The Silmarillion.326 The
Silmarillion names the tale “The Tale of Grief, for it is sorrowful, and in it are revealed
most evil works of Morgoth Bauglir.”327 The epitaph is appropriate: the narrative is
structured around a series of traumatic losses that shape the life of its protagonist, often
through his own violent reactions to them. The chain of events culminates in the suicides

325

Davis, 9.
I draw from both published versions in this discussion. Given their contemporaneous composition, and
the fact that each fulfilled a different textual role, I take them broadly to represent a single conception of
the narrative. Christopher Tolkien apparently believed the same, utilizing the shortened version to fill in
gaps in the longer during his editing process.
Tolkien, J. R. R. Unfinished Tales of Númenor and Middle-Earth, ed. Christopher Tolkien. (New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 1980), 6.
327
Tolkien, J. R. R. The Silmarillion, 2nd Ed, ed. Christopher Tolkien. (New York: Houghton Mifflin,
1999), 199.
326

180

of both Turin and his sister, Nienor. His father, Hurin, is held captive and magically
forced to watch the entirety of his son’s tragic life; he is freed only after his children have
died.
Much as Graves’s second sergeant and his burned diary created the condition of
unknowable silence that led many British civilians to explore mysticism as a means to
mourning, Hurin’s refusal to speak of the tragedy he has witnessed haunts the place of his
children’s death. Following his release, Hurin makes his way to their grave site. There he
finds Morwen, the mother of Turn and Nienor, sitting against the stone. Only Hurin
knows the tragic details of their children’s story; Morwen knows simply that they are
dead. Near death herself, she asks Hurin to tell he what happened to their children.
Burdened by the weight of his grief, and the tragedy that he has witnessed, which
compounds the loss by tainting its memory, Hurin cannot or will not answer. Turin and
Nienor are thus alienated from their mother by the unspeakability and unknowability of
the traumas that comprise their story. Through the irreconcilability of this alienation, they
become a source of Morwen’s own trauma. Morwen dies soon after, and Hurin buries her
in the same spot. The memorial stone that marks all three persists long after:
he made a grave for Morwen … on the west side of the stone; and upon it
he cut these words: Here Lies Also Morwen Eledhwen.
It is told … that the Stone of the Hapless should not be defiled by
Morgoth, nor ever thrown down, not though the sea should drown all the
land; as indeed after befell, and still Tol Morwen stands alone in the water
beyond the new coasts that were made in the days of the wrath of the
Valar.328
Tol Morwen’s fantastic properties are a product of its roots in a narrative of mourning. It
signifies not one but three tragic losses, and the point at which they became irretrievable.
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The island that it becomes haunts Middle-Earth through its persistent presence in
combination with its inaccessibility. Even as the landscape around it is remade, the
monument impossibly remains to commemorate the loss. But it is remote; standing
“alone in the water beyond the new coasts.” Like a ghost, it persists beyond the point
when it should have been consigned to the past, and in doing so it mimics the effects of
trauma. Turin, Nienor, and Morwen haunt the landscape less by their deaths than by the
unspeakability and inaccessibility of the space that they leave behind. The hill and its
name testify to their existence, invoking their past in the present, but as time passes, only
a few can remember the meaning of either.
Middle-Earth is largely defined by its tendency to accumulate spaces like TolMorwen, spaces that represent the disintegration imposed by trauma. Ruins and
memorials are frequent subjects of attention throughout the texts. By the time of The
Lord of the Rings, nearly every space evokes an event of loss. These places, and their
accumulation across the entirety of Middle-Earth, constitute what Jay Winter calls “sites
of memory.” This term describes artifacts and spaces that testify to the nature of a
catastrophic experience, and “the multifaceted effort of survivors to understand what
[has] happened.”329 The Lord of the Rings famously features – among others – the
sepulchral Mines of Moria, the Dead Marshes, and the fallen capital city of Osgiliath.
The expansive history of mourning that exists beneath the narrative surfaces only in ruins
and through haunting glimpses – what John Marino calls “a shadow that lingers on the
periphery of the setting.”330 These spaces are determined more by what they used to be
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than by what they are. They signify the emptiness left in the wake of past loss. The
memorial function of these locations is evident in the frequency with which characters
respond by telling the story of the lost people and places whose absence they represent.
The Book of Lost Tales can be interpreted as an extended representation of this exchange.
The tales amount to a single, immense narrative, presented as explanation for the absence
of Beleriand – the destroyed elven lands memorialized by the island of Tol Eressëa.
The loss signified by these memorials is compounded by forgetting. Forgetting
intensifies loss by making it irrevocable. In forgetting, we lose access to the associations
that point to our gap in knowledge and conjure the disruptive effects of haunting.
Mourning becomes an impossibility, relying as it does on the recurrence of loss via
memory. If The Book of Lost Tales is a fictional representation of memorialization, its
prospective conclusion associates catastrophe with this sort of forgetfulness. A scene of
war is presented as a moment of loss and despair in the aftermath of violence, leaving
emptiness behind: “now sorrow and [?] has come upon the Elves … all are fled, fearing
the enemy … whose hands are red with the blood of Elves and stained with the lives of
his own kin.”331 The driving-out of the elves mimics the disruptive effect of traumatic
violence as an alienation from one’s own past. Their presence constitutes a continuity in
which the past remains meaningful; their absence is both symptom and symbol of a
traumatized world that has lost this connection. The consequences of this type of loss are
emphasized in a later passage that mourns this loss:
Who are the fairies … Memories faded dim, a wraith of vanishing
loveliness in the trees, a rustle of grass, a glint of dew, some subtle
intonation in the wind …
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But behold, Tavrobel shall not know its name, and all the land be changed,
and even this written words of mine believe will all be lost; and so I lay
down the pen, and so of the fairies cease to tell. 332
This passage conforms to Cathy Caruth’s definition of a history of trauma as a history
that is “referential precisely to the extent that it is not fully perceived as it occurs;” – that
it “can be grasped only in the very inaccessibility of its occurrence.” 333 The fairies here
are represented precisely by the emptiness they leave; they are reminders of a loss,
interpretable only through the pain of loss. The fairies have disappeared not only
materially, but epistemologically. They are perceptible only through natural phenomena
that have been made uninterpretable by a lack of access to the knowledge necessary for
understanding. In this way, their loss has become irrevocable.
Losing the meaning of a shared past leads to the forgetting of oneself: we are told
that“Tavrobel shall not know its [own] name.” A loss of the self is the ultimate
consequence of unreconciled disconnection from the past that results from trauma
inflicted by mass violence. This is because it negates the possibility of self-recognition –
a necessary precondition for the narration of one’s life. In forgetting one’s own past, it
becomes unknowable and therefore incommunicable, either to oneself or others. Truly
forgetting oneself, relinquishing all continuity between the past and present, thus renders
recovery impossible. The command given to Graves’s by second sergeant thus indicates
his despair of this possibility. To burn his diary, consigning the recollections and truths it
contains to oblivion, renders his experience permanently incommunicable. It likewise
ensures that he will remain unknowable; his family retains an imaginative version of him
which includes none of the experiences that so changed him. The sergeant anticipates his
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family’s material loss with his epistemological obliteration. By abandoning his narrative,
Tolkien’s narrator similarly surrenders to forgetfulness and unknowability; he ceases to
(re)construct the history of the fairies. As it relates to the time of its composition,
however, this finale is not anticipatory but reflective. Tavrobel is a literal representation
of pre-historic Staffordshire. For a contemporary audience, therefore, the implication is
that Travrobel has already forgotten herself. The story has already become unknowable,
severing those links to the past that permit the people of England to recognize
themselves. This surrender thus signifies a contemporary despair of England’s capacity to
ever know itself again in the wake of mass violence, both on the page and on the front.
Middle-Earth’s memorial logic anticipates what we now refer to as cultural
memory. Emerging in the late 1980s, cultural memory studies examine “the symbolic
order … practices by which social groups construct a shared past.” 334 In much the same
way that the logic of trauma was used synecdochally to relate the state of post-war
English society to the psychological condition of the individual, cultural memory inhabits
an essentially metaphorical relationship to individual memory. As Astrid Erll tells us,
“much of what is done [by societies] to reconstruct a shared past bears some resemblance
to the processes of individual memory.” This includes “the selectivity and perspectivity
inherent in the creation of versions of the past according to present knowledge and
needs.”335 Cultural memory operates in part through the textual interrelation of signs and
the significance a given culture applies to these relationships. Literature, with its capacity
to manipulate these relationships, occupies a unique position in the context of cultural
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memory. According to Brigit Neuman, because of the “specific referentiality of literary
works – that is, cultural preformation on one hand and possibilities of imaginative
formation on the other hand – a study of fictional representations of memory yields
insight … into both sanctioned and unsanctioned memories.” 336 Fictional literature is
capable both of participating in a culture’s memorial practices, and exploring as well as
expanding the boundaries of those same practices. If, as Jay Winter contends, in the
aftermath of the Great War, “older motifs took on new meanings and new forms,” the
relationships on which cultural interpretation and thus cultural memory depended were
disrupted and violently reconfigured. 337 The effects of mass violence on a society can
thus correspond to those of personal trauma by fracturing agreed-upon codes of cultural
signification. This makes possible the dissolution of cultural memory, perceived as a
collective break with the past, as occurs when Tavrobel forgets its own name.
Tolkien’s fantastic history is deliberately constructed not from concrete historical
knowledge, but from the remnants of such disintegrated systems of cultural signification.
Its distorted and fantastic qualities haunt the modern reader by conjuring the possibility
of unknowable pasts that cannot be rationally accessed. Tolkien locates Middle-Earth in
what Tom Shippey refers to as an “asterisk-reality,” imaginatively inferred from the gaps
in knowledge of ancient languages.338 Linguistic constructions whose underlying
referents are inaccessible imply the prior existence of consonant terms whose meaning
although unknowable is suggestive. Thus, they tantalize and invite speculation. In many
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instances, this is the vehicle by which Tolkien gains imaginative access to historical
alterity. As Cathy Caruth’s theorizes of histories of trauma, it is “no longer
straightforwardly referential (that is, no longer based on simple models of experience and
reference).”339 Tolkien’s history is imbricated in the systems that comprise cultural
memory, which make it accessible but also misleading and prone to distortion. It
simulates the destructive effects of forgetting by imaginatively locating the reader in a
world that has already forgotten. That Tolkien identifies the effects of forgotten pasts in
modern England reflects the affinities between cultural memory and his academic
practice of philology. This method of deriving cultural knowledge from the interstitial
gaps in language is commonly associated with the discipline, particularly, as Shippey
notes, in “the fastening down of landscape to popular consciousness by the habit of
naming places.”340 Although the meanings of placenames are lost over time, they
nonetheless exert ownership over the space and those who inhabit it – an ownership that
becomes harder to gainsay precisely because we cannot interpret it and therefore cannot
dismantle it. In forgetting “Tavrobel,” the modern English subject forgets even the
remnant of this connection to the past, and has ceased to be haunted by its unknowability.
In this formulation, forgetting is aligned with an end of mourning and with the
negative connotations of nostalgia. Remembrance is aligned with haunting, the
continuance of mourning, and constructive nostalgia. Each concerns the relationship to
the past that we inhabit, as well as the degree to which we recognize the past’s role in
shaping the present. Likewise they demand we address the question of our responsibility
to the past. The first set constructs the past primarily through its opposition to the present.
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Uncritical nostalgia, for example constitutes a form of forgetting that replaces memory
with an idealized construct that it construes as genuine. A static ideal condemns the
present as unworthy, foreclosing the possibility of generative exchange or growth. The
past is held to be the betrayed party, above reproach for the creation of the present by
which its promise was squandered. The latter set on the other hand, acknowledges the
debts owed to the past by the present, for better or worse, and the continued role that each
plays in shaping the other. Tolkien utilizes the fantastic as a means to access and explore
new configurations by constructing imaginative alternative memories. The Book of Lost
Tales posits the distorting effects of the fantastic as a defense against the dissolution of
cultural memory by generating a fictionalized memorial for an imaginative forgotten past.
But to do so it utilizes the lacunae within ancient cultural memory to posit a rationally
impossible world. In the context of modernism and the war in particular, this has the
troubling potential to efface genuine contemporary suffering in much the way nostalgia
effaces the past. The question, then, is which of these possible interactions with the past
does The Book of Lost Tales undertake?

Ethics of the Fantastic in War

If Tolkien’s fiction portrays a world that is defined through representations of
mourning, it also implies an aesthetic dimension to its portrayal of mourning by virtue of
its elevated romantic language. Particularly in the context of the Great War, this sort of
aestheticization tends to trouble modern critics, and with good reason. As John Su points
out, in an argument centered on the significance of aesthetics in colonial texts, literary
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scholars have long understood modern European aesthetics, developed during the
Enlightenment, to be “intimately linked to the intellectual and ideological justifications
for worldwide colonial expansion.” In the context of colonial literature, privileging
aesthetics threatens to conceal the political realities afflicting the colonized behind “a
universalizing, Enlightenment discourse.”341 The aesthetic quality of Tolkien’s writing
similarly risks aligning the work with the social and political forces of imperialism that
motivated the war effort. This is especially damning if the aesthetics with which the text
invests mourning recognizably glorify the loss of life that precipitated it. The question we
must answer is whether, and to what degree, Tolkien’s aesthetics avoid what Tammy
Clewell describes as “the anesthetizing potential of the aesthetic” – the tendency toward
unjustified consolation and comfort that lends support to imperial ideologies by
“[facilitating] the forgetting of lost others and lost histories by insisting on closure.” 342
Can an artistic project such as Tolkien’s address the past in this way without silencing its
disruptive lessons and serving the purposes of its destructive ideologies?
The content and imagery of medievalism and heroic romance is particularly
fraught in this context because of its prevalent role in British war propaganda.
Throughout the war, the medieval world was utilized by the British government not only
to sanitize the image of warfare, but to suggest a unifying national history for which
hundreds of thousands of young British men were dying. In Bloody Good: Chivalry,
Sacrifice, and the Great War, Allen Frantzen examines the role played by the chivalric
ideal in contemporary British war promotions, as well as war memorials. Frantzen argues
that the idea of heroic sacrifice took on special significance, particularly Christ-like self-

341
342

Su, John. Imagination and the Contemporary Novel. (New York: Cambridge UP, 2011), 126.
Clewell, Tammy. Mourning, Modernism, Postmodernism. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 3.

189

sacrifice. He argues that self-sacrifice blurs the lines between martial sacrifice of one’s
enemy and the piety of anti-sacrifice, which opposed the taking of life. 343 We are
reminded of the terms in which Dr. Rivers refutes Sherston’s prospective pacifism – that
to withdraw early would “nullify all the sacrifices [Britain] had made.” 344 The trappings
of chivalric romance invested the war with moral weight and established combat fatalities
as fallen heroes whose deaths were justified by their service to the nation.
At the same time, the sanitizing effects of romantic imagery suppressed the
impersonal brutality of modern warfare. In contrast to the stark and bloody portrayals of
the front found in the writing of the war memoirists, this effect enabled propogandists to
present war as a clean, noble undertaking. The prospective soldier was encouraged to
take aesthetic pleasure in the idea of joining the fight. Frantzen reproduces a common
recruitment poster that portrays St. George’s defeat of the dragon, proclaiming “Britain
Needs You At Once.” He observes that the romanticized elements “conspire to suppress
blood and struggle – to say nothing of war – and present the surface of heroic masculinity
as a free-floating fantasy.” Victory here is achieved without violence: “the dragon
appears to have been pierced without force; the knight’s horse … seems gracefully
airborne.”345 Because it abstracts the war from concrete reality, the fantastic imagery of
chivalric romance is able to promote enlistment without reference to the impersonal,
mechanized conflict unfolding on the continent. It presents a version of warfare that is
entirely without risk or loss. The deceptive qualities of the poster are intensified because,
as Frantzen notes, by the time it appeared in 1915, the British government knew that the
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war would be neither quick nor easy.346 What might otherwise be excused as an earnest,
if misguided, plea to the citizenry is in fact a cynical rhetorical decision, designed to
render violence (and likely death) appealing. In the context of the Great War, the
language and images of chivalric romance are perhaps inseparable from the dishonesty
and opportunism with which they were wielded.
In addition to concealing the violent nature of the war, propaganda of this type
distorted and oversimplified the conflict by placing it in continuity with nationalist
narratives. The figure of St. George, with his status as England’s patron saint, provides a
means for the average soldier (and noncombatant civilian) to identify with the nation. As
Frantzen points out, George is not only England’s patron saint, but “a traditional figure of
British patriotism, and an emblem of chivalry and holy warfare.” 347 For England, St.
George personifies a mythic national past; because he provides a position into which
observers can place themselves, contemporary British citizens are able to imagine their
role in an unbroken cultural tradition. Through St. George, the British nation is made
synonymous with the chivalric associations of romance combat, and simultaneously
identified with its young men. Likewise, the dragon occupies the position of the German
forces, and invites the observer to imagine the enemy as monolithic – a rhetoric that
Fussell identifies as key to discourse surrounding the war effort. 348 The poster is designed
to induce the citizen observers to imagine themselves in brave opposition to the German
attackers, while at the same time steering their imaginations away from the realities of
modern war.
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After the war, the trappings of romance were utilized in public displays of
mourning. In Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural
History, Jay Winter argues that – far from catalyzing modernist revolutions – the war had
the effect of intensifying the general European public’s reliance on traditional forms of
expression, particularly when it came to mourning. Winter’s argument distinguishes
between what he views as the elitist aesthetic practices of the high modernists, and the
larger population of Europe, which he represents as the mass public response. Like the St.
George poster, public commemoration “affirm[s] community … assert[s] its moral
character, and … exclude[s] from it those values, groups, or individuals that [place] it
under threat.”349 Also like the poster, public mourning drew on the chivalric tradition to
convey its message. Memorials frequently participated in “the glorification of sacrifice …
[in] deliberately archaic language, the cadences of knights and valour, of quests and
spiritualized combat.”350 Memorial sites represent the intersection of state power with
personal bereavement. By abstracting the dead into a singular loss, often represented as a
collective sacrifice, they reaffirm the nationalist narrative and the state’s right to compel
its citizens to die. At the same time, however, they are a place in which the bereaved can
imaginatively encounter the dead whom they mourn as a personal loss – a physical
artifact that attests to the efficacy of mourning. 351 In part this is a consequence of the
scope of the war’s casualties; the national death toll was immense. Yet because of this,
nearly every citizen felt personally the death of some friend or loved one. The aesthetics
and logic of chivalric romance allowed national bereavement to be personalized without
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sacrificing its cultural impact.352 Winter argues that these localized sites of memory
provided points of focus for the individual, providing a means of “passing through
mourning, of separating from the dead, and beginning to live again.” Indeed, he argues,
memorials are an impetus for “forgetting, as much as commemoration, and war
memorials … help in the necessary act of forgetting.” 353 In this sense, the public practice
of mourning adheres to the logic of trauma, enabling the citizens of Europe to locate their
loss in the past and move forward with their lives.
It is precisely this forgetting, however, to which many twentieth-century critics
find an objection in modernist and post-modernist literature. Patricia Rae has argued that
such forgetting is seen to amount to “an abdication of responsibility for, what has been
lost … amnesia has been too often demanded and paid in the interests of preserving the
status quo.”354 In other words, the closure of the mourning process discourages positive
action to dismantle those ideologies that motivated the war. Thus, like pro-war
propaganda, it is ultimately aligned with the forces that precipitated the war. According
to Tammy Clewell, modernists, particularly Woolf and Faulkner, responded by creating a
“conception of mourning as an interminable rather than finishable labor [resulting] from a
steadfast rejection of all symbolic forms of consolation.” 355 This rejection includes a
disavowal of “the anesthetizing potential of the aesthetic,” reasoning that “consolatory
paradigms … both [reinforce] a capitalist status quo and [facilitate] the forgetting of lost
others and lost histories by insisting on closure.” 356 This perspective interprets the closure
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of mourning as an effective refusal to be haunted by the past, which it views as an ethical
imperative. The traumas of the past are disavowed and made invisible rather than being
recognized and interpreted. Aestheticizing language (of which romance was most often
applied to the Great War) is from this perspective primarily a means to conceal
unpleasant or violent realities, thus encouraging complacency and discouraging positive
action. The consolatory effect of aesthetic production conspires with completed mourning
to deny responsibility to victims of past violence. In doing so, they allow the potential for
such violence to persist into the future.
Nostalgia, trauma, and romantic aestheticism are interlinked by the ways that each
concerns personal and collective relationships to the past, particularly the past as it is
shaped by the present, and shapes the present in return. Each represents a distinct, but
related, type of memory. If romantic aesthetics portray an idealized version of an
inaccessible past, nostalgia and trauma recovery represent different methods of signifying
and engaging with a past that is defined by the memory of its loss. Each constitutes what
Linda Hutcheon describes an act of “memory and desire … [as well as] forgetting” in the
service of imaginatively constructing the past. 357 They are distinguished from one
another, therefore, by the ways in which memory and desire determine what is
remembered, what is forgotten, and how, as well as the purpose with which they are
undertaken: to acknowledge or to suppress the haunting effects of the past on the present.
In his examination of Siegfried Sassoon’s postwar writing, Robert Hemmings posits that
the functions of nostalgia and trauma recovery are essentially oppositional. According to
Hemmings, Sassoon’s recovery from trauma is undermined by the nostalgic indulgence

357

Hutcheon, Linda. “Irony, Nostalgia, and the Postmodern,” in Methods for the Study of Literature as
Cultural Memory. ed. Raymond Vervliet and Annemarie Estor. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 195.

194

which “hinders [the] thoroughness” of his “exploration of his past.” 358 Nostalgia prevents
genuine, earnest reconstruction of the past, which is a necessary step in traumatic
recovery, by filling its place with a desirable imaginative substitute. For Hemmings, the
prevalence of nostalgia following the Great War reflects the reaction of a society,
“invested in a social geography of Englishness to which homecoming was no longer
possible,” to the incipient decline of the empire. 359 Others, like Stephen Spender, argue
that nostalgia has the potential for a positive aspect – one which avoids a purely
sentimental and ultimately ineffectual longing for the past, instead using the imaginative
past to provide a contrasting position from which to critique the present and ultimately
open the possibility of alternative futures. 360
Any conclusion we draw about the relationship between J. R. R. Tolkien’s work
and the personal and social traumas of the Great War must to some degree take these
question into consideration. The general critical assumption has been that Tolkien’s
treatment of the past represents the negative side of the equation, aligned with undue
consolation, and the silencing of trauma’s claim on the present; this is reflected in the
accusations of nostalgic indulgence that are frequently leveled against his fiction. The
key point of dispute is whether the particular character of the fantastic elements in
Tolkien’s fiction serves to avoid the traumas of the past, thus denying our responsibility
to the victims, or enables meaningful confrontation of the past; whether romanticizing or
aestheticizing language can be deployed in the context of the Great War without being
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complicit in its justification. Ted Bogacz, for example, contends in “A Tyranny of
Words” that high diction reproduces violent, imperial ideologies not through context, but
by its nature. For him, high diction and romanticized imagery are “abstract, euphemized
language[s],” whose use, because they are “not rooted in observed reality,” inherently
“ignore and obfuscate [the writer’s] and others’ experiences.” 361 This was the quality on
which British propaganda drew to make the war palatable and retain public support. Can
The Book of Lost Tales utilize such language without being complicit in its associated
ideological practices? Does it indulge in uncritical nostalgia for an imaginative past, or
does it, in some more deliberate way, critique the present?
The most radical objections to Tolkien’s literary romanticism contend that all
aesthetic representation cannot help but support capitalist and imperial ideologies. This
view is most famously professed by Theodor Adorno in Aesthetic Theory. In this
influential work, Adorno contends that aesthetic appreciation is an act of misdirection
that serves the purposes of capitalist society by distracting the populace from the reality
of its social and economic oppression. As a result, it discourages positive action against
the status quo of late capitalism. The very act of representing an object for aesthetic
satisfaction makes it available for commodification and subversion by capitalist
frameworks.362 This is in some sense a broader application of the modernist objection to
the consolatory closure of mourning. In this case, the principle applies to all types of
consolation. Or, perhaps more precisely, it identifies in aesthetic pleasure an illusory
consolation that fraudulently satisfies the need for genuine resolution. As an alternative,
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Adorno advocates for a modern aesthetic of art that is non-representative. By eliding
representation, art refuses to submit its subject to the co-opting forces that seek to turn it
into consolatory artifacts, and thus retains its ability to gesture toward new possibilities.
However, arguments such as this underestimate the collective need for
consolation, particularly in the context of such immense collective traumas as the Great
War. In his conclusion to “Nostalgia, Trauma, and the Aftermath of War,” Robert
Hemmings describes Sassoon’s nostalgia as “a kind of vaccine, a consciously held means
of inoculating himself and his readers against the renewal of trauma.” 363 The “renewal of
trauma,” as Cathy Caruth reminds us, can be a perpetual and paralyzing occurrence.
Traumatic experience not only reveals itself via its recurrence; the recurrence is the
experience. Because of this, it exerts determinative power over the present for those
afflicted. In this way, violence and trauma located in the past can manifest as “a sort of
face … which [seems] to be entirely outside … wish or control.” 364 A case can be made
that in the aftermath of catastrophic violence, the denial of consolation can foreclose
possibilities as completely as undue consolation discourages them. Under the logic of
trauma and recovery, consolation can be seen to signify an attempt to break the cycle of
recurrent, paralyzing violence. In Ethics and Nostalgia in the Contemporary Novel, John
Su makes a similar case for the constructive possibilities of nostalgia. Su argues that, by
providing an alternative imaginative position from which to critique the present, nostalgia
“facilitates an exploration of ethical ideals in the face of disappointing circumstances.” 365
Although Hemmings suggests an emotional utility for nostalgia, and Su an intellectual
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utility, each depends on nostalgia’s imaginative aspect. Nostalgia has the capacity to do
positive work because it provides a habitable external perspective from which to
contemplate alternatives to contemporary material conditions.
Tolkien himself argues for the virtues of consolatory aesthetics in “On FairyStories.” In fact, the essay in its entirety can be read as an extended apology for the
consolatory virtues of the fantastic in the modern world particularly. 366 Tolkien’s chief
target is the contemporary perception that the fantastic is not serious or viable literary
mode. Throughout the course of the essay, he cites accusations of escapism that are
frequently leveled against the fantastic. Although Adorno’s rejection of representational
art is more radical and absolute than these critiques, there is an affinity to be found
between them. Each opposes the fantastic on the principle that it occludes unpleasant
truths in favor of comforting (and, it is implied, disabling) lies. Tolkien contends that
these critics have failed to accurately assess the need for such imaginative action,
famously accusing them of “confusing … the Escape of the Prisoner with the Flight of
the Deserter.”367 What critics identify as concealment or naiveté intrinsic to fantastic
literature in fact signals an implicit critique:
it is after all possible for a rational man … to arrive at the condemnation,
implicit at least in the silence of ‘escapist’ literature of progressive things
like factories, or the machine-guns and bombs that appear to be their most
natural and inevitable, dare we say ‘inexorable’ products. 368
The modern fantastic’s turn away from modernity toward what might be called nostalgia
does not here signal a suppression of modernity’s unpleasant truths, but rather an attempt
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to navigate, and perhaps mitigate, their most destructive effects on those who experience
them. In other words, when it appears in the context of modernity, Tolkien’s conception
of the fantastic relies on the presence in its readers of precisely the traumatizing modern
awareness that it is accused of suppressing. In the absence of this kind of knowledge, the
-fantastic is purposeless.
The disillusioning, dispiriting nature of the modern condition makes the fantastic
uniquely capable of recuperative work in Tolkien’s opinion. In what he describes as
“recovery,” the fantastic’s capacity enable authors to imaginatively dismantle the sensory
components of material reality and recombine them produces an effect rather like the
Russian formalist concept of defamiliarization:
We should look at green again, and be startled anew (but not blinded) by
blue and yellow and red. We should meet the centaur and dragon, and then
perhaps suddenly behold, like ancient shepherds, sheep, and dogs, and
horses – and wolves. This recovery fairy-stories help up make. 369
“Recovery” makes possible a childlike rediscovery of that which has been rendered
mundane in the ennui of modern life. It discourages rather than engenders complacency.
Although the process can be interpreted as a nostalgic return to an imaginative unspoiled
state, it also bears affinities with Judith Herman’s model of storytelling as a means of
traumatic recovery. Both compel a deliberate, imaginative reconnection with the past
with the goal of transforming the present and lending to it new potential. Tolkien in fact
refers to “return and renewal of health” as concomitant effects, describing the resultant
state as “a re-gaining, regaining of a clear view.” 370 “Recovery” does not redress the loss
of innocence; rather, like traumatic recovery, it repairs the lenses with which we interpret

369
370

“On Fairy-Stories,” 146.
“On Fairy-Stories,” 146.

199

our world in the aftermath of loss. The past is not revisited, but experienced as if it were
new, absent the certitude imposed by hindsight. In contrast to the recurrent experience of
trauma which limits continuity to repetition, recovery restores the potential for newness.
Tolkien identifies a connection between the critical opinion of the fantastic to the
disparagement that was directed at the shell-shocked soldier. In what he describes as the
“Escape” function, the fantastic permits an imaginative departure from what we
understand to constitute “Real Life.” 371 Tolkien’s ironic use of the term refers specifically
to those for whom “reality” constitutes only the spaces and trappings of a modern,
industrialized urban space. This prioritization tends to regard all other spaces and modes
of existence as backward. Moreover, it proceeds from and thus implicitly endorses a
progressive ideology, along with its destructive consequences:
‘The March of Science, its tempo quickened by the needs of war, goes
inexorably on … making some things obsolete, and foreshadowing new
developments in the utilization of electricity’: an advertisement. This says
the same thing only more menacingly.372
Tolkien aligns his model of escape with the rejection of jingoistic rhetoric and
mechanized warfare expressed by many veterans of the war. It is not for the escape itself
that critical discourse condemns the fantastic mode; as Tolkien notes, the critique is
limited to fiction; in the real world, escape is often a necessary, even practical
undertaking. Rather it is because, like the stories and traumas of soldiers returning from
the front, fantastic escape asserts the possibility of a world that is at odds with ideological
priorities. “Escape” in this sense is condemned because reality is invested with an
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ideological dimension which, whether in fatalist or laudatory terms, maintains the
supremacy of progress as a historical framework.
Perhaps the most stringent critiques of Tolkien’s theory of the fantastic have been
reserved for the element he calls “consolation.” This effect, he tells us, arises from “the
joy of the happy ending … the good catastrophe, the sudden joyous “turn’ (for there is no
true end to any fairy-tale.’373 This principle gives rise to Tolkien’s concept of
“eucatastrophe” – that is, the opposite of catastrophe, a sudden and unexpected happy
outcome. At least since Colin Manlove’s Modern Fantasy, critics have accused Tolkien’s
work, most especially The Lord of the Rings of demonstrating a doe-eyed naiveté in its
conclusion. For his part, Manlove argues that what he sees as the ubiquity of joyous turns
in the narrative undermines its coherence: a “sense of inevitability comes over the reader:
nothing is at risk, nothing can be lost; Frodo is home and dry under the umbrella of
authorial fortune.”374 This accusation parallels Adorno’s condemnation of
aestheticization in that both are concerned with the capacity of art and literature to
conceal unpleasant realities, to the detriment of those who consume them. (It is perhaps
similar logic that leads Manlove to declare Sauron the most realistic character in the text,
precisely because he remains unrepresented).375 In broad terms, twentieth-century
criticism tended to construe consolatory effects in literature as a betrayal of
responsibility, both because it is unrealistic, and because it alleviates the pain of
existence, and thus cheats our ongoing need to reckon with the past.
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Tolkien’s own argument, however, undermines the assumption that the
consolation provided by the fantastic represents a definitive end state. If indeed such
consolation is aligned with closed mourning, it is an extremely provisional type. He
refers to eucatastrophe as a “turn,” because, he cautions, “there is no true end to any fairy
tale.” “Happily ever after,” is “no more thought to be the real end … than the frame is of
the visionary scene.” In contrast, he argues, “most modern ‘realistic’ stories” are
comparably insular, “already hemmed within the narrow confines of their own small
time.”376 The eucatastrophe thus represents not an end to suffering and mourning, but a
reprieve – temporary by definition. Consolation in this model does not mean the redress
of every injury, but a perhaps irrationally-achieved return of a sense of continuity. Rather,
the happy ending is a transformative moment that “reflects its glory backwards,”
recontextualizing that which has come before and creating the possibility of new
continuities to repair old wounds. Critical readings that highlight Tolkien’s overly sunny
endings thus emerge in part from misreading the finality with which his texts are meant
to conclude – a misjudgment of the limits of the text, we might say. They are only ever a
respite, offering hope but acknowledging the inescapability and ultimate irreconcilability
of mass suffering.
If we understand the fantastic and its aestheticizing effect to be serving the
demands of mourning by offering freedom from the constraining, recursive state brought
on by traumatic loss, then it becomes possible to acknowledge the profound need for such
consolation that must have been felt by British society during and after the Great War. It
is perhaps easy to forget the extent of the loss suffered during the war: “three million
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Britons out of forty-two million lost a close relative … The secondary bereaved
comprised virtually the entire population.”377 The enormity of these losses compelled a
re-emergence of mysticism, and what was in some ways a nationwide state of mourning.
If the end of mourning unduly absolves us of the burdens of the past, the perpetual
deferment of closure implies a never-ending return to the disruptive event of loss. By
preventing the establishment of a coherent history, it limits the capacity to build a future.
The ability of the individual, to say nothing of British society, to move forward
necessitated some degree of consolation, however it might be achieved. To all this
Tolkien brings his imaginative history as an apparatus with which to render meaning
through a past that is not defined by its complicity in the present catastrophe.

The Reconstruction of History

At the core of Tolkien’s model of history is a rejection of dominant narratives of
progress. This model is informed and shaped by the logic of trauma and the imperative of
mourning. Positivist ideologies sublimate the atrocities of the past by casting them as the
price of progress – the regrettable but necessary sacrifices that cleared the way for the
superior present.
Violations of the social contract “too terrible to utter aloud” become unspeakable on an
immense scale. Traumatic silence is made collective by creating the violations as
beneficial to those who are obligated to speak out. Entire populations are rendered
complicit in the atrocities of the past. But the atrocity haunts precisely because it exposes
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the precarious foundation on which the present is built, the bad faith with which we
ascribe to progress our better angels. Middle-Earth opposes this by manifesting the signs
of trauma within its landscape, endowing it with memorial qualities independent of any
mourning or silencing consciousness. The Book of Lost Tales constructs a history that is
defined by the recurrence of loss and the paralyzing effects of a present that is perpetually
determined by the violence of the past. The elves’ salvation from violence does not take
the form of material victory, but rather a memorial plea to escape the machinery of
history that has ground and diminished them.
The call for a history free from the silencing and paralyzing effects of progress is
famously made by Walter Benjamin in “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” He
characterizes this call as the “angel of history:”
A Klee painting named “Angelus Novus” shows an angel looking as
though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are
spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned
toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single
catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in
front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make
whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it
has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer
close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his
back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This
storm is what we call progress.378
Jay Winter argues that this type of backward gaze is apparent in “so many writers, artists,
politicians, soldiers, and everyday families in this period [reflecting] the universality of
grief and mourning in Europe from 1914.” 379 This perspective is likewise present in
Tolkien’s earliest work, visible through the language and logic of trauma. Moreover,
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while “Angelus Novus” is a distinctly modern work, Benjamin draws meaning from it in
part by drawing on the fantastic; the representational weight of a literal perspective on
history is borne by the figure of an angel. The imaginative demands of describing a
temporal point of view that is at odds with ideological and experiential precedent can
only be fulfilled by constructing and personifying a mythic figure.
In Tolkien’s fiction, this backward-looking perspective is embodied by a
character who is simultaneously the product of three histories of trauma. Eärendel is
descended from elves, humans, and by way of his maternal great-grandmother, the divine
Ainur. In every version of the legendarium, he is a sailor who finds his way to Valinor in
defiance of the ban placed on travel to the continent of the gods. In the version of the
narrative ultimately published in The Silmarillion, Eärendel serves as witness to the
suffering of the people of Middle-Earth. Authorized by his status as an inheritor of both
earthly legacies, he testifies before the Valar on behalf of his own traumatic past, as well
as the humans and elves across the ocean who cannot speak for themselves. His speech
conjures the violence of the past, and asserts its claim on the present, calling on the Valar
to redeem the losses of the elves in the same way Benjamin’s angel longs to awaken the
dead.
Eärendel stood before [the Valar] and delivered the errand of the Two
Kindreds. Pardon he asked for the Noldor, and pity for their great sorrows,
and mercy upon the Men and Elves and succor in their need. And his
prayer was granted.380
Eärendel is empowered to speak on behalf of the Kindreds because he embodies the long,
parallel cultural narratives of trauma that have culminated in his existence. His singular
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being literalizes his role as witness, which for Shoshana Feldman means “to bear the
solitude of a responsibility, and to bear the responsibility, precisely, of that solitude.” The
act of witnessing implies singularity; if Eärendel were one of many capable of speaking,
he would not be compelled to speak. Likewise, however, to witness is “to transgress the
confines of that isolated stance, to speak for other and to others.”381 The witness acts as a
conduit between the victim and the listener, provided access to hidden histories of
trauma, a boundary-crossing reflected by Eärendel’s passage into Valinor.
Eärendel’s plea constitutes a request to escape the oppressive sovereignty of
history. His voyage is catalyzed by the destruction of Gondolin, the last of the Elven
strongholds. As discussed in the previous chapter, the city’s fall is construed in some
ways as an end to history. It is emphasized as the final bastion against Morgoth. With its
destruction, the romantic world is overwhelmed and annihilated by modern,
industrialized warfare. The diminished state of the elves subsequent existence is likewise
depicted as the telos of the Doom of Mandos, a decree delivered by the eponymous god
of the dead. The Doom dictates the fate of the Noldorian elves on Middle-Earth:
the Valar will fence Valinor against you, and shut you out, so that not even
the echo of your lamentation shall pass over the mountains … To evil ends
shall all things turn that [you] begin well; and by treason of kin unto kin,
and the fear of treason, shall this come to pass. The Dispossessed shall
[you] be for ever.382
Broadly speaking, the Doom structures the subsequent history lived by the Noldor in
Middle-Earth – a teleology of ongoing diminishment, violence, and trauma brought about
by past transgressions. Eärendel’s voyage, however, violates the first decree – that they
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will be shut out of Valinor. His testimony violates the second – that word of their
suffering will never reach it. His plea amounts to a request that the Valar annul the
remainder. That they agree to revoke the Doom represents the crowning eucatastrophe of
Tolkien’s early legendarium. The decision negates not only the primary motivating force
that drives and shapes the period referred to as the First Age, but in doing so, to some
degree it negates causality as well. Eärendel reaches Valinor by passing through a
boundary that was historically impassable; Middle-Earth is saved by the intercession of
the Valar, who had divested themselves from its history. To call the outcome unexpected
in the context of the strictures Tolkien places on his narrative would be insufficient. Prior
to its occurrence it has every appearance of impossibility, and could nearly be said to
enter into history from without. At the same time, Eärendel’s lineage and act of witness
bind it to the narrative. His plea, and the Valar’s assent, remake the reader’s
understanding of the narrative that precedes them. Through Eärendel, the happy ending
appears to be a culmination of history rather than a contravention. His messianic act
reflectively restores continuity and creates the possibility for the Nolder’s redemption.
Bearing witness to trauma is thus affirmed as a potent means of intervention into histories
of trauma, and breaking the deterministic hold trauma exerts on the future.
However, this transformative sequence of events only emerged in drafts of the
Quenta Silmarillion, written in or around 1926. 383 In the version featured in The Book of
Lost Tales, Eärendel is already distinct as the only character to successfully defy the ban
of the Valar and find his way to their realm. But in this case, the most remarkable feature
is the way the narrative seems contrived to cheat him of any agency in its resolution. He
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arrives in Valinor only to find it empty, walk its deserted paths, and return to his home,
which is finds to also be abandoned. 384 Notes suggest that prior word of Gondolin’s fall
was carried to Valinor by birds spattered with the blood of its citizens, crossing the ocean
by air.385 Consequently, this version lacks the narrative act of witness; the blood merely
signifies the violence committed, rather than the experience of its victims. Other excerpts
seem to suggest that the salvation of Middle-Earth was carried out by elves in defiance of
the Valar.386 Far from the messianic role he plays in later versions, Eärendel here appears
to signify narrative discontinuity and fruitless achievement. He is defined primarily by
the emptiness of his accomplishments; the single persistent image of his journey into
Valinor has him wandering through an abandoned city, with diamond dust collecting on
his shoes.387 This version of the narrative tracks more closely with what is traditionally
understood as modernist literature. There is a seeming disjuncture between cause and
effect, a thwarting of narrative expectations. Eärendel’s heritage remains, as does his
location at the culmination of the Tales, and his heroic voyage, and yet it comes to
nothing in the end. “The Tale of Eärendel” suggests that satisfying continuity with the
past is unattainable, that survivors of trauma in this world are incapable of redressing
their suffering and integrating it meaningfully into their lives. 388
The changes Tolkien made to this text between 1917 and 1927 push the resolution
of his legendarium in the direction of consolation. We can infer that this shift reflected in
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part the mass mourning being practiced in England and across Europe during the same
period. Giving Eärendel’s act of witness a meaningful role in the outcome returns a
positive continuity to a history dominated by the burden of collective loss. It represents a
move toward a teleology that is motivated not by the effacement of the past that fuels
progress, but by open acknowledgment of the past and responsibility to its casualties.
Mourning here achieves closure not by abdication of responsibility, but by the willing
and difficult fulfillment of our debts to the dead. This achievement is made possible in
the literal sense only by the fantastic mode; the mourning population of postwar Britain
could not, after all, duplicate Eärendel’s journey. Nonetheless, like Marlene Briggs
attributes to D. H. Lawrence, in the aftermath of the Great War, Tolkien found mourning
to be “a critical … component of a multifaceted vision responsible social rebuilding after
massive violence.”389 The gradual shift toward this type of consolatory conclusion in the
ten years following the war reflects a growing recognition of the social need for closure
through the integration of the past into present modes of life. Such a way of living is, of
course, not rational. Rationality insists on the irrevocability of the past and compels us to
leave it behind rather than dwell on impossibilities. The fantastic urges us to attend to
ghosts.
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Conclusion: The Fantastic Lens on Late Empire

Although this study interprets the Great War as a catalytic event in the emergence
and development of modern fantasy, it would be a mistake to conclude that the war
represents an incidental moment of affinity between the fantastic and the experiences of
modernity. Rather, in the war, we have a particularly visible moment of the continuing
presence and development of fantastic writing during the modern period. It is a key
juncture to which the commercial fantasy genre we think of today can trace its roots and
thereby illuminate its relationship with the twentieth century, not a singular or unique
event. The fantastic proceeds alongside traditionally-endorsed literary forms, surfacing
and submerging in turn, appearing in places both expected and unexpected, interacting
with and influencing its contemporaries, and grappling in its own way with the same
dilemmas of modernity as canonically modernist writing. It both predates the war and
endures beyond the armistice; we must refute the impression that it recedes into
obsolescence once the war is over. Indeed, it is precisely this type of imaginative
temporal isolation that this project was designed to combat.
J. R. R. Tolkien’s early work shares a common catalyst with literary modernism
in the First World War, as well as many of its preoccupations, but when it comes to the
Second World War, the two face opposite dilemmas. At times in its history, The Lord of
the Rings has suffered from its close chronological association with WWII, even being
read as a loose allegory for the war itself. Our capacity to read these later works in the
context of their time has thus been limited at times by this restrictive, one-to-one
paradigm. On the other hand, if the First World War has at times been over-credited was
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the inciting incident of high modernism, the Second was long dismissed as a literary
footnote. Writers of the 40s and 50s were viewed as lesser practitioners of an exhausted
art. They suffered from working in between the modernist vanguard of literary
innovation, and the anarchistic refutation of postmodernism. In Imagination at War,
Adam Piette argues that this sense of literary inferiority was shared by writers of the
time.390 Recent criticism has revised this, however. Consequently, the literary production
of World War II has been restored to narratives of twentieth century literature. Previously
understood as ‘an endpoint of modernism,’ the war now seems ‘at least continuous with
the experiments of the previous twenty years.’391 This continuity enables us to extend the
principles by which we have connected the origins of modern fantasy and
contemporaneous Great War writing to this, later period, as well as backward to earlier
imperial-era writing. By the same token, it offers the capacity to read The Lord of the
Rings, as well as Tolkien’s other late works, in the context of their time without relying
on the limitations of allegory to provide an interpretive lens.
To illustrate the sorts of readings this strategy makes possible, I close with a brief
consideration of Elizabeth Bowen’s “Mysterious Kôr” and Tolkien’s contemporary (and
ongoing) work on The Book of Lost Tales, which had by now become The Silmarillion.
These disparate works are connected by their mutual use of the city of Kôr, the
abandoned, ancient, semi-mythic city at the center of H Rider Haggard’s adventure novel,
She. The idea of Kôr, not only as a city, but as a fantastic city that is encountered from
the outside only in abandonment and inscrutability, persists across all of these texts,

390

Piette, Adam. Imagination at War: British Fiction and Poetry 1939-1945. (London: Papermac, 1995), 2-

3.
391

MacKay, 104.

211

which were composed over the course of eighty years. However, it is only by attending to
the fantastic as an equal, persistent thread in twentieth-century literature that the
significance of these connections becomes visible. That these texts share a mutual
ancestry in the figure of Kôr could be reasonably dismissed as trivia. But its centrality
and persistence suggest the closeness of these long-isolated threads of English literature.
Late modernism and the fantastic had and continued to manifest mutual cultural anxieties
that preoccupied English authors writing in the late empire. Kôr’s fantastic geography
lends a substantive alternative to the “shrinking island” that Jed Esty identifies as the
dominant metaphor for the “relative diffusion” of “economic, social, and cultural power
in metropolitan London” during the late modernist period.392 In Haggard’s text it
represents abstracted limits of empire. But, under the oppressive threat of the Second
World War, it takes on the immediacy of a looming violent eschaton. Marina MacKay
argues that, when modernism wrote about war, “it was always attuned to what could
happen and not simply what had.” 393 By turning to the fantastic, these writers render
through Kôr an imaginative precedent for MacKay’s unthinkable “could.”
In Haggard’s novel, Horace Holly and his ward, Leo Vincey, journey into a
fantastic version of Africa in search of a lost civilization. Kôr is all that remains. Emptied
of its people, sparsely inhabited by local remnants who can only mimic its culture, the
city they find is more a mausoleum than a metropole. Kôr’s ruins are funereal, even
sepulchral. Its nigh-immortal queen, Ayesha (‘She’ of the title), describes it as “a land of
… dead old shadows of the dead.”394 Even the city’s art invokes death, as Holly observes

392

Esty, Jed. A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England. (Princeton: Princeton UP,
2003), 2.
393
MacKay, 141. Emphasis in original.
394
Haggard, H. Rider. She. (New York: Penguin, 2001), 147.

212

a mural portraying “with studious accuracy, the last rites of the dead as practised among
an utterly lost people.”395 But Kôr is not just empty; it is emptied. A “lighted street,”
Vincey muses, “has always a more solitary appearance than a dark one.” 396 Kôr’s
desertion is similarly intensified because its remnants of civilization no longer serve a
purpose or convey a meaning. The images Vincey observes, and therefore Kôr itself,
suggest something greater than simple mortality. Each instance doubles the image of
death. Dead “shadows of the dead,” says Ayesha. The mural, the work of a deceased
people, itself portrays death. What haunts Kôr is not simply that its inhabitants are dead.
Rather, it is because they have been wiped out so utterly, so completely, that no one
remains to remember or mourn them. The artifacts and spaces they leave behind are
uninterpretable precisely because they invoke an irrevocable absence.
That Kôr is emptied, rather than destroyed, constitutes an existential threat to the
citizen of late empire. Its abandonment destabilizes the civilizational surety on which
imperial knowledges depend – that of the empire’s position at the culmination of history
and its implicit cultural immortality. It is impossible to approach Kôr from a place of
knowledge because even the cultural context in which its knowledge was conveyed has
been extinguished. Kôr is always deserted because it is impossible to imagine a plausible
picture of the city in its life. It is a city defined by its desertion, a memorial metropolis
whose memory is vacant because no one remains who can interpret its signifiers with any
certainty. Kôr invokes not death, but oblivion: the utter annihilation not only of a people
but of any means by which to remember them, leaving behind only unanswerable
questions. Its inscrutable emptiness arrests and consumes characters in both Tolkien and
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Bowen’s texts. Kôr embodies the threat that the World Wars and the interwar period
posed to the British Imperial subject: the possibility of the end of the civilization that saw
their nation astride the globe. Examining these texts’ shared ancestry in the motif of Kôr
highlights the continued affinity shared between modernist literature and its fantasy
contemporaries, even into the late modernist period. Consequently, it suggests new
contexts in which to continue the recent reevaluation of World War II-era modernism.
The Blitz – the extended bombing campaign of England by the Luftwaffe –
provides the common context in which these affinities emerge. Patrick Deer has observed
that ‘The Blitz Experience’ (a term taken from London’s Imperial War Museum) roughly
correlates to ‘The Trench Experience.’ Each represents the dominant imaginative
construction of England’s encounter with modern total war in its respective world war.
However, in contrast to the trenches, which were experienced by citizen-soldiers, the
Blitz represents ‘the most potent and circulated representation of civilian experience at
war.’397 Thus, in the same way that the trenches and No Man’s Land provided the
imaginative stock that shaped many literary responses to the Great War, London during
the Blitz did for World War II. Like No Man’s Land, the Blitz transformed the space in
which it occurred, creating what Deer describes as ‘a new, nocturnal landscape.’ 398 Under
blackout regulations, even a metropolis like London took on alien qualities of desertion
under the covers of darkness and silence. And, like No Man’s Land, writers attempting to
navigate and represent this new landscape frequently did so through recourse to the
fantastic. Like the Great War, the Blitz was attended by an increase of mysticism and
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paranormal superstitions in English culture. This turn subverted governmental insistence
that the home front “be a modernized space, exorcised of the ghosts, spirits, and séances
that haunted and comforted the survivors [of World War I].” 399 The degree to which these
practices nonetheless persisted suggests that many experienced the Blitz as a haunted
environment. This haunting represented both a collective awareness of the accumulated
dead and perpetual anticipation of imminent, unforeseeable attack.
Tolkien was no less familiar with the Blitz than he had been with the trenches.
Recall from the opening chapter that he served as an air marshal during the war. His
contemporary letters are replete with references to late nights spent listening for bombers
in the dark (as well as falling asleep on duty). 400 In other cases, he describes Inklings
meetings that ran past midnight. 401 One imagines Tolkien wandering home from The
Eagle and Child pub through blacked-out Oxford streets, apprehensive of the telltale
whine of approaching planes. This period, it should be noted, overlapped much of the
composition of The Lord of the Rings. In a letter to his son, Christopher, who was
stationed in Africa with the RAF, Tolkien refers to his civilian duty before commenting
that he has ‘brought Frodo nearly to the gates of Mordor.’ 402 For evidence that this
collective tension inflected his work, we need only examine the chapter in question: “The
Passage of the Marshes.” Christopher Tolkien places the its composition around April of
1944, during the last months of the blackout. 403 The chapter portrays Frodo, Sam, and
Gollum’s journey across the extensive titular marshland on their way to Mordor. As they
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travel during the night, Gollum is seized by paranoia concerning the sky overhead. He
stands “to his full height, craning his head eastward and southward,” as if in expectation.
The first sensory sign of approaching threat is auditory – “a long wailing cry, high and
thin and cruel … [at] the same moment the stirring of the air became perceptible.”
Looking up, the hobbits first see “the clouds breaking and shredding,” before “a vast
shape winged and ominous [crosses] the moon … outrunning the wind in its fell
speed.”404 The passage in fact concerns the group’s first encounter with the Nazgûl’s
flying steeds, but it could nearly describe an approaching bomber. It is more important to
note, however, that it conveys the ominous, almost supernatural apprehension of the night
sky that authors and scholars attribute to the Blitz.
The city of Kôr has an extensive lineage in Tolkien’s writing. In early
manuscripts, the name is given to the capital city of the elves in Valinor. Tolkien’s Kôr
shares many of the features of Haggard’s lost capital. Although its name is changed to
‘Tirion’ in later versions, the city retains this affinity for its entire literary lifespan. Like
the original, Tolkien’s Kôr is described in terms of death and forgetting. It first appears in
an eponymous poem, written in 1915. The poem describes “marble temples white … And
tawny shadows fingered long … upon their ivory walls.” Again, the space is defined by
desertion, and the inscrutable emptiness left behind by forgotten inhabitants. In the city,
“slow forgotten days for ever reap … counting out rich hours;/ And no voice stirs; and all
the marble towers … ever burn and sleep.” The poem is subtitled “In a City Lost and
Dead.”405 Although, at the time of the its composition, Kôr had not been integrated into
Tolkien’s extended narrative, the city retains many of its defining features throughout
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subsequent iterations. And like the city to which it owes its name, Tolkien’s Kôr is
encountered by outsiders in a state of haunting desertion. When he lands on the shores of
Valinor, Eärendel (discussed in chapter 3), makes his way into Kôr, only to find it
emptied. In Tolkien’s early notes on the story, Eärendel “returns to find it [Kôr], only to
find that the fairies have departed from Eldamar … Dusted with diamond dust [he
climbs] the deserted streets of Kôr.” 406 Kôr’s unsettling emptiness destabilizes even the
certainty with which heaven can be regarded as an aspirational, final state.
Like Turin’s death, the image of Eärendel’s venture in Kôr persists in nearly
every iteration of the story. But what is striking here is not what changes, but how much
work has been done, despite many more substantive changes, to keep this image
consistent. In the earliest versions, the city is deserted because the elves living there have
left to save those on the mainland from Melkor. They have already received word of the
suffering overseas – from the birds escaping Gondolin, one note suggests. 407 Thus,
Eärendel’s purpose in journeying to Kôr is moot; despite his triumph, he is unable to
plead his people’s case. But later versions, in which the weight and consequences of
Eärendel’s journey change dramatically, his wandering in the deserted city remains. As of
The Quenta, composed around 1930, Eärendel in fact succeeds in pleading to the Valar
for mercy. But in order to retain the image of his wandering through the deserted city,
Tolkien places his arrival during a festival that sends the inhabitants to the home of the
Valar. Once more, he finds a city of empty streets. He walks “in the deserted ways of Tûn
[Kôr] and the dust upon his raiment and his shoes [is] a dust of diamonds, yet no one
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[hears] his call.”408 Although the city’s name has been changed by now to Tûn (and
would change again later), the persistent image of diamond dust covering Eärendel’s
shoes demonstrates that it represents a consistent, continuous idea, dating back to the
1915 poem. The image remains in the published Silmarillion.409
In Elibzabeth Bowen’s “Mysterious Kôr,” the Blitz comes to represent the
ultimate vulnerability of imperial civilization in much the same way as Kôr. The short
story portrays a Blitz-era London that is haunted by the anticipation of its own
destruction, as well as the conspicuous absence of its citizens. In the moonlit night on
which the story takes place, the city is uncomfortably visible. The narrator imagines the
ease with which it could be marked from the air, implicitly the perspective of
approaching planes: “from the sky, presumably, you could see every slate in the roofs,
every whited kerb, every contour of the naked winter flowerbeds in the park; and the lake
… would be a landmark for miles, yes, miles overhead.” The light is thus construed as a
threat, and the city as conspicuously vulnerable. Residences and shops appear “equally
brittle under the moon, which blazed in windows that looked its way.” 410 All but vacated,
the streets seem haunted by the few people who appear, only to disappear again,
manifesting as temporary disturbances of the intersection’s proper, emptied state. A trio
of French soldiers pass singing. A pair of air wardens cross the road and separate. The
only larger group emerges from the London Underground, as is rising from the
underworld, only to “[disappear] quickly, in an abashed way, as though dissolved in the
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street by some white acid.”411 Even the narrator’s presence at the intersection seems in
some way ghostly. The narrative perspective observes the disruptive comings and goings
in this uninhabited place without being itself recognized by any of the passers-by. This
gives the impression of an uncanny presence, perhaps one specially in tune with the
tension that suffuses London’s population. But the threat under which the city rests is not,
we are told, genuine fear of an air raid, but rather something “more immaterial.” In these
late stages of the Blitz, attacks “no longer came by the full moon.” 412 The vacant state of
the city is thus not a purely practical condition, but on that is in some way metaphysical.
Bowen’s London is haunted not by the concrete possibility of attack, but by a collective
awareness of the city’s ultimate vulnerability, and indeed, ephemerality, in the context of
modern total war.
The characters in “Mysterious Kôr” contemplate the informational lacuna left by
the titular fictional city as a means of reflecting on London’s desertion. Pepita, a young
Londoner, travels with Arthur, a soldier on leave, through the deserted city on their way
back to her small, shared flat. As they walk, Pepita takes in the city, dubbing it
“Mysterious Kôr, and drawing on Arthur Lang’s poem about the city itself:”
- a completely forsaken city, as high as cliffs and as white as bones, with
no history –’
‘But something must once have happened: why had it been
forsaken?
‘How can anyone tell you when there’s nobody there?’413
The emptiness of Kôr both reflects contemporary London and anticipates a future in
which it is destroyed and forgotten. Not death but disappearance preoccupies Bowen’s
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characters – the ultimate ephemerality of both themselves, and the civilization in which
they have lived their entire lives. As a perpetually deserted urban space, Kôr provides
precedent without explanation. London has the potential to become a new Kôr: the blitz
makes this imaginable, but offers no insight into its meaning, or its prevention.
The couple’s discussion about Kôr reflects their respective attitudes toward the
empire and its potential downfall. Arthur, the good and faithful soldier, downplays Kôr’s
implications by attempting to relegate the city to the realm of the fantastic: “the poem
begins with ‘Not’ – ‘Not in the waste beyond the swamps and sand –’ And it goes on, as I
remember, to prove Kôr’s not really anywhere.” The more skeptical Pepita corrects him,
noting that he has omitted subsequent lines. “The world is disenchanted,” she quotes,
adding “That was what set me off hating civilization.”414 But even Pepita leaves out the
more pointed selection that appears at the end of the quoted line. The passage is drawn
from the end of the first stanza. The complete poem includes explicit reference to the
predation of European empires. The stanza concludes “The world is disenchanted; over
soon/Shall Europe send her spies through all the land.” 415 ‘Disenchantment’ is the
crowning imperial achievement, accomplished by the total quantification and
categorization of the world’s contents by the colonizing processes of empire. Pepita
laments the limiting effects imposed by empire: “Every thing and place had been found
and marked on some map; so what wasn’t marked on any map couldn’t be there at all.” 416
Kôr undermines both effects: it exists despite its absence from maps, and it is
unknowable because its history is inaccessible. It thus provides a unique resistance to the
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totality of empire’s civilizing effect. To imaginatively abide in Kôr is to deny the
temporal and epistemological totality of empire. Pepita’s attraction to the city’s emptied
state is thus not an affection for the blitz itself, but the prospect of an existence beyond
the boundaries of empire.
The fantastic remained a vital imaginative force during a period that saw it largely
banished from literary discourse. Much as it offered a position from which to interpret the
events of a war a generation earlier, the fantastic provided recourse to authors who saw
themselves as the unlucky inheritors of overwhelming predecessors. It survived as an
undercurrent, only to resurface. The deluge of fantasy writing in the later part of the
century was in fact the public continuation of a cultural practice that had persisted
privately. As the events of the century continued to undermine the stability with which
Enlightenment-based English culture had constructed itself, the fantastic provided a
cultural outlet for the resulting uncertainty. Thus, the progress of modernity rendered the
fantastic more, not less, relevant. It cushions the lurches and sways of dizzying change
that accompany historical transition. It posits an outside – of localized time, place, and
knowledge – that conjures possibilities beyond the limits of the contingent present. The
conclusion of “Mysterious Kôr” peeks inside Pepita’s dreams, and finds her exploring
these possibilities:
[She] looked this way, that way, down the wide, void, pure streets,
between statues, pillars and shadows, through archways and colonnades.
With [Arthur] she went up the stairs, down which nothing by the moon
came; with him trod the ermine dust of the endless halls, stood on terraces,
mounted the extreme tower, looked down on the statued squares, the wide,
void, pure streets. He was the password, but not the answer; it was to
Kôr’s finality that she turned.417
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In the face of annihilation, it is the possibility of an ‘after’ that draws Pepita. To restore
the fantastic to our understanding of the twentieth century is to recognize and understand
the enduring, haunting allure of Kôr. Moreover, it is to recognize the often
unacknowledged means by which many find the capacity to contemplate the
incomprehensible changes of modernities both old and new.
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